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Abstract 
Objectives. This study aimed to investigate the nature of social anxiety in 
psychosis through comparison with individuals with social anxiety without 
psychosis. Extending the work of Lockett (2011), it explored factors 
associated with both cognitive models of social anxiety (Clark & Wells, 1995; 
Rapee & Heimberg, 1997) and models of social anxiety in psychosis 
(Birchwood et al., 2006; Lockett, 2011).  
Methods. The study employed a quantitative cross-sectional design to 
compare participants with social anxiety and psychosis (SAp group, n = 30) 
with participants with social anxiety and no psychosis (SA group, n = 35) on 
measures of shame, socially anxious cognitions, schemas and paranoia. A 
semi-structured interview elicited images and memories experienced in 
social situations. A self-report measure compared the groups in relation to 
trauma symptoms associated with reported memories.  
Results. Participants in the SAp group experienced significantly higher 
levels of shame, negative self-schemas and PTSD symptoms than 
participants in the SA group. There were no significant differences between 
the groups on measures of socially anxious cognitions, negative other-
schemas and self/other focus of memories. Participants in both groups 
scored highly for paranoia, with the scores for the SAp group being 
significantly higher. When the sample was split based on level of paranoia 
(regardless of psychosis), paranoid participants had significantly higher 
scores for shame, negative self and other schemas, depression and PTSD. 
Data suggested paranoid participants are more likely to experience images 
associated with memories focused on threatening others.  
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Conclusions. The findings suggested two possible pathways to the 
development of social anxiety. Paranoia may differentiate social anxiety as 
part of complex emotional dysfunction from social anxiety as conceptualised 
within existing cognitive models (Clark & Wells, 1995; Rapee & Heimberg, 
1997). A number of limitations are discussed to enable a balanced 
interpretation of the study findings. These included the small sample size; 
characteristics of the participants, particularly the number of students in the 
SA group; and the violation of parametric assumptions in the data for 
depression and negative schemas. Clinical implications are discussed, 
including the need for thorough assessment of paranoia, trauma and shame 
and the importance of the therapeutic relationship and assertive engagement 
of complex clients.  
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Overview 
 A substantial body of research has explored social anxiety (SA), and a 
number of psychological models have been developed that seek to explain 
its development and maintenance (e.g., Clark & Wells, 1995; Rapee & 
Heimberg, 2007). Rates of SA are higher following psychosis than in the 
general population (Pallanti, Quercioli, & Hollander, 2004), and SA in 
psychosis is associated with significant social disability even when psychotic 
symptoms have been successfully treated (Lysaker & Hamersley, 2006; 
Michail & Birchwood, 2009). This thesis seeks to investigate the 
phenomenology of SA in psychosis through comparison with SA in 
individuals without psychosis. It will focus on shame, schemas, cognitions 
and paranoia. The thesis will also explore whether SA in psychosis is 
triggered by different memories from SA in participants without psychosis 
and whether those memories are more likely to be traumatic. Furthering 
understanding in this area may have implications for formulating the SA of 
individuals with psychosis and may add to the empirical basis for the 
development of psychological interventions.   
This chapter will begin by exploring SA, with a focus on cognitive 
models of its maintenance (Clark & Wells, 1995; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997) 
and associated cognitions and beliefs. The application of these models to the 
treatment of SA will then be considered. In the psychosis section, cognitive 
models of symptom development and maintenance (Garety, Kuipers, Fowler, 
Freeman, & Bebbington, 2001; Morrison, 2001) will be explored as well as 
stress-vulnerability models (e.g., Ciompi, 1988; Strauss & Carpenter, 1981) 
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of the development of psychosis. The relationship between cognitive models 
(Clark & Wells, 1995; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997) of SA and cognitive models 
of psychosis (Garety et al., 2001; Morrison, 2001) will be discussed as this is 
important in considering the nature of SA comorbid with psychosis. In order 
to develop an understanding of the range of factors hypothesised to relate to 
SA in psychosis, this introduction will also give an overview of psychological 
theories and research related to shame, and the relationship between 
images, memories and traumatic events as they apply to SA, psychosis and 
SA in psychosis. Research exploring the nature of SA in psychosis will then 
be reviewed before discussing the rationale for the current study, its research 
questions and hypotheses. 
1.2 Social Anxiety Disorder 
 1.2.1 Definition of social anxiety disorder. 
 The terms SA and social phobia have often been used 
interchangeably (e.g., Spurr & Stopa, 2002; Wells, 1997). In order to 
maximise recruitment for the current research, participants were selected 
based on self-reported symptoms or difficulties associated with social 
phobia, but a formal diagnosis was not required. Not all individuals with 
clinically significant anxiety in social situations receive a diagnosis (Bruce & 
Saeed, 1999), but the screening measure used in the current study (Social 
Interaction Anxiety Scale, Mattick & Clarke, 1989) was designed in 
accordance with DSM-III-R criteria for Generalised Social Phobia (American 
Psychiatric Association [APA], 1987). The term SA will be used to describe 
the features associated with the psychological models discussed below and 
with the criteria used to diagnose social phobia.  
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 The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (4th ed., 
text revision, DSM-IV-TR; [APA], 2000) defined social phobia as ‘a marked 
and persistent fear of one or more social or performance situations in which 
the person is exposed to unfamiliar people or to possible scrutiny by others. 
The individual fears that he or she will act in a way (or show anxiety 
symptoms) that will be humiliating or embarrassing’. Diagnostic criteria have 
also required that exposure to the feared situations consistently provokes 
anxiety and that they are either avoided or endured with significant distress; 
the person recognises that the fear is excessive or unreasonable; and that 
there is significant interference with the person's normal routine, 
occupational/academic functioning, or social activities or relationships, or 
there is marked distress about having the phobia (p.456). 
 SA is one of the most common psychiatric disorders. Kessler et al. 
(2005) investigated lifetime prevalence and age-of-onset distributions of 
DSM-IV disorders in the United States.  lifetime prevalence of SA was 
estimated at 12.1%, the second highest prevalence of any anxiety disorder 
(specific phobias were estimated at 12.5%).  The highest rates were 
observed in people under the age of 45 years (Kessler et al., 2005). In a 
study exploring the long-term course of anxiety disorders, Bruce et al. (2005) 
found that, when compared to panic disorder and generalised anxiety 
disorder, SA had the poorest rate of recovery (37%) after 12 years of follow-
up, and medication did not predict recovery. However, only 39% of those 
individuals who did recover had a further episode within the 12 year follow-
up, compared with a recurrence rate of 45% and 57% respectively for 
generalised anxiety disorder and panic disorder. Results indicated that 
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individuals with SA were more likely than patients recovering from other 
anxiety disorders to stay well, which suggested potential benefits for effective 
psychological treatments.  
Bruce and colleagues (2005) explored the impact of comorbid anxiety 
disorders, depression and substance use disorders on recovery from SA, but 
a history of schizophrenia or a current psychotic episode were exclusion 
criteria for the study. Similarly, Kessler and colleagues (2005) did not include 
psychosis in their analyses of comorbidity. In order to compare the nature of 
SA in participants with and without psychosis, it is important to understand 
psychological models that aim to formulate how and why the symptoms 
described in diagnostic criteria for SA develop and are maintained. These 
models of SA are considered below. 
 1.2.2 Psychological models of social anxiety disorder. 
 In order to establish which psychological models of SA are currently 
the most influential in relation to research and treatment models, a search of 
the literature was performed. Full details of the search strategy and results 
can be found in Appendix A.  Clark and Wells’ (1995) cognitive model and 
Rapee and Heimberg’s (1997) cognitive-behavioural model will be 
considered in detail below, being the most influential models in current 
psychological theory. 
 1.2.2.1 Clark and Wells’ (2005) cognitive model of social phobia. 
 Clark and Wells (1995) suggested that individuals with SA hold 
negative beliefs or schemas about themselves and others. In social 
situations, assumptions linked to these beliefs are activated in the form of 
negative predictions regarding their own social performance and others’ 
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propensity to judge negatively. A desire to be judged favourably by others is 
thus combined with beliefs that make this seem unachievable. This leads to 
a perception of threat which manifests as anticipatory worry and negative 
automatic thoughts. Negative automatic thoughts are associated with 
somatic and cognitive symptoms of anxiety which the individual then 
interprets as evidence of failure and social humiliation (Clark & Wells, 1995; 
Wells, 1997).  
 Central to the model is a hypothesised shift in attention such that 
appraisals of danger trigger increased self-observation and self-monitoring 
(Bögels & Mansell, 2004; Spurr & Stopa, 2002; Wells & Papageorgiou, 
1998). The individual then makes inferences regarding how they appear to 
others and how others are evaluating them, and these often take the form of 
an image of the self as it would appear to an observer (Coles, Turk, 
Heimberg, & Fresco, 2001; Hackmann, Surawy, & Clark, 1998; Wells & 
Papageorgiou, 1999). This results in an information processing bias such 
that individuals are unaware of evidence from the environment and others’ 
responses that would enable a more accurate evaluation of the situation 
(Clark & McManus, 2002; Hirsch & Matthews, 2000; Wells & Papageorgiou, 
1998). As the self-image is largely based on interoceptive information 
resulting from heightened physiological anxiety, self-focus confirms the 
individual’s fears of performance failure (Shultz & Heimberg, 2008). In 
addition, Clark and Wells (1995) suggested that an internal focus reduces 
ability to process information relevant to the required social tasks, impacting 
on social performance and making the feared outcomes more likely. It also 
biases post-event processing such that individuals have a distorted 
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perception of their performance, confirming negative schemas and 
increasing sense of threat in future social situations (Brozovich & Heimberg, 
2008; Clark & Wells, 1995; Schultz & Heimberg, 2008). 
 Clark and Wells (1995) suggested that symptoms of SA are 
maintained by safety behaviours which are attempts to avoid negative 
evaluation either by concealing perceived inadequacies and symptoms of 
anxiety or by avoiding attention. These behaviours maintain SA by increasing 
self-focused attention and somatic symptoms, drawing attention to the self, 
and impacting negatively on social performance (Wells et al., 1995). If the 
social situation is avoided completely, the individual is prevented from 
experiencing opportunities which may disconfirm negative beliefs. A 
schematic representation of the model is shown in Figure 1.1.   
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Figure 1.1 
Clark and Wells’ (1995) Model of Social Phobia 
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 1.2.2.2 Rapee and Heimberg’s (1997) cognitive-behavioural model 
 of social phobia.  
 Rapee and Heimberg (1997) conceptualised the key threat in SA as 
the perception of an audience. Evaluation by others is seen to be threatening 
because individuals with SA have a desire to be appraised positively but 
assume that others are inherently critical (Leary, 2001). Similarly to Clark 
and Wells (1995), Rapee and Heimberg suggested that individuals form a 
mental representation of their own appearance and behaviour as it would be 
seen by an audience. Their attention is then focused both on this 
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representation and on monitoring of the social environment for perceived 
threat in the form of negative evaluation (Heinrichs & Hofmann, 2001). This 
is in keeping with evolutionary models which have highlighted the role of 
threat detection in self-protection (Öhman, 1986; Trower & Gilbert, 1989). As 
such, the individual constructs a perception of their own performance and the 
reactions of others and compares this against the critical standards assumed 
to be employed by the audience. The discrepancy between the perceived 
standard and the perceived appraisal determines the prediction of negative 
evaluation and associated consequences (Alden, Bieling, & Wallace, 1994; 
Hoffman, 2007). This results in physiological, cognitive, and behavioural 
manifestations of anxiety which feed back into the representation of the self. 
A schematic representation of the model is shown in Figure 1.2.   
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Figure 1.2 
Rapee & Heimberg’s (1997) Cognitive-Behavioural Model of Social Phobia 
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 Rapee and Heimberg (1997) clarified that the proposed mental 
representation of the self is not likely to be experienced as a static 
‘photograph’ but is a distorted amalgamation of information stored in long-
term memory (based on actual images of the self, feedback from others, and 
previous experiences) which is then continually modified based on internal 
cues processed through self-monitoring of behaviour and physiological 
symptoms of anxiety and external cues from the ‘audience’. Such cues are 
likely to be subject to a negative processing bias, feeding back into a 
distorted self-image (Heimberg & Becker, 2002; Roth & Heimberg, 2001; 
Turk, Lerner, Heimberg, & Rapee, 2001). 
 Both Clark and Wells (1995) and Rapee and Heimberg’s (1997) 
cognitive models agreed that pre-existing negative beliefs about the self and 
others are important in the initial detection of social threat, in informing the 
construction of the self-image, evaluating this image against the perception 
of the standards of others and predicting the consequences of their 
perceived inadequacy. The role of cognitions and beliefs in the development 
and maintenance of SA will be briefly considered in the next section. 
 1.2.3 Research and theory exploring cognitions and beliefs in 
 social anxiety disorder. 
 In the Clark and Wells (1995) model, dysfunctional beliefs and 
assumptions lead to a vulnerability to SA and are activated by social 
situations. Beck and colleagues (Beck, 1967; Beck & Clark, 1997; Beck & 
Emery, 1985) suggested that dysfunctional assumptions impact on the 
person’s behaviour and interpretations such that their underlying negative 
core beliefs or schemas appear to be confirmed.  Wells and Clark (1997) 
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suggested that schemas may influence the pattern of onset of SA such that 
negative self and other beliefs linked to childhood experiences may be 
related to the earlier emergence of SA. Conditional assumptions related to 
rules for social behaviour may trigger SA in a previously high-functioning 
individual when there is a perceived failure to meet their own standards.  
 The role of pre-existing core beliefs or schemas in SA has been 
supported by research evidence. Pinto-Gouveia, Castilho, Galhardo, and 
Cunha (2006) found that participants with SA were more likely to endorse 
personal failure schemas than those with other anxiety disorders and non-
clinical participants. In addition, Wenzel (2004) asked socially anxious and 
non-clinical participants to create scripts for social and evaluative scenarios. 
SA participants created scripts that were more negative in tone and more 
closely linked to anxiety. Wenzel suggested that this is reflective of 
underlying maladaptive schemas, but there was no direct assessment of 
participants’ beliefs and the sample size was insufficient to determine 
whether there were significant differences between the groups. However, a 
study by Coles et al. (2001) suggested support for the role of a relationship 
between negative schemas and SA. They found that the attributions of 
socially anxious participants regarding their performance and nervousness 
became more internal, stable and global as the level of anxiety provoked by 
the situation increased. Non-socially anxious participants showed the 
opposite pattern – i.e. they attributed negative outcomes externally in high-
anxiety situations. The findings of Wilson and Rapee (2006) suggested 
further support for the role of negative self-beliefs. They found that SA was 
associated with lower positive belief and higher negative belief ratings of own 
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personality characteristics. However, the relationship with higher negative 
belief ratings did not remain significant when controlling for depression, 
which suggested that negative self-beliefs may convey a vulnerability to 
more general psychopathology rather than being specific to SA. Wilson and 
Rapee also found that socially anxious participants displayed greater 
uncertainty in their self-ratings. They suggested that this may contribute to 
socially anxious individuals placing importance on the evaluations of others, 
heightening fears of negative evaluation. 
Fear of negative evaluation has been suggested to be the central 
focus of negative automatic thoughts maintaining SA and linked to the 
underlying beliefs and assumptions discussed above (Clark & Wells, 1995; 
Rapee & Heimberg, 1997). The fear of negative evaluation has been found 
to be associated with greater striving for approval from others (Leary, 1983a; 
Watson & Friend, 1969) and avoidance of potentially threatening social 
comparison (Friend & Gilbert, 1973) and has been shown to be related to SA 
(Leary, 1983b; Watson & Friend, 1969). As such, measures of the fear of 
negative evaluation have often been used to assess SA (Leary, 1983a; 
Watson and Friend, 1969). In addition to cognitions associated with fear of 
negative evaluation, there has been some support for the role of paranoid 
cognitions in SA. This will be briefly discussed below, as these beliefs are a 
factor of interest in the current research. 
1.2.4 Paranoid beliefs and social anxiety. 
There is evidence for the role of paranoid beliefs in SA in the non-
psychotic population. Martin and Penn (2001) found that higher levels of 
paranoid ideation were associated with depression, SA and avoidance, fear 
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of negative evaluation, self-monitoring and lower self-esteem in a non-clinical 
sample. However, it is not possible to establish whether SA in this sample 
developed as a result of paranoid beliefs, or whether paranoid beliefs were 
formed in the context of SA and avoidance. 
Research has found that paranoid thoughts are relatively common in 
the general population (e.g., Freeman, 2007; Green et al., 2008), and it has 
been suggested that both paranoia and SA develop in the context of 
dysfunctional beliefs (Fowler et al., 2006; Pinto-Gouveia et al., 2006) and 
common anxious thoughts related to fear of rejection and negative evaluation 
(Freeman et al., 2005a, 2005b). 
Freeman and colleagues (2005a, 2005b) suggested that SA occurs at 
the lower levels of a hierarchy of social-evaluative concerns with paranoid 
delusions at the highest level. However, other studies have found that SA is 
not always related to paranoid beliefs (Freeman et al., 2008; Michail & 
Birchwood, 2009), and this issue warrants further investigation. The nature of 
paranoia will be considered further in the psychosis section (see section 
1.3.4). This chapter will now give an overview of psychological interventions 
for SA as the relevance of these approaches to SA in psychosis will need to 
be evaluated based on the extent to which cognitive models of SA (Clark & 
Wells, 1995; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997) prove useful in formulating SA in 
individuals with psychosis. The current research aims to contribute to the 
empirical foundations of this issue. 
1.2.5 Psychological interventions for social anxiety disorder. 
 Psychological models of SA (Clark & Wells, 1995; Rapee & Heimberg, 
1997) suggest that therapeutic interventions should target information 
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processing biases, behavioural responses that maintain anxiety, 
management of physiological symptoms of anxiety, and negative beliefs 
about the self and others. Specifically, Hoffman and Otto (2008) suggested 
that CBT should address high social standards, negative self-perception, 
self-focused attention, high estimated probability and cost of negative social 
consequences, and perceived poor social skills. To this end, therapeutic 
interventions have largely focused on exposure, cognitive restructuring, 
relaxation, and social skills training (Heimberg, 2002). 
 Research trials and meta-analyses have suggested that CBT is 
effective in the treatment of SA. For example, Clark and colleagues (2003) 
found that cognitive therapy for SA was more effective than medication 
alone, and McEvoy and Perini (2009) found significant improvements in SA 
with group CBT. Overall, the outcomes of meta-analyses (Federoff & Taylor, 
2001; Feske & Chambless, 1995; Gould, Buckminster, Pollack, Otto, & Yap, 
1997; Taylor, 1996) have suggested that both exposure and exposure 
combined with cognitive restructuring reduce symptoms of SA but that the 
addition of cognitive restructuring does not improve outcomes. However, 
social skills training and cognitive restructuring alone have also yielded 
positive results, as did relaxation techniques (Federoff & Taylor, 2001). All 
variations of CBT were found to be more effective than no treatment. Taylor 
(1996) reviewed studies comparing CBT with a placebo and found that only 
exposure combined with cognitive restructuring was more effective.  
 Despite seemingly positive outcomes for CBT for SA, Clark and 
colleagues (2003) highlighted that a significant number fail to benefit from 
treatment. Beck (2005a) and Wells and McMillan (2004) emphasised the 
27 
 
importance of understanding underlying cognitive factors maintaining an 
individual’s SA, and interventions that are explicitly based on cognitive 
models (e.g., Clark & Wells, 1995) have been shown to be effective in 
previously treatment-resistant patients (Bates & Clark, 2002; Bowers & 
Yates, 1992). A treatment protocol derived from Clark and Wells’ model 
(Clark and Wells, 1995; Wells, 1997) produced larger treatment effects in a 
single-case series than previous studies of CBT for SA (Wells and 
Papageorgiou, 2001). A subsequent randomised controlled trial found the 
treatment to be more effective than either a placebo or fluoxetine combined 
with exposure therapy (Clark et al., 2003). This suggested that CBT 
incorporating all aspects of the cognitive model is superior to a purely 
behavioural intervention and the most commonly used pharmacological 
treatment for SA (Wells & McMillan, 2004). 
 More recent studies have aimed to evaluate the efficacy of individual 
techniques in targeting aspects of the Clark and Wells (1995) model. 
McManus and colleagues (2009) evaluated the effect of an initial session 
constructing a collaborative formulation based on the Clark and Wells model 
followed by two single sessions involving behavioural experiments aiming to 
demonstrate the model. The first behavioural experiment involved 
comparison of self-rated anxiety and performance when participants focused 
on themselves and used safety behaviours versus an external focus and no 
safety behaviours condition. The second behavioural experiment involved 
video feedback and comparison of predicted self-ratings with how 
participants actually appeared in a social interaction. Results suggested that 
both experiments reduced symptoms of SA. 
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 1.2.6 Summary.  
 The social anxiety disorder section gave an overview of SA and 
discussed the two most currently influential psychological models. It also 
explored research and theory on cognitions and beliefs in SA and how this 
relates to cognitive models of the disorder (Clark & Wells, 1995; Rapee & 
Heimberg, 1997). The core aspects of SA were identified as negative self 
and other beliefs which are activated by social situations, leading to cognitive 
biases; negative automatic thoughts; safety behaviours and avoidance; and 
an observer perspective negative self-image.  
 Both Clark and Wells (1995) and Rapee and Heimberg (1997) 
highlighted the role of feared negative evaluation in SA. This is based on a 
desire to be judged favourably and a perception of one’s own poor 
performance and others’ tendency to judge critically. Both models suggested 
that the perception of social threat leads to information processing biases 
which confirm existing negative beliefs about the self and others and impact 
on evaluation of threat in the current situation.  
 There is a discrepancy between the models regarding whether 
negative self-images develop wholly as the result of an increase in self-
focused attention (Clark & Wells, 1995) or whether they are the product of 
increased attention to both internal and external threat (Rapee & Heimberg, 
1997). According to the latter model, the individual with SA is hypervigilant to 
external threat cues and will monitor the reactions of others and is likely to 
interpret these in a way that confirms fears of negative evaluation. This 
suggested that attentional biases are directed to both perceived internal and 
external threats. In the Clark and Wells model, the allocation of attentional 
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resources to processing of the self as a social object prevents observation of 
actual responses from others such that individuals with SA assume that 
others see them as they see themselves in the image. In either case, the 
self-image is likely to be distorted and appear to confirm beliefs about 
personal failure and the likelihood of negative evaluation from others.   
This section also explored the role of beliefs in SA in relation to 
paranoia and then examined evidence on the efficacy of psychological 
interventions for SA and the implications of cognitive models (e.g., Clark & 
Wells, 1995) for treatment protocols. Research has suggested that treatment 
for SA is most effective when it explicitly targets aspects of the Clark and 
Wells (1995) model. Recent cognitive behavioural interventions that have 
specifically addressed the negative observer-focused self-image central to 
both the Clark and Wells and Rapee and Heimberg (1997) models will be 
considered in section 1.5.4.  
 This chapter will now consider the nature of psychosis, since this is 
also a focus of the thesis. It will explore psychological theories of the 
development and maintenance of psychotic disorders, and the role of 
cognitions and beliefs in psychosis. The relationship between cognitive 
models (Clark & Wells, 1995; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997) of SA and theories 
of psychosis will also be discussed in preparation for consideration of the 
nature of SA in psychosis. 
1.3 Psychosis 
 1.3.1 Definition of psychosis. 
 ‘Psychosis’ does not refer to a distinct diagnostic category but rather a 
range of disorders defined by symptoms such as delusions and 
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hallucinations which involve some degree of loss of contact with reality 
(Huang et al., 2006). Such symptoms are likely to cause distress and impact 
on everyday functioning as well as resulting in social withdrawal (Bentall, 
2003). The Office for National Statistics (2000) estimated that 1/200 people 
in the UK have experienced a psychotic episode in the last year. The 
estimate for diagnosis of a psychotic disorder (historical or recent) was 1.1%. 
 Psychosis has been conceptualised in a number of ways. The 
psychiatric literature has tended to take a diagnostic approach and identify 
specific disorders such as schizophrenia as defined by ICD-10 (World Health 
Organization, 1992) and DSM-IV (APA, 1994) which described symptoms as 
a deviation from the person’s normal behaviour. Alternative approaches have 
focused on the understanding of specific symptoms – for example by 
exploring biological or neurodevelopmental mechanisms that may be 
implemented in their development or by considering the psychological factors 
underpinning unusual experiences. The following sections will consider 
theoretical approaches to understanding the development of psychosis 
followed by an exploration of psychological models and theories that seek to 
explain psychotic symptoms, including paranoid beliefs. The role of 
cognitions and beliefs in the development and maintenance of the 
experience of psychosis will subsequently be discussed, followed by an 
appraisal of the relationship between psychological theories of psychosis and 
cognitive models of SA (Clark & Wells, 1995; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997). 
 1.3.2 Theories of the development of psychosis. 
 Research has suggested that the development of psychosis is best 
accounted for by an interaction between an underlying vulnerability to 
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developing a psychotic disorder and environmental factors that cause 
increased stress (French and Morrison, 2004). Fowler, Garety and Kuipers 
(1995) suggested that vulnerability-stress models allow for a flexible 
conceptualisation of psychosis in that they encompass the possibility of 
biological influences on the development and experience of psychotic 
symptoms whilst emphasising the importance of psychological and social 
factors on outcomes.  
A number of researchers have proposed specific vulnerability-stress 
models (e.g., Ciompi, 1988; Neuchterlein & Dawson, 1984; Perris, 1989; 
Strauss & Carpenter, 1981; Zubin & Spring, 1977) with variation in the 
emphasis placed on biological dysfunction in understanding individual levels 
of vulnerability. Neuchterlein (1987) suggested a neurobiological approach 
and proposed possible markers of vulnerability such as social skills deficits, 
schizotypal personality characteristics, cognitive-neuropsychological deficits, 
neurological impairment, and lack of stability in autonomic nervous system 
response that represent manifestations of neurobiological dysfunction. 
However, others have suggested that psychological and environmental 
factors can confer vulnerability as well as acting as stressors that may trigger 
and maintain a psychotic episode (Ciompi, 1988; Perris, 1989). 
There has been evidence to suggest that schizotypal symptoms are 
indicative of an underlying genetic or biological vulnerability (Grove et al., 
1991; Meehl, 1990). Schizotypal symptoms have been found to broadly 
relate to the underlying dimensions of schizophrenia (Bentall, Claridge, & 
Slade, 1989). Symptoms include unusual perceptual experiences, beliefs, 
and behaviour; SA; anhedonia; and cognitive disorganisation (Claridge et al., 
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1996). In schizotypy, these symptoms exist at a lower level and/or are 
associated with lower levels of distress and interference in functioning than 
the symptoms of a psychotic episode. Continuum hypotheses (e.g., Strauss, 
1969) have suggested that psychotic symptoms are on a continuum with 
normal processes. Individuals with higher levels of schizotypal symptoms 
may be at increased risk of developing psychosis such that lower level 
stressors would be more likely to trigger the onset of symptoms.   
Yung et al. (1998) defined criteria for individuals at risk of developing 
psychosis as having either a first-degree relative with a psychotic disorder, or 
a diagnosis of schizotypal personality disorder and a recent deterioration in 
functioning. French and Morrison (2004) argued that, although the chances 
of developing schizophrenia increase with genetic proximity to a person with 
this diagnosis, 37% of people with schizophrenia do not have a first or 
second degree relative with the disorder (Gottesman & Erlenmeyer-Kimling, 
2001). In addition, although there has been evidence to suggest the role of 
cognitive and neurobiological deficits (e.g., Chua & McKenna, 1995; Nelson, 
Pantelis, Barnes, Thrasher, & Bodger, 1994) and dopamine dysregulation 
(e.g., Kapur, 2003; Reith et al., 1994) in conferring vulnerability, there has 
been little evidence to suggest the implication of a specific abnormality that 
underlies the range of experiences associated with psychosis (Fowler et al., 
1995). As such, the role of factors which can trigger psychosis may give a 
greater insight into an individual’s difficulties and are at least as important as 
vulnerability factors.  
Factors that precipitate the onset of an acute psychotic episode are 
also likely to be factors that maintain emotional disturbance and 
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dysfunctional appraisals. As such, stressors that act as triggers may also be 
involved in the maintenance and outcome of a psychotic disorder (Fowler et 
al., 1995; Strauss & Carpenter, 1981). These may be biological factors such 
as drug use, or psychological factors such as major life events, 
characteristics of relationships with significant others, or existential conflicts 
(Fowler et al., 1995; Warner, 1985). Additional factors that may affect the 
course of psychosis following the onset of symptoms include those that 
influence the impact of the psychotic episode on self-worth such as stigma 
from others and internalised self-stigma, as well as social and environmental 
factors which may support or inhibit recovery, and motivation to manage the 
disorder (Fowler et al., 1995). 
 The advantage of stress-vulnerability frameworks is their adaptability 
to incorporating new research into neurodevelopmental, genetic, biological 
and cognitive factors that may be implicated in the development of 
psychosis. For example, studies which have explored the role of specific 
genes (reviewed by Harrison & Owen, 2003) in the development of 
schizophrenia are concordant with a stress-vulnerability approach. The 
development of the evidence base on vulnerability factors has enhanced the 
existing frameworks which have also placed importance on environmental 
factors in triggering a psychotic episode.  
 A weakness of the stress-vulnerability approach has been that a 
broad view of psychosis as a syndrome has been taken and has offered little 
to explain the specific experiences that an individual may be faced with 
during a psychotic episode. Fowler et al. (1995) suggested that alternative 
approaches focused on the problems of people with psychosis are more 
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likely to lead to effective treatments.  A psychological understanding of both 
psychosis and SA is important in the development of hypotheses relating to 
the nature of SA comorbid with psychosis and to the development of 
theoretically driven interventions. Psychological approaches to 
understanding the development and maintenance of psychotic symptoms will 
therefore be considered below.  
 1.3.3 Psychological models and theories of psychotic 
symptoms. 
 Research into the nature of psychotic symptoms has generally 
supported categorisation into positive, negative and disorganised symptoms 
(Arndt, Allinger, & Andreasen, 1991; Peralta, de Leon, & Cuesta, 1992; 
Strauss, Carpenter, & Bartko, 1974). It has been suggested that correlations 
between disorganised symptoms (such as disordered speech and thought) 
and neuropsychological test results are a reflection of underlying cognitive 
dysfunction (Basso, Nasrallah, Olson, & Bornstein, 1998). Research has 
tended to focus predominantly on positive symptoms with a smaller body of 
literature related to negative symptoms. Positive symptoms have been 
conceptualised as ‘productive’ in that they reflect the presence of something 
which would not be experienced in the absence of psychosis (e.g., delusions 
and hallucinations), whereas negative symptoms have been conceptualised 
as ‘deficits’ or the absence/reduction of ‘normal’ abilities or affect (e.g., 
blunted affect and social withdrawal) (Kay, Opler, & Lindenmayer, 1988). 
Theories of the negative symptoms of psychosis such as anhedonia and 
poverty of speech have generally postulated a biological basis (e.g., 
Buchanan, Carpenter, Kirkpatrick, Bryant, & Bustillo, 1995).  Purely 
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neurobiological and neurocognitive accounts have been challenged by some 
researchers (for a review, see Rector, Beck, & Stolar, 2005). However, 
psychological factors involved in the maintenance of negative symptoms 
have received less research attention than psychological models of positive 
symptoms. Beck, Rector, Stolar, and Grant (2009) sought to address this 
and proposed a conceptualisation of the maintenance of negative symptoms 
that incorporated psychological factors such as beliefs and expectations 
related to own performance and social interactions. Beck, Grant, Huh, 
Perivoliotis, and Chang (2011) explored these dysfunctional attitudes and 
expectancies in relation to deficit syndrome – a presentation of schizophrenia 
in which negative symptoms are primary and enduring (Carpenter, Heinrichs, 
& Wagman, 1988). They suggested a continuum in relation to negative 
symptoms and found that participants with deficit syndrome endorsed 
defeatist and asocial beliefs to a greater degree and showed greater 
impairment in emotion recognition and poorer insight than nondeficit 
participants with negative symptoms. They proposed that asocial beliefs and 
poor emotion recognition lead to reduced fear of negative evaluation, 
providing insulation against the impact of stigma and protecting self-esteem. 
Such beliefs also lead to social indifference and withdrawal and poorer 
functional outcomes, reinforcing negative expectations and maintaining 
negative symptoms. Beck and colleagues’ findings suggested that the factors 
in this cycle were more pronounced in deficit syndrome participants, but 
previous research has suggested that defeatist beliefs about performance, 
asocial beliefs, and negative expectancies regarding satisfaction were 
associated with negative symptoms in general samples of participants on the 
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schizophrenia spectrum (Gard, Kring, Gard, Horan, & Green, 2007; Grant & 
Beck, 2009, 2010). This relationship was supported by Grant, Huh, 
Perivoliotis, Stolar, and Beck’s (2012) finding that participants with negative 
symptoms showed greater reduction in avolition-apathy and greater 
improvement in functioning following cognitive therapy targeting self-
defeating and dysfunctional beliefs than participants who received standard 
treatment. This chapter will now focus on psychological models of positive 
symptoms. 
 1.3.3.1  Models of positive symptoms. 
There are a number of approaches to understanding the nature of the 
positive symptoms of psychosis. These have included theories related to 
cognitive neuropsychological deficits and brain dysfunction. For example 
Frith (1987, 1992) proposed a cognitive-neuropsychological model that 
suggested a cognitive deficit leads to difficulties with self-monitoring such 
that a person’s own actions seem to be the result of external stimuli, resulting 
in experiences of passivity and auditory hallucinations. He suggested that 
dopamine dysregulation may be an underlying factor in this deficit, providing 
a link with theories of the development of psychosis. Other theorists have 
also sought to explain positive symptoms as the result of cognitive deficits or 
brain dysfunction (e.g., Gray et al., 1990; Hemsley, 1993).  However, Fowler 
and colleagues (1995) argued that the symptomatic expression of any 
biological pathology as well as symptom maintenance will also depend on 
social and psychological factors and that such factors are of primary 
importance in an individual’s experience of psychosis. As these are the 
factors and processes likely to be amenable to therapeutic interventions and 
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to offer the opportunity of developing a collaborative understanding of the 
lived experience of psychotic symptoms, psychological models will form the 
focus of this section. The predominant models in the literature have been 
based on cognitive theory, which allows for comparison with cognitive 
models of SA (Clark & Wells, 1995; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997). 
Earlier cognitive theories have focused on the role of cognitive 
processes in specific symptoms. For example, Chadwick and Birchwood 
(1994) used the cognitive model to explain auditory hallucinations and 
suggested that it is beliefs about voices that predict distress and problematic 
behaviour rather than the nature or content of the voices themselves. French 
and Morrison (2004) argued for the application of more comprehensive 
models which can account for the range of factors involved in the onset, 
development and maintenance of both delusions and hallucinations. In order 
to be therapeutically useful, such models need to account for the role of 
emotion and how the individual makes sense of their experiences. Such an 
approach has been offered by Garety et al. (2001) and Morrison (2001). 
These cognitive models are considered below.   
 1.3.3.1.1  Garety, Kuipers, Fowler, Freeman, and Bebbington’s (2001) 
cognitive model of the positive symptoms of psychosis. 
 Garety and colleagues (2001) suggested that there are two routes via 
which the positive symptoms of psychosis may develop. They postulated that 
the most common route is related to both cognitive and affective changes. 
However, they suggested that a minority of individuals with psychosis 
experience delusions in the absence of other positive symptoms as a result 
of triggering events that cause disturbed affect without any disruption in 
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information processing. The changes in affect are sufficient to activate 
biased appraisal processes and maladaptive schemas resulting in delusional 
interpretations of the triggering event or the emotional response. As both 
cognitive and affective changes are suggested to be implicated in the 
majority of cases of positives symptoms, this primary route will be in 
considered in more detail. Although Garety and colleagues’ (2001) model 
focused on symptom onset and maintenance, their conceptualisation is 
compatible with stress-vulnerability models (e.g., Ciompi, 1988; Strauss & 
Carpenter, 1981) as they suggested a predisposition towards developing 
psychosis makes the individual vulnerable to a disruption in cognitive 
processes following stressful or traumatic events (Garety & Hemsley, 1994). 
Drawing on neurocognitive theories of psychosis (Frith, 1992; Hemsley, 
1993), the model suggested there is a disruption in the individual’s ability to 
recognise their own intentions to act such that self-generated cognitions and 
actions feel external and threatening and are experienced as anomalous 
(Garety et al., 2001). 
 Garety and colleagues (2001) stressed that anomalous experiences 
alone do not denote the onset of psychosis. The development of psychosis 
depends on the individual appraising these experiences as having an 
external cause and being personally significant. As such, an individual who 
experiences hallucinations but is able to reject external appraisals in favour 
of appraisals relating to their own cognitive processes or emotional state 
would not be considered psychotic.   
 A number of factors have been thought to contribute to individuals 
with psychosis developing delusions and hallucinations as a result of 
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anomalous experiences. Emotional changes that occur as a result of the 
triggering event and the unusual experiences feed back into the nature of the 
experiences themselves – for example by impacting on the content of voices. 
This in turn can make the experiences seem more threatening or distressing, 
causing a feedback loop. Experiences that are both unusual and associated 
with high levels of emotion trigger a search for meaning (Maher, 1988). 
When combined with cognitive biases thought to be common in individuals 
with psychosis (Garety and Freeman, 1999) and exacerbated by negative 
emotions, this search for meaning leads to a delusional explanation (Garety 
et al., 2001).  
Garety et al. (2001) also suggested that social isolation means that 
individuals with psychosis do not have the normalising experience of being 
offered alternative explanations to their appraisals (White, Bebbington, 
Pearson, Johnson, & Ellis, 2000). They outlined a number of other factors 
which further contribute to the maintenance of psychotic appraisals to explain 
why they are not corrected in the absence of evidence. The biased reasoning 
processes hypothesised to contribute to symptom development are also 
likely to contribute to their maintenance. For example, a ‘jumping to 
conclusions’ data gathering bias may cause an individual to select an 
explanation for their experiences based on a lower level of evidence. This 
reasoning bias is likely to be stronger in the face of emotive and self-referent 
material, meaning that the appraisal may be maintained in the face of very 
limited evidence that seems to fit with the initial interpretation (Garety & 
Freeman, 1999). 
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In addition, Garety and colleagues’ (2001) model suggested that 
dysfunctional schemas, adverse social environments, and emotional distress 
contribute to the maintenance of positive symptoms. Beliefs about the self 
and others have been shown to influence the content of delusions and 
hallucinations and the tenacity with which psychotic beliefs are held. In turn, 
distressing hallucinations and delusions are likely to be seen as confirmation 
of negative beliefs. Garety and colleagues suggested that these beliefs are 
often the consequence of aversive social environments and/or traumatic 
experiences. The role of beliefs and cognitions in psychosis is considered in 
more detail in section 1.3.5, and the relationship between trauma and 
psychosis is explored in section 1.5.3.  
Emotional distress in the form of depression may contribute to the 
maintenance of psychotic symptoms and has been associated with poorer 
outcomes (Aguilar et al., 1997; Birchwood & Iqbal, 1998). In addition, Garety 
et al. (2001) highlighted the similarities between processes maintaining 
anxiety disorders and factors associated with the maintenance of psychosis. 
Both anxiety and psychosis have been associated with biases in information 
processing involving hypervigilance to perceived threat, safety behaviours 
that prevent experiences or evidence gathering that would disconfirm beliefs, 
and metacognitive beliefs regarding the meaning of anxious thoughts or 
psychotic appraisals. These processes interact with existing beliefs and drive 
a search for meaning that is consistent with beliefs and emotions, increasing 
distress and maintaining dysfunctional appraisals (Garety et al., 2001).   
The final part of Garety and colleagues’ (2001) model is the 
secondary appraisal or how the experience of psychosis is perceived by the 
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individual. Insight is likely to affect the way that symptoms are addressed and 
engagement with treatment. An appraisal of psychosis itself as shameful or 
stigmatising may influence the development of concurrent or post-psychotic 
emotional disorders (Birchwood & Iqbal, 1998; Birchwood, Iqbal, Chadwick, 
& Trower, 2000; Iqbal, Birchwood, Chadwick, & Trower, 2000), feeding back 
into maintenance of the disorder. 
 1.3.3.1.2  Morrison’s (2001) cognitive model of psychosis. 
 Morrison’s (2001) cognitive model of psychosis is similar to that 
proposed by Garety and colleagues’ (2001) in that the interpretation of 
unusual experiences is seen as key to the development of psychosis. The 
model was developed to account for the difficulties of individuals at high risk 
of developing psychosis as well as those experiencing a psychotic episode. 
As such, it considered factors implicated in whether unusual experiences 
develop into acute psychosis as well as emotional difficulties associated with 
both psychosis and at risk mental states. 
 Morrison (2001) suggested that the processes involved in the 
development of psychosis are similar to those involved in the development of 
non-psychotic disorders and drew parallels with models of anxiety disorders. 
Specifically, Morrison conceptualised delusions and hallucinations as 
intrusions into awareness that could be understood within similar explanatory 
frameworks to those used to formulate intrusions in anxiety disorders (such 
as obsessional thoughts in OCD and intrusions into awareness of body state 
information in panic disorder and hypochondriasis). Cognitive models of 
anxiety disorders (e.g., Clark, 1986; Salkovskis, 1985; Warwick & Salkovskis, 
1990) have hypothesised that it is the misinterpretation of such intrusions 
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that differentiates clinical groups from the normal population and causes 
distress. These misinterpretations are then maintained by safety behaviours 
that prevent disconfirmation of threat. Similarly, epidemiological studies have 
supported Strauss’ (1969) hypothesis that psychotic symptoms are on a 
continuum with normal processes and that phenomena such as hearing 
voices and endorsing delusional ideas are common in the general population 
(e.g., Slade & Bentall, 1988; Tien, 1991; van Os, Hanssen, Bijl, & Ravelli, 
2000). However, it is the appraisal of these experiences that determines 
emotional response and associated use of safety behaviours and attempts to 
control such intrusions (Morrison, 2001). Peters, Joseph, and Garety (1999) 
compared the beliefs of delusional patients with those of the general 
population and found that it was conviction, distress and preoccupation 
rather than thought content that differentiated the groups. Evidence has 
suggested that symptom distress is associated with counterproductive 
attempts to control thoughts and safety behaviours designed to prevent 
feared outcomes which, in practice, serve to prevent disconfirmation of 
beliefs (Freeman & Garety, 1999; Morrison, 1998). Central to the experience 
of psychosis is that the interpretation of intrusions is deemed culturally 
unacceptable.  
 Morrison (2001) drew further parallels with anxiety disorders when he 
considered the development of unusual experiences and the maintenance of 
psychotic appraisals. Drawing on Wells and Matthews’ (1994) Self-
Regulatory Executive Function (S-REF) model of emotional dysfunction, 
Morrison’s model suggested that vulnerability to psychosis and its 
subsequent maintenance are associated with beliefs about the self, others 
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and the world (declarative beliefs); procedural beliefs that direct selective 
attention, memory retrieval, appraisal and metacognitive processing; and 
positive and negative beliefs about unusual experiences (for example 
determining whether someone engages with a voice or attempts to suppress 
it). Emotional experiences and physiological arousal have also been shown 
to influence the frequency and interpretation of unusual experiences (Garety 
& Hemsley, 1994; Gumley, White, & Power, 1999). The model also 
suggested that early experiences and current environmental influences 
contribute to the development of dysfunctional beliefs and the nature of 
interpretations of intrusions as well as the content and frequency of 
anomalous experiences (Morrison, 2001). A schematic representation of 
Morrison’s model is shown in Figure 1.3. 
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Figure 1.3 
 
Morrison’s (2001) Cognitive Model of Psychosis 
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 Morrison’s (2001) approach drawing on models of anxiety disorders 
may be particularly useful in considering the specific symptom of paranoia. 
Although paranoid beliefs have been found in the general population (see 
section 1.2.4), they are particularly common as a feature of psychosis 
(Cutting, 1997). The following section will give an overview of psychological 
theory in this area, as the role of paranoia in SA in psychosis is of interest in 
the current study. 
1.3.4 Paranoia. 
Following his cognitive-neuropsychological model of hallucinations 
(see section 1.3.3.1), Frith (1992) went on to suggest that paranoid delusions 
may result from deficits in cognitive processes related to understanding 
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social interactions and developing theory of mind, resulting in confusion over 
the actions and intentions of others. Alternative approaches to understanding 
paranoia have incorporated cognitive processes with theories related to 
social and psychological factors. Bentall, Kinderman, and Kaney (1994) 
developed a model of persecutory delusions which suggested that attentional 
biases towards threat-related stimuli activate discrepancies between actual 
and ideal self, leading to delusional explanations that locate the source of the 
discrepancy within other people, allowing maintenance of a positive self-
concept and protecting self-esteem. 
Contrary to Bentall and colleagues’ (1994) model, later research 
suggested considerable variation in self-esteem amongst individuals with 
persecutory delusions (Garety & Freeman, 1999). As such, Trower and 
Chadwick (1995) suggested that there may be two types of paranoia – ‘poor 
me’ paranoia related to seeing oneself as a victim and attributing negative 
events to other people; and ‘bad me’ paranoia related to seeing oneself as 
‘bad’ and expecting to be punished by others. 
Bentall et al. (1994) and Trower and Chadwick (1995) have provided 
conceptualisations of paranoid beliefs as functional in terms of providing an 
explanation for negative events and/or counteracting negative beliefs. 
Similarly, Freeman, Garety, Kuipers, Fowler, and Bebbington (2002) cited 
evidence that the content of delusions tends to reflect existing beliefs about 
the self, others and the world and that lower self-esteem is associated with 
more self-diminishing delusions (Bowins & Shugar, 1998; Freeman et al., 
2002). They developed an alternative framework which applied the cognitive 
model of the positive symptoms of psychosis (Garety et al., 2001) to the 
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specific symptom of persecutory delusions. Freeman and colleagues 
hypothesised that persecutory delusions are threat beliefs, and this 
application of the model placed greater emphasis on processes associated 
with anxiety. They suggested that individuals with paranoia are likely to have 
high premorbid anxiety and depression that interacts with a precipitating 
stressor and vulnerability to psychosis to cause anomalous experiences, 
cognitive biases and a search for meaning. Anxiety associated with 
impending threat or danger influences the explanation chosen for distressing 
experiences – i.e. a persecutory delusion. Drawing on Birchwood (1995), 
Freeman and colleagues also suggested that beliefs about mental illness 
may lead to the selection of a persecutory belief rather than the more 
distressing belief that the person is going ‘mad’. Social isolation and lack of 
cognitive flexibility also make it more likely that delusional beliefs will go 
unchallenged (Freeman et al., 2002; Garety et al., 1997). According to the 
model, persecutory delusions are further maintained by cognitive biases and 
social interactions that lead to the gathering of confirmatory evidence and 
safety behaviours that prevent the gathering of disconfirmatory evidence 
(Bentall & Kaney, 1989; Freeman et al., 2002; Freeman, Garety, & Kuipers, 
2001; Freeman, Garety, & Phillips, 2000; Wahl, 1999). Incorporating 
disconfirmatory evidence into the delusional belief system may also lead to it 
being discarded (Melges & Freeman, 1975). In common with the more 
general model of positive symptoms (Garety et al., 2001), the secondary 
appraisal of the experience of delusional thoughts influences the level of 
distress experienced by the individual (Freeman & Garety, 1999). A 
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schematic representation of the cognitive model of persecutory delusions is 
shown in Figure 1.4. 
 
Figure 1.4 
 
Freeman, Garety, Kuipers, Fowler, and Bebbington’s (2002) Cognitive Model 
of Persecutory Delusions 
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 In common with Garety and colleagues’ (2001) and Morrison’s (2001) 
cognitive models of the positive symptoms of psychosis, Freeman and 
colleagues (2002) highlighted the interaction between dysfunctional beliefs, 
information processing biases and the search for meaning in the 
development and maintenance of symptoms. This chapter will now briefly 
consider research findings related to the role of cognitions and beliefs in 
psychosis (including paranoia), as these are important features of the models 
and of interest in this thesis.  
 1.3.5 Cognitions and beliefs in psychosis. 
 Research has shown negative self-evaluations to be common in 
psychosis, and there is a considerable body of research linking low self-
esteem to the experience of psychosis (Bowins & Shugar, 1998; Combs & 
Penn, 2004; Gureje, Harvey, & Herrman, 2004). However, low self-esteem is 
common to many psychological disorders (Bednar, Wells, & Peterson, 1989), 
and more recent research has focused on schematic beliefs that may be 
implicated in psychosis but less prevalent or less extreme in other groups. 
For example, Fowler et al. (2006) found that individuals with psychosis held 
more extreme negative beliefs about themselves and others than a student 
sample despite there being no significant differences between the groups on 
an additional measure of self-esteem and on positive beliefs about the self 
and others. These extreme beliefs have been hypothesised to result from 
early experiences and influence the appraisal of anomalous experiences or 
ambiguous social situations, triggering psychotic symptoms (Garety et al., 
2001). As has been described in the cognitive models (Garety et al., 2001; 
Morrison, 2001), psychotic experiences appear to confirm negative beliefs 
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about the self and others, feeding back into the cycle. These beliefs have 
been thought to be especially important in the development of delusions and 
the content of delusional beliefs – for example, negative beliefs about the self 
in relation to vulnerability or deserving to be harmed and negative beliefs 
about others in relation to hostility and threat are likely to be implicated in the 
formation of persecutory beliefs (Freeman et al., 1998, 2002; Trower & 
Chadwick, 1995). Such beliefs have often been associated with traumatic 
earlier experiences (Freeman et al., 2002), and this is considered in section 
1.5.3. 
 1.3.6 Summary and appraisal of relationship between cognitive 
models of social anxiety disorder and theories of psychosis. 
 Garety and colleagues’ (2001) and Morrison’s (2001) cognitive models 
of positive symptoms are largely complementary and are compatible with 
stress-vulnerability models (e.g., Ciompi, 1988; Strauss & Carpenter, 1981). 
Both models focused on the interpretation of delusions and hallucinations as 
the defining factor in whether unusual experiences become psychotic 
symptoms. This is similar to cognitive models of anxiety disorders (e.g., 
Clark, 1986; Salkovskis, 1985; Warwick & Salkovskis, 1990), although the 
similarities were made more explicit in Morrison’s model and in the 
application of Garety and colleagues’ model to persecutory delusions 
(Freeman et al., 2002). In both SA and psychosis, social isolation and/or 
avoidance have been seen as preventing alternative interpretations (of social 
situations or unusual experiences). 
As discussed above, cognitive models of SA (Clark & Wells, 1995; 
Rapee & Heimberg, 1997) have suggested that the perception of social 
50 
 
threat is the result of pre-existing maladaptive schemas and that this 
perception leads to information processing and attentional biases which 
confirm beliefs and impact on the evaluation of threat. However, the beliefs 
that trigger dysfunctional assumptions related to SA have been hypothesised 
to be situation specific in that they are activated in social situations (Coles et 
al., 2001). Dysfunctional beliefs in psychosis have been hypothesised to be 
the result of adverse early experiences, and there is evidence to suggest that 
individuals with psychosis hold extreme negative beliefs about themselves 
and others (Fowler et al., 2006). The extent to which dysfunctional beliefs 
resulting from adverse early experiences may be implicated in SA that is 
associated with subclinical paranoia in the non-psychotic population is 
unclear. A hierarchical conceptualisation of paranoia (Freeman et al., 2005a, 
2005b) suggested that there may be a continuum of experiences associated 
with SA with varying levels of dysfunctional beliefs in relation to the self and 
others. This is concordant with continuum theories of psychosis (e.g., 
Strauss, 1969).  
Garety and colleagues (2001) and Morrison (2001) also highlighted 
the interaction of dysfunctional beliefs and information processing biases in 
the development and maintenance of psychosis. Morrison reported that the 
most frequently studied information processing bias in schizophrenia is 
attentional bias. Research that has suggested that individuals experiencing 
persecutory delusions exhibit an attentional bias towards threatening stimuli 
(Bentall & Kaney, 1989; Kaney, Wolfenden, Dewey, & Bentall, 1992; 
Kinderman, 1994) may be compared to Rapee and Heimberg’s hypothesis 
that individuals with SA exhibit an attentional bias towards external sources 
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of threat. In addition, Morrison cited evidence of a further information 
processing bias in psychosis related to self-focused attention (e.g., Frith, 
1979; Ingram, 1990). Ensum and Morrison (2003) found that reducing self-
focused attention decreased the extent to which participants with auditory 
hallucinations made external attributions for their choice of words in a word 
association task. They suggested that this indicated that deficits in source-
monitoring were associated with an internal focus of attention. Cognitive 
models of SA (Clark & Wells, 1995; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997) have also 
highlighted the role of self-focused attention in the development of an 
observer-perspective negative self-image. In the Clark and Wells model, self-
focused attention was hypothesised to be the central component in the 
creation of the image. If psychosis is associated with increased self-focused 
attention, then this may increase vulnerability to SA. Alternatively, the 
association between paranoid beliefs and selective attention to external 
threat may convey a vulnerability to SA that is more in keeping with Rapee 
and Heimberg’s model and may be phenomenologically similar to low-level 
paranoia.  
Garety and colleagues’ (2001) cognitive model of positive symptoms 
highlighted the role of the secondary appraisal in the maintenance of 
psychosis, which suggested that, when psychosis is seen as shameful or 
humiliating, the individual may be vulnerable to developing depression. This 
is in keeping with Birchwood’s (2003) conceptualisation of emotional 
dysfunction in psychosis. Amongst first episode psychosis (FEP) patients, 
more than half reported post-psychotic depression, more than a third 
reported symptoms consistent with PTSD, and nearly half reported SA 
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(Birchwood, 2003; Birchwood, Iqbal, Chadwick, & Trower, 2000; Cosoff & 
Hafner, 1998; McGorry et al., 1991). Birchwood highlighted the difficulties in 
making clear distinctions between these emotional disorders. For example, 
the appraisal of psychosis as resulting in entrapment, loss of social goals 
and loss of social status may result in the episode being experienced as 
traumatic, inescapable and shameful – factors linked to post-psychotic 
depression, PTSD and SA (Birchwood, 2003). As shameful appraisals of 
psychotic experiences have been implicated in the development of SA 
(Birchwood et al., 2006), this chapter will now consider psychological 
approaches to understanding shame, its links with SA and depression, and 
relation to the experience of psychosis. This will be followed by a 
consideration of images, memories and the relationship between trauma and 
psychosis, as this is also a focus of the thesis, and research has suggested 
the development of trauma symptoms in people with psychosis may share 
pathways with SA and depression (Birchwood, 2003; McGorry et al., 1991). 
1.4 Shame 
 1.4.1 Definition of shame. 
 Beck (2005b) defined shame as ‘an affect related to a person’s 
conception of his public image at the time that he is being observed or 
believes he is being observed’ (p.156). Shame is activated when a person 
believes that they have been observed to be falling short of expected social 
norms, expectations or demands. The fundamental trigger is the belief that 
other people see them as in some way weak, inferior or inept rather than the 
actual communication that this is the case (Beck, 2005b).  
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 Gilbert (2001) offered a subtly different interpretation of shame. He 
suggested that it is not activated by the threat of failing to attain a desired 
standard but by a perception of being close to an ‘undesired self’. Ogilvie 
(1987) found that the distance between the ‘undesired self’ and the ‘real self’ 
was more highly correlated with life satisfaction than that between the ‘real 
self’ and an ‘ideal self’. In relation to shame, this conceptualisation was 
supported by research by Lindsay-Hartz, de Rivera, and Mascolo 
 (1995), whose participants emphasised the experience of themselves as 
who they did not want to be rather than failing to be who they did want to be. 
Both Beck’s (2005b) and Gilbert’s conceptualisations of shame are 
consistent with a fear of one’s inadequacies being exposed and both 
associate shame with withdrawal and safety behaviours. These are key 
aspects of a psychoevolutionary approach, such as that taken by social rank 
theory (e.g., Gilbert, 2000), which has understood such responses as 
submissive self-protective strategies.  
 This section will now give an overview of the conceptualisation of 
shame within social rank theory (Gilbert, 1989, 1992; Price & Sloman, 1987). 
It will then explore the relationship between shame and SA before 
considering shame and the experience of psychosis in preparation for 
discussion of the role of shame in SA in psychosis.   
 1.4.2 Shame and social rank theory. 
 Social rank theory (Gilbert, 1989, 1992; Price & Sloman, 1987) has 
suggested that an individual’s perception of their status or rank and 
associated appraisals related to being inferior to others impacts on their 
emotional state, leading to submissive behaviour designed to appease 
54 
 
others and ward off attack. In animals, this would have an adaptive function 
where the social threat is aggression. In humans, the desire is to convey a 
favourable impression to others which is unlikely to be achieved by 
withdrawal behaviours (Gilbert, 1989, 2001; Leary, 1995). 
 The broad concept of shame has been associated with the 
expectation or being found to be in some way undesirable or unattractive and 
consequently rejected (Gilbert, 2001). Internal shame has been related to 
negative views about one’s own attributes or behaviour, whereas external 
shame has been associated with the awareness or perception of stigma from 
others (Cook, 1996; Pinel, 1999). It is external shame which has been 
associated with unfavourable social comparisons and submissive safety 
strategies (Keltner & Harker, 1998; Tangney, 1995).  
 In applying social rank theory (Gilbert, 1989, 1992; Price & Sloman, 
1987) to depression, Gilbert (1992) suggested that experiences that trigger 
feelings of loss, humiliation and entrapment or defeat are depressogenic. 
Such events lead to the initiation of submissive behaviours as a defensive 
reaction to entrapment, resulting in feelings of inferiority and self-blame. 
Similarly, Zuroff, Moskowitz, and Côté (1999) suggested that vulnerability to 
depression is related to insecurities around attachment and social 
acceptance. The perception of social inferiority associated with shame has 
also been implicated in SA (e.g., Gilbert, 2000), and this relationship will now 
be explored. 
 1.4.3 Shame and social anxiety. 
 Social rank theory (Gilbert, 1989, 1992, 2000; Price & Sloman, 1987) 
has suggested that SA occurs when, as a result of negative schemas, a 
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person sees themselves as subordinate and others as dominant and 
believes they have to compete for their social place and will be revealed as 
incompetent (Gilbert & Trower, 2001; Trower, Sherling, Beech, Harrop, & 
Gilbert, 1998). Defensive strategies are automatically activated, making the 
person hypervigilant and more likely to perceive a social situation as 
threatening. They will closely monitor their behaviour for anything they 
believe will heighten that threat or draw attention to themselves, leading to 
self-monitoring, safety behaviours and avoidance (Gilbert, 2000). These 
responses have been seen as a defence against loss of social status and the 
rejection that has been associated with negative evaluation. Emphasis on 
negative self and other beliefs, threat perception, self-monitoring, safety 
behaviours and avoidance have made this approach complementary to 
cognitive models of SA (Clark & Wells, 1995; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997). 
 Within social rank theory (Gilbert, 1989, 1992; Price & Sloman, 1987), 
shame and SA behaviours have been described and understood in a 
complementary manner (Gilbert, 2000), and there has been disagreement 
over the extent to which they are overlapping concepts (Gilbert, 2000; 
Tangney & Miller, 1996). In both cases, submissive behaviours are 
incompatible with an evolved social rank system in which acceptance is 
based on affiliative qualities rather than hierarchies based on physical 
strength, dominance and submission. Such behaviours are likely to result in 
marginalisation, feeding back into a SA or shame based maintenance cycle 
(Gilbert, 1997). However, shame has been associated with a range of 
specific disorders such as SA, depression and personality disorders, 
whereas SA has been seen as a distinct psychopathology (Allan, Gilbert, & 
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Goss, 1994; Gilbert, 1998; 2000). It may be that shame conveys a 
vulnerability to the development or contributes to the maintenance of 
emotional disorders or is activated in different contexts for different disorders.  
 1.4.4 Shame and psychosis. 
 Garety and colleagues’ (2001) cognitive model of psychosis 
suggested that the secondary appraisal of psychotic symptoms may be 
implicated in the subsequent development of depression if the experience of 
psychosis is seen as stigmatising (Birchwood & Iqbal, 1998). As discussed 
above, Birchwood (2003) suggested that appraisals of the meaning of 
psychosis for the individual may contribute to post-psychotic emotional 
dysfunction, highlighting SA and PTSD as well as depression. He suggested 
that, following a FEP, individuals perceive themselves to be shamed and 
socially subordinated by others because of their diagnosis (Haghighat, 
2001). This is in keeping with research into stigma and psychosis (e.g., 
Corrigan, 2005; Hinshaw, 2007; Thornicroft, 2006), but such research has 
not tended to explicitly consider shame as a reaction to perceived stigma.  
 Rüsch and colleagues (2009) explored the cognitive appraisal of 
stigma stress and associated emotional and coping responses in people with 
mental illnesses. They found that high stigma stress was associated with 
increased SA and shame. They hypothesised that, if an individual perceives 
that the potential harm of stigma exceeds their coping resources, they 
experience SA and shame which lead to negative emotional and social 
outcomes. However, not all of their participants were diagnosed with 
psychotic disorders and shame-proneness was measured using a 
questionnaire based on specific social scenarios, making it unclear to what 
57 
 
extent these results may be generalised to individuals with psychosis and 
more global perceptions of external shame. 
 A psychotic episode can lead an individual to feel entrapped; either in 
their symptoms, or because they feel constrained in their ability to achieve 
desired roles or goals. In the context of mental illness stereotypes, psychosis 
may further be perceived as a threat to social rank (Rooke & Birchwood, 
1998). Individuals may thus perceive themselves to be close to their 
‘undesired self’ (Ogilvie, 1987) and see a discrepancy between the self they 
would like to be and their ‘probable/future self’ (Iqbal et al., 2000; Markus & 
Nurius, 1986). As such, the key elements associated with shame (Gilbert, 
2001) may be activated in individuals who hold such appraisals of their 
psychosis. 
 1.4.5 Summary and appraisal of theories of shame. 
 There has been a lack of empirical research exploring the links 
between SA and shame. However, one such study (Gilbert, 2000) found that 
both shame and SA were associated with feeling inferior and displaying 
submissive behaviour. This is concordant with their conceptualisation within 
social rank theory (Gilbert, 1989, 1992; Price & Sloman, 1987). The key 
difference between shame in SA and shame in psychosis is that fear of 
humiliation and criticism in SA is triggered by specific social situations, 
whereas individuals with psychosis feel shamed as a result of something 
which may seem fixed and is always present (the diagnosis). This may 
impact on levels of avoidant behaviour and interact with negative schemas 
which have been hypothesised to be more extreme in individuals with 
psychosis (Birchwood, 2003; Fowler et al., 2006). However, empirical 
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research exploring links between psychosis and shame rather than stigma 
has also been lacking. Birchwood and colleagues (2006) used social rank 
theory (Gilbert, 1989, 1992; Price & Sloman, 1987) to explore SA in 
psychosis, and this study will be considered in the social anxiety and 
psychosis section (see section 1.6.2.2). Preceding this, the chapter will 
explore the role of images, memories and trauma symptoms in SA, as they 
are also investigated in this thesis. As discussed above, the appraisal of 
psychosis may be implicated in the development of trauma symptoms as well 
as SA (Birchwood, 2003). The role of a negative image of the self in SA 
(Clark & Wells, 1995; Rapee & Heimberg, 2007) has been outlined above, 
and links between these images and memories will now be considered in 
relation to SA, psychosis and traumatic experiences. 
1.5 Images, Memories and Traumatic Experiences 
 1.5.1 Images and memories in social anxiety disorder. 
 As discussed in the social anxiety disorder section above, Clark and 
Wells’ (1995) and Rapee and Heimberg’s (1997) cognitive models have 
hypothesised that individuals with SA experience a mental image of 
themselves as they believe that they appear to an observer. The 
phenomenology of images experienced when feeling anxious in social 
situations has been explored by a number of researchers. 
 Hackmann, Surawy, and Clark (1998) developed a semi-structured 
interview designed to explore the images experienced by people with SA. In 
comparison to non-clinical participants, they found that people with SA are 
more likely to experience images incorporating themselves as if seen 
through an observer’s eyes rather than taking a field perspective and 
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picturing the social situation through their own eyes. Wells and Papageorgiou 
(1999) reported similar results and found that a shift to the observer 
perspective when imagining an anxiety provoking social situation 
differentiated socially anxious participants from participants with agoraphobia 
and blood/injury phobia. Other researchers have used experimental designs 
to compare the impact of qualitatively different mental images on SA. 
Findings have suggested that self-images which are negative and 
experienced from an observer perspective are associated with greater levels 
of anxiety and poorer social performance than neutral or positive images and 
images experienced from a field perspective (Hirsch, Clark, Mathews, & 
Williams, 2003; Hirsch, Meynen, & Clark, 2004; Spurr & Stopa, 2003; 
Vassilopoulos, 2005).  Such studies have appeared to confirm the 
hypothesis that an observer perspective negative self-image is a key factor in 
the maintenance of SA (Clark & Wells, 1995; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997). 
Following on from Hackmann and colleagues’ (1998) study, 
Hackmann, Clark, and McManus (2000) used an extended interview to 
explore whether the images experienced by socially anxious participants 
were related to specific memories. Participants who indicated that their 
image was closely linked to a memory were asked to recall the remembered 
event and describe what they could see, hear, smell and taste and what 
sensations they experienced in their body. They were also asked about 
events before, during and after the memory; what they felt; and what the 
remembered event meant about themselves, others and the world.  
Hackmann and colleagues (2000) also used rating scales to elicit 
quantitative data on how similar the memory and the image appeared to be 
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in both their sensory qualities and their interpersonal meanings. The 
relationship between the memory and the onset of SA was then explored. 
 All 22 participants reported experiencing an image when anxious in 
social situations, and 96% indicated that their image was closely linked to a 
negative event in their memory. The themes identified in these memories 
related to negative responses from other people and experiences of self-
consciousness. Hackmann et al. (2000) therefore concluded that their results 
suggested that the negative self-image that is central to cognitive models of 
SA (Clark & Wells, 1995; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997) is the result of early 
unpleasant social experiences. They hypothesised a maintenance cycle 
whereby memory content triggers the experience of the negative image in 
social situations. The image maintains anxiety in the social situation, 
reinforcing self-focused attention and avoidance which prevent the gathering 
of disconfirmatory evidence that would allow the image to be updated. 
 A potential weakness of this study was that the participants had all 
completed treatment for SA and were asked to recall situations that had 
made them anxious prior to their treatment. In addition, as the sample size 
was relatively small, replication could strengthen the findings, particularly 
given that there have been few other studies exploring the link between 
images and early memories in SA. However, this study advanced earlier 
research in that it proposed a mechanism through which negative self-
images impact on SA. 
 One recent study sought to further explore the role of autobiographical 
memories and the nature of images in SA. Moscovitch, Gavric, Merrifield, 
Bielak, and Moscovitch (2011) compared high and low socially anxious 
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participants and found that both groups experienced negative images that 
were associated with autobiographical memories when in anxiety-provoking 
social situations. However, the low SA group were also able to access 
positive self-representations, and these were more detailed than the lower 
number of positive self-images retrieved by the high SA group. The negative 
images of the high SA group were also associated with more emotional and 
cognitive consequences, and the researchers suggested that it may be the 
psychological impact of images rather than the frequency of these 
experiences that distinguished individuals with SA. 
 Although research relating to imagery and memory in SA is in its 
infancy, there has been evidence for a relationship in other emotional 
disorders, particularly in post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD; Holmes & 
Hackmann, 2004). Possible overlaps between the reexperiencing symptoms 
associated with traumatic memories and imagery in psychosis and SA will be 
considered below. To contextualise this discussion, this chapter will first give 
an overview of a study exploring images and memories in psychosis. 
 1.5.2 Images and memories in psychosis. 
 Morrison and colleagues (2002) explored the images reported by 
people experiencing psychotic symptoms during the course of delivering 
cognitive therapy. They found that 74.3% of 35 patients interviewed were 
able to identify an image that they associated with their psychotic symptoms. 
Drawing on Hackmann and colleagues’ (2000) interview, participants were 
then asked whether their images were associated with particular memories. 
Of those participants who identified an image, 70.8% associated it with a 
remembered event in their past. In addition, participants reported that their 
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images were recurrent and were linked to an emotional response and beliefs 
about the self, others and the world. Morrison and colleagues concluded that 
their findings supported theories of similarities between the processes 
maintaining psychosis and anxiety disorders (Morrison, 2001) and suggested 
that images linked to memories may contribute to the maintenance of 
psychotic symptoms. 
 In exploring the themes contained within participants’ descriptions of 
their images, Morrison and colleagues (2002) identified feared catastrophes 
associated with paranoia or persecutory ideas and memories of real 
traumatic events. They highlighted similarities between these latter images 
and the reexperiencing symptoms of PTSD. This relationship will now be 
explored below.  
 1.5.3 Trauma and psychosis. 
 Approximately 70% of the general population have experienced an 
event that would be considered traumatic (Norris, 1992). Such events include 
natural disasters, terrorist attacks, assault, road accidents, and witnessing 
extreme suffering or death (Brewin, 2003). Breslau, Davis, Andreski, and 
Peterson (1991) suggested that up to 24% of these people will go on to 
develop PTSD. Experiences of traumatic events have been reported to be 
especially high in people with psychosis (Morrison, Frame, & Larkin, 2003), 
and studies of FEP clients have found that between 31 and 46% meet 
criteria for the symptoms of PTSD (Jackson, Knott, Skeate, & Birchwood, 
2004; McGorry et al., 1991; Tarrier, Khan, Cater, & Picken, 2007).  
 A meta-analysis (Varese, Smeets, et al., 2012) indicated that patients 
with psychosis were 2.72 times more likely to have experienced childhood 
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trauma than controls and suggested that childhood adversity increases the 
risk of developing psychosis. A particularly strong research finding has been 
that of a link between childhood sexual abuse (CSA) and psychosis. Using 
data from the 2007 Adult Psychiatric Morbidity Survey (McManus, Meltzer, 
Brugha, Bebbington, & Jenkins, 2009), Bebbington and colleagues (2011) 
found that individuals who had been sexually abused before the age of 16 
were 2.74 times more likely to screen positive for psychosis. Those who had 
experienced non-consensual intercourse were 10.14 times more likely to be 
classified as ‘psychotic’. More specifically, CSA has been linked to 
hallucinations (Read, Agar, Argyle, & Aderhold, 2003). Varese, Barkus, and 
Bentall (2012) explored this association and found that the relationship 
between childhood trauma and hallucinations was mediated by dissociative 
tendencies. Hallucinating participants reported significantly higher rates of 
CSA and had significantly higher scores for dissociative experiences 
compared to non-hallucinating participants. These findings suggested that 
there may be an overlap between symptoms of psychosis and symptoms of 
PTSD, and this is considered further below.  
Despite the reported prevalence of PTSD symptoms in FEP clients, 
Mueser, Lu, Rosenberg, and Wolfe (2010) pointed out that they may not 
necessarily meet diagnostic criteria for PTSD. DSM-IV (APA, 1994) criteria 
for PTSD require that the person has been exposed to a traumatic event 
involving ‘actual or threatened death or serious injury, or a threat to the 
physical integrity of oneself or others’ (p.427-428). Jackson and Birchwood 
(2006) suggested that this means that threats to psychological wellbeing do 
not meet criteria for a traumatic event. However, research has suggested 
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that the experience of psychosis can be traumatic as it shatters beliefs about 
the self, others and the world (Shaner & Eth, 1989). Frame and Morrison 
(2001) studied participants hospitalised for an acute psychotic episode both 
during their admission and 4-6 months later. They found that 67% had 
clinically significant PTSD symptoms at time one and 50% at time two. 
Hierarchical regression analyses indicated that, when hospitalisation and 
earlier traumatic events were statistically controlled for, the experience of 
psychosis accounted for 24% of unique variance in PTSD scores. However, 
a history of trauma and victimisation experiences are common in people with 
psychosis (e.g., Goff, Brotman, Kindlon, Waites, & Amico, 1991; Masters, 
1995), and research has also suggested that traumatic events may increase 
the risk of developing psychosis (Janssen et al., 2004; Spauwen et al., 
2006). In addition, notwithstanding the findings of Frame and Morrison, 
psychiatric treatment, particularly hospitalisation, may be experienced as 
traumatic (Beveridge, 1998).  
Morrison and colleagues (2003) suggest three possible pathways: 
psychosis as a cause of PTSD; trauma as a trigger for psychosis; and 
psychosis and PTSD as part of a spectrum of responses to traumatic events. 
There are similarities between the intrusive thoughts, images and 
‘flashbacks’ associated with PTSD and psychotic hallucinations, and the re-
experiencing symptoms of PTSD often take the form of hallucinations and 
may be accompanied by paranoia (Butler, Mueser, Sprock, & Braff, 1996). 
Research has suggested hallucinatory experiences in psychosis may be the 
result of intense anxiety disrupting the contextual processing of traumatic 
memories, causing them to be vulnerable to being triggered involuntarily and 
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experienced as intrusions (Steel, Fowler, & Holmes, 2005). This is similar to 
theories of the disruption of memory processes in PTSD (e.g., Brewin, 2001; 
Ehlers & Clark, 2000).  
Steel, Mahmood, and Holmes (2008) found that schizotypy was 
related to a data-driven information processing style. Ehlers and Clark (2000) 
suggested that, when there is a shift to such an information processing style 
following a traumatic event, the memory is subsequently inadequately 
integrated into its context, resulting in reexperiencing symptoms. Such an 
information processing style in individuals with high levels of schizotypal 
symptoms may therefore be seen as a vulnerability factor for intrusive 
memories and may be implicated in the transition to psychosis (Steel et al., 
2008). 
In line with Morrison’s (2001) cognitive model, Morrison et al. (2003) 
suggested that the cultural acceptability of intrusions and their interpretation, 
and beliefs about psychotic experiences may determine whether someone is 
diagnosed with PTSD or psychosis – i.e., if individuals link their experiences 
to traumatic events rather than making external appraisals, then a PTSD 
diagnosis is more likely. 
 1.5.4 Summary and appraisal of the relationships between 
traumatic memories, images, psychosis and social anxiety. 
 The above section has given an overview of research indicating the 
nature of imagery in SA and how this may link to early memories. It has also 
considered the role of images in psychosis, which Morrison et al. (2002) 
found were often connected to traumatic memories. The relationship 
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between trauma and psychosis was discussed in relation to similarities in 
intrusive symptoms and processing of traumatic memories.  
 The link between images and memories and their role in the 
maintenance of SA has further been suggested by the results of studies 
using imagery and memory rescripting. Wild, Hackmann, and Clark (2007, 
2008) found that the process of reliving, reappraising and updating 
distressing memories linked to images experienced during anxiety-provoking 
social situations led to significant improvement in negative self-beliefs, image 
and memory distress and vividness, fear of negative evaluation, and anxiety 
in feared social situations.  
 Morrison et al. (2002) reported that some participants who did not 
report an image related to their psychotic symptoms did report images 
related to anxiety-based symptoms. This supported the findings of Lockett 
and colleagues (2012, discussed in section 1.6.2.2) that participants with 
both psychosis and SA experienced a mixture of typical SA images and 
images that appeared to be more related to psychotic symptoms and 
paranoia.  
 In summary, research has suggested that both SA and psychosis are 
associated with intrusive images which may be linked to memories. This 
suggests that memory rescripting may also be beneficial in the treatment of 
individuals with comorbid SA and psychosis. However, as discussed above, 
the intrusive memories of people with psychosis may relate to traumatic 
experiences and be associated with symptoms of PTSD rather than being 
memories of social performance and embarrassment. Hackmann and 
colleagues’ (2007, 2008) intervention may usefully be integrated with existing 
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treatments for PTSD if memories were found to be focused on external 
threat. Where such memories are experienced as intrusive and appraised as 
external in origin, integration of CBT techniques for psychosis and PTSD 
may be appropriate (Steel et al., 2005). The nature of SA in psychosis, which 
is the subject of this thesis, will be considered in the next section. 
1.6 Social Anxiety in Psychosis 
 1.6.1 Prevalence and implications. 
 The symptoms of comorbid emotional disorders may have an equal or 
greater impact on an individual’s life than the symptoms of psychosis (Fowler 
et al., 1995; MacCarthy, Benson, and Brewin, 1986). SA in schizophrenia 
has been reported to range from 13% to 39% (Pallanti et al., 2004). It has 
been linked to poorer outcomes and often remains untreated (Lysaker & 
Hammersley, 2006). 
 There has been debate as to whether SA in psychosis is associated 
with similar causes and correlates to classic SA, or whether there are factors 
related to psychosis that explain the high rates of SA (Lysaker & 
Hammersley, 2006). As previously discussed, there are similarities between 
the processes that are hypothesised to maintain psychosis and SA. Common 
factors include maladaptive schemas; interpretations of intrusive thoughts, 
images, or experiences that cause distress; and behaviours that maintain 
isolation and prevent the gathering of evidence that may challenge existing 
beliefs.  
If SA and psychosis are underpinned by similar processes, then SA 
that is comorbid with psychosis may be formulated using cognitive models of 
SA (Clark & Wells, 1995; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997) and respond to existing 
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treatments based on these models (e.g., Wells, 1997; Wells and 
Papageorgiou, 2001). However, the research summarised above has also 
suggested that the negative self and other beliefs of people with psychosis 
may be particularly strong and consistent across situations (Fowler et al., 
2006). In addition, the memories underpinning images in psychosis may 
relate to traumatic events and be associated with PTSD symptoms (Frame & 
Morrison, 2001; Morrison et al., 2002). The images experienced when 
socially anxious may also be more likely to reflect such traumatic events and 
to be focused on external threat rather than being self-focused (Lockett et al., 
2012; Morrison et al., 2002). These factors may have implications for the 
understanding of the nature of SA in psychosis and for the development of 
interventions. Research exploring the nature of SA in psychosis will now be 
discussed. 
 1.6.2 The nature of SA in psychosis. 
 Birchwood (2003) proposed three pathways to SA in psychosis. First, 
where SA predates psychosis, it may be triggered by childhood experiences 
such as trauma. Research has indicated high rates of trauma in people with 
psychosis (e.g., Resnick, Bond, & Mueser, 2003), but the relationship to SA 
is unclear. 
 Second, SA may also develop during a psychotic episode and be 
triggered by psychotic symptoms, as has been seen in paranoia research, 
which has suggested anxiety and persecutory delusions are both maintained 
by threat beliefs (Freeman et al., 2002). Finally, SA may develop following a 
psychotic episode. This occurs when the experience or diagnosis is 
appraised as shameful and involving social subordination. Fear of others 
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discovering their patient status and responding in a threatening or 
judgemental way leads to anxiety and avoidance. 
 A review of the current literature was carried out to address two 
questions: 
1. What cognitive and affective factors are related to SA in 
psychosis? 
2. Is SA in psychosis related to psychotic symptoms? 
 1.6.2.1  Search strategy. 
 Full details of the literature search methods and a summary table of 
the main findings and characteristics of the reviewed studies are provided in 
Appendices B and C. Ten studies met the criteria of the literature search. In 
addition, Following initial review of the literature, the researcher became 
aware that a new study was published meeting the inclusion criteria (Lockett 
et al., 2012). An additional literature search was performed and no further 
new studies meeting the criteria were found. Lockett and colleagues’ (2012) 
study was included in the review, taking the total number to 11 studies. 
Studies were evaluated in relation to their aims and theoretical 
underpinnings, participants and sample size, measures, analyses, and 
conclusions. The results are reviewed below. 
 1.6.2.2  What cognitive and affective factors are related to SA in 
psychosis? 
 Birchwood et al. (2006) found that participants with a FEP and SA 
experienced greater shame and entrapment attached to their diagnosis and 
appraised it as leading to a loss of social status and marginalisation. This 
study supported a social rank account of SA (Gilbert, 2000) and also drew on 
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theoretical frameworks of the development of SA in psychosis (e.g., 
Birchwood, 2003) and evidence in relation to stigma and mental illness (e.g., 
Corrigan, 1998). On the basis of their findings, Birchwood and colleagues 
proposed a stigma model of SA in psychosis. This suggested that, prior to 
the development of psychosis, individuals have internalised cultural values 
that stigmatise mental illness. In social situations, this leads to the perception 
of being subordinate and the expectation of negative judgement and 
rejection (other-to-self focus). Attention then shifts to an impression of how 
the person comes across to others (self-to-other-focus) with a desire for 
membership of the stigmatised group not to be discovered. This reduces 
opportunities for external feedback from the situation. Both the other-to-self 
focus and the self-to-other focus result in shame-based appraisals related to 
how the individual will be perceived in the context of their mental illness. In 
line with social rank theory (Gilbert, 2000), the model proposed that 
submissive behaviours are initiated with the aim of reducing the perceived 
threat but which result in contamination of the social interaction and a 
reduction in opportunities to disconfirm existing beliefs. Elements of the 
model are concordant with Birchwood and colleagues’ findings, and it 
successfully integrated existing cognitive behavioural models (Clark & Wells, 
1995; Rapee & Heimberg, 2007) with social rank theory (Gilbert, 1989, 1992; 
Price & Sloman, 1987) and Gilbert’s (2002) model of shame. The authors 
acknowledged that this is a small study and further testing was required. The 
model is shown in Figure 1.5 overleaf. 
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Figure 1.5 
 
Birchwood and Colleagues’ (2006) Stigma Model of Social Anxiety in  
 
Schizophrenia 
 
 
 
 
 
 
       
 
 
    
              
           
 
 
 
 
 
  
Gumley, O’Grady, Power, and Schwannauer (2004) used a similar 
framework in a study exploring SA in participants considered to be at risk of 
psychotic relapse. They found that participants with psychosis and SA had 
higher levels of self-blame, entrapment and shame and lower self-esteem 
than participants with psychosis and no SA. Taken together, these studies 
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have suggested that a social rank approach to understanding SA in 
psychosis may be useful. 
 The above studies were unique in their consideration of models based 
on shame and social rank, but Lysaker, Ringer, and Davis (2008) also 
explored the relationship between self-esteem and SA in psychosis. They 
found self-esteem predicted SA 6 months later in participants on the 
schizophrenia spectrum. The strength of this study was its longitudinal 
design, which allowed testing of competing hypotheses about causality 
between the two variables. Although the study could not establish that the 
association is not related to confounding variables, it gave a greater 
indication of causality than cross-sectional studies and suggested that low 
self-esteem may contribute to the development of SA in psychosis. 
 In one of the few studies to compare SA in participants with and 
without psychosis, Michail and Birchwood (2009) considered whether SA in 
FEP is phenomenologically different from SA without psychosis. SA was 
associated with depression in both groups, but those without psychosis had 
significantly higher scores on a measure of fear of negative evaluation (the 
Brief Fear of Negative Evaluation Scale; BFNE; Leary, 1983a). However, the 
authors offered limited interpretation of this difference, and concluded that 
there is little difference between SA in people with and without psychosis. 
Voges and Addington (2005) also considered the relationship between 
depression and SA in psychosis, but found no association once a Bonferroni 
correction was applied. Despite this, they reported that SA in FEP appeared 
to be related to depression. No information on power was given, making it 
difficult to determine whether the sample size was sufficient to detect any 
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association. They also reported a significant relationship between SA and 
negative self-statements, which is in keeping with findings of high levels of 
self-blame in people experiencing shame (which is linked to SA and 
depression) (Gilbert & Miles, 2000). 
The above studies have suggested that SA in psychosis may be 
associated with shame, self-esteem, depression and negative self-
statements. However, there are a number of methodological limitations that 
necessitate caution in interpreting the findings. All the studies acknowledged 
the use of a small sample for at least one of the participant groups, 
increasing the risk of Type I error (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). The use of a 
large number of measures and multiple calculations with these samples also 
increased the risk of Type II error (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). Finally, since 
the studies have not reported information on power, it was difficult to 
evaluate their conclusions. 
There were also diagnostic and measurement issues associated with 
some of the studies. Gumley and colleagues (2004) used the Rosenberg 
Self-Esteem Scale (Rosenberg, 1965), the validity of which has been 
questioned in individuals with severe mental illness (Lecomte, Corbière, & 
Laisné, 2006). More broadly, Barrowclough et al. (2003) criticised the use of 
self-report measures for assessing self-esteem in schizophrenia as their 
findings indicated a disparity with an interview-based assessment of self-
esteem. In addition, they suggested that self-report measures of self-esteem 
may lack discriminant validity due to correlation with participants’ level of 
depression. 
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In Michail and Birchwood’s (2009) and Voges and Addington’s (2005) 
studies, it was the measurement or diagnosis of SA that gave cause for 
concern. A proportion (11.6%) of Michail and Birchwood’s FEP participants 
did not receive a diagnosis of SA on the Schedules for Clinical Assessment 
in Neuropsychiatry (Wing, Sartorius, & Ustun, 1996), but did score above 
threshold on at least one SA measure. These participants were included in 
the no SA group, but analyses were not conducted to determine whether this 
was justified. Similarly, 30% of Voges and Addington’s participants who did 
not have a DSM-IV (APA, 1994) diagnosis of SA met criteria for social 
phobia on the Social Phobia and Anxiety Inventory (Turner, Beidel, & Dancu, 
1996), suggesting that this measure may lack specificity.  
People with SA and psychosis are a very specific group and many 
measures of emotional disorder have not been validated in people with 
psychosis (Voges & Addington, 2005). In addition, many of the studies were 
exploratory and it may be unrealistic to expect large samples or newly 
developed standardised measures in the initial investigation of SA in 
psychosis. In a novel study, Lockett and colleagues (2012) collected 
qualitative data to investigate SA in psychosis. They conducted a pilot study 
using Hackmann and colleagues’ (1998) semi-structured interview to explore 
the images experienced by participants with SA and psychosis. The interview 
measured participants’ levels of anxiety, the extent to which their images 
were experienced from a field or observer perspective, and image clarity and 
level of distortion. The small sample size in this exploratory study prevented 
statistical analysis of the data obtained from the rating scales. However, the 
researchers suggested that the findings were indicative of a relationship 
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between the quantitative rating of image perspective and the content of 
images described by the themes identified in the qualitative analysis.  
Observer perspective images were associated with aspects of typical SA 
such as embarrassment and negative evaluation, and field perspective 
images were associated with themes of physical danger which were more in 
keeping with the images related to psychotic symptoms reported by 
participants in Morrison and colleagues’ (2002) study.  
The main focus of Lockett and colleagues’ (2012) analysis was on the 
qualitative data elicited in the interviews. They identified themes relating to 
fear of negative evaluation and loss of social status; the image being 
negatively distorted; fear of physical threat; an impression of being stared at, 
known, or talked about by others; images of what might happen in the 
immediate future; and threats from certain types of people. These themes 
and the findings related to image perspective supported the researchers’ 
hypotheses. The use of template analysis (King, 2008) which involved the 
creation of an a priori template of themes based on existing literature which 
then informed the analytic process may, however, have influenced the 
themes identified. The template developed was based on research into 
images in SA and images in psychosis. As there has been no previous 
research explicitly exploring images in SA with psychosis, the validity of the 
template could be questioned. The themes identified supported the 
researchers’ hypotheses and no information was given as to whether 
measures were taken to ensure the trustworthiness of the analysis (e.g., 
Rolfe, 2006; Sandelowski, 1993). However, the study demonstrated 
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transparency in that tables were presented summarising each participant’s 
description of their image. 
Negative self-images experienced in social situations are a central 
aspect of cognitive models of SA (Clark & Wells, 1995; Rapee & Heimberg, 
1997). Lockett and colleagues’ (2012) study has been the only published 
research exploring such images in participants with psychosis. However, as 
there were only seven participants, and given the limitations described 
above, the findings can only be considered as preliminary, and this was 
acknowledged by the researchers.  
 1.6.2.3  Is SA in psychosis related to psychotic symptoms? 
 Similarly to their conclusion relating to depression and SA, Voges and 
Addington (2005) reported an association between SA and negative 
symptoms in FEP that was not directly supported by their data. The 
relationship was not significant once a Bonferroni correction was applied. SA 
was also not related to positive symptoms. Other studies supported the lack 
of association between SA and psychotic symptoms. Pallanti et al. (2004) 
compared schizophrenia patients with and without SA with SA patients 
without psychosis in order to define the nature of SA in schizophrenia. 
However, their participants were in remission and had low average scores on 
the PANSS (Kay et al., 1987), calling into question the validity of their 
conclusion that SA was not related to psychotic symptoms.  
 Despite the limitations of the above studies, their findings were 
supported by Birchwood et al. (2006) and Gumley et al. (2004) who reported 
that there was no relationship between SA and psychotic symptoms. 
Similarly, Michail and Birchwood (2009) found no relationship between SA 
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and symptoms measured by the PANSS (Kay et al., 1987), but SA was 
related to perception of threat from others. The authors concluded there may 
be a subgroup of socially anxious people with psychosis whose SA was 
related to paranoia, but analysis of subgroups would be needed to support 
this conclusion.  
 In contrast to the studies described above, the findings of Mazeh et al. 
(2009) and Penn, Hope, Spaulding, and Kucera (1994) suggested that there 
may be a relationship between SA and psychotic symptoms. Penn and 
colleagues reported an association between self-reported SA and negative 
symptoms, and Mazeh and colleagues reported a non-significant trend for 
patients with SA to have higher total PANSS scores. Mazeh and colleagues 
also found that the social fear and social avoidance subscales of the 
Liebowitz Social Anxiety Scale (LSAS; Liebowitz, 1987) were correlated with 
positive and negative symptoms respectively. They suggested the lack of a 
significant overall effect may be the result of the study being underpowered. 
 The findings of studies exploring the relationship between SA and 
psychotic symptoms have lacked concordance. However, these 
inconsistencies may be related to methodological issues. Similarly to 
research exploring cognitive and affective factors in SA in psychosis, these 
studies have used small samples and have not report information on power. 
In addition, participants may not have been representative of the population 
of people with psychosis. For example, Mazeh et al. (2009) and Penn and 
colleagues’ (1994) studies used inpatient samples. Such participants have 
fewer opportunities for social interaction, which may have accounted for the 
low occurrence of SA (11%) in Mazeh and colleagues’ study. 
78 
 
 There were also potential problems with the validity of measures used 
in the above studies. For example, Penn et al. (1994) attempted to 
accommodate the nature of their inpatient sample by including a new scale 
designed to assess ward-based interactions. There was no information on 
whether this measure was reliable. There was also no evidence that the role 
play assessment used has been validated for this population. 
In Mazeh and colleagues’ (2009) study, the Liebowitz Social Anxiety 
Scale (LSAS; Liebowitz, 1987) was used in the assessment of the 
relationship between SA and positive and negative symptoms. Romm et al. 
(2011) found that factor analysis did not support the subscales of the LSAS, 
suggesting that the overall finding of no association with psychotic symptoms 
may be more valid than conclusions drawn based on separating social fear 
and social avoidance. Furthermore, in Michail and Birchwood’s (2009) study, 
persecutory threat perception as measured by the Details of Threat 
Questionnaire (DoT; Freemanet al., 2001) was not measureable by the 
PANSS (Kay et al., 1987), suggesting that the DoT may lack construct 
validity. This makes their conclusion that SA is related to perception of threat 
from others more questionable. 
 Two of the studies (Huppert & Smith, 2005; Lysaker & Hammersley, 
2006) reported less ambiguous findings of an association between SA and 
psychotic symptoms but were not without limitations. Huppert and Smith’s 
(2005) hypotheses were based more on epidemiological data and twin and 
family studies than on theoretical models, but this was appropriate for their 
aims. The study had a sample of 32 patients and a large number of 
analyses. Only 12 met criteria for SA, making the findings exploratory. 
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Although most measures employed have been widely used within research 
in this area, three supplementary questions were developed to establish the 
presence of delusions and hallucinations. There was no evidence of any 
assessment of the reliability or validity of these items. The study reported a 
significant relationship between SA and positive symptoms, but the number 
of different measures of psychotic symptoms and SA suggested significant 
results were reported in preference to non-significant results. Lack of 
correlation between interview and self-report measures called measurement 
validity into question. The heterogeneous nature of the sample in terms of 
stage of illness and comorbidity may have made results more generalisable. 
However, differences between subgroups were not explored, and comorbid 
anxiety diagnoses may have confounded the relationship between SA and 
psychotic symptoms. 
 Lysaker and Hammersley’s (2006) study had a more specific focus. 
They found delusions were related to SA, but only in participants with a lack 
of cognitive flexibility. They suggested the combination of difficulties in 
understanding shifting social rules and maladaptive interpretations of 
situations leads to SA. Their results were strengthened by strong inter-rater 
reliability and use of established measures, although psychometric data were 
not reported for all tests. Groups appeared to have been comparable 
demographically, but, in common with other studies, two of the groups were 
particularly small (n = 6 and n = 11), and a number of separate analyses 
were performed. Therefore, there remained a high risk of both Type I and 
Type II error in this study and the analysis could not establish causality.  
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 1.6.2.4  Overview and appraisal of the current literature. 
 The studies of Birchwood et al. (2006) and Gumley et al. (2004) were 
the most theoretically driven and supported the application of social rank 
theory (Gilbert, 1989, 1992; Price & Sloman, 1987) and shame based 
approaches to SA in psychosis. Despite limitations in sample size, the 
similarity of the results suggested this area warrants further exploration. The 
importance of self-esteem was supported by Lysaker and colleagues’ (2008) 
findings. The studies have suggested that one of Birchwood’s (2003) 
proposed pathways to SA in psychosis is applicable to some people with 
comorbid SA and psychosis, but there has been a lack of studies exploring 
all three pathways and investigating whether there are differences in the 
correlates and features of SA based on time of onset. 
 There has been some evidence for the role of beliefs about self and 
others in the development of SA in psychosis. Voges and Addington’s (2005) 
findings were in keeping with cognitive models of SA (e.g., Clark & Wells, 
1995) and research into schemas in psychosis (Fowler et al., 2006). Further 
research is needed to establish similarities and differences between beliefs 
underlying SA in psychosis and cognitive models of SA (Clark & Wells, 1995; 
Rapee & Heimberg, 1997). Michail and Birchwood’s (2009) findings 
suggested measures such as the Brief Fear of Negative Evaluation Scale 
(Leary, 1983a) have not adequately captured the beliefs of those with SA 
and psychosis. In order to test the relationship between SA and cognitions 
that underpin paranoia (Freeman et al., 2002), research is needed that uses 
measures validated in a psychosis population such as the Brief Core 
Schema Scales (Fowler et al., 2006). 
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 Despite hypothesised links between paranoia and SA in psychosis, 
the evidence has suggested that SA is not related to psychotic symptoms 
(Birchwood et al., 2006; Gumley et al., 2004; Pallanti et al., 2004). However, 
studies may have been underpowered, and methodological limitations have 
made it difficult to draw conclusions.  
Although Lockett and colleagues’ (2012) findings pointed to a useful 
direction for further research, they would need to be extended in order to 
draw conclusions regarding the extent to which the images of individuals with 
SA and psychosis are similar to or different from the images reported by 
participants in Hackmann and colleagues’ (1998) study. 
 As already discussed, sample size was a key limitation of all of these 
studies, as was the lack of measures validated in this population. Voges and 
Addington (2005) highlighted the importance of testing the specificity and 
sensitivity of SA measures in a psychosis population, and the divergence 
between different measures found in a number of these studies has 
suggested that there may be problems with measurement of SA.  
 1.6.3 Summary of SA in psychosis.  
This section has considered the nature of SA in psychosis by focusing 
on published research using participants with both disorders. Given the 
methodological issues discussed, it has been difficult to draw firm 
conclusions. Important considerations for future research include the 
relationship between SA and beliefs about self and others; whether the 
stigma model of SA in psychosis (Birchwood et al., 2006) can be supported 
by research using a larger sample; and whether SA in psychosis is related to 
different types of memories from SA without psychosis.  
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Although the literature review above focused on published studies, it 
seemed important to consider the recent doctoral thesis research of Lockett 
(2011), as the current study aims to build on her findings. Lockett’s research 
compared socially anxious participants with and without psychosis and found 
that participants with psychosis scored more highly on a measure of negative 
beliefs about others but that there was no significant difference between the 
groups for negative self-schemas. The results were in keeping with findings 
that participants with psychosis scored more highly on a measure of 
paranoia. In addition, Lockett used Hackmann and colleagues’ (1998) 
interview to compare the images experienced by both groups. Qualitative 
analysis identified that participants with psychosis were more likely to 
experience images related to physical threat from others than participants 
without psychosis. Negative beliefs about others, residual paranoia and 
threat themes within imagery suggested that participants with psychosis may 
have related their images to memories involving interpersonal threat, but this 
was not explored. Some socially anxious participants without psychosis in 
this study also reported images related to threat, and 10 (31.3%) participants 
in this group had scores indicative of a clinical level of paranoia.  
Lockett’s (2011) qualitative analysis also sought to explore the validity 
of Birchwood and colleagues’ (2006) stigma model of SA in psychosis. Some 
participants in the SA and psychosis group reported images that reflected 
anxiety about being judged based on their mental health. This suggested that 
shame may be implicated in the development and maintenance of SA in 
psychosis (as suggested in the Birchwood et al., 2006 model), but not all 
participants spontaneously reported experiencing shame and it was not 
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explicitly measured. In addition, Lockett suggested that the presence of 
themes relating to negative evaluation and fear of others indicated that 
paranoia and negative beliefs about others may be important aspects 
missing from Birchwood and colleagues’ model. Given the findings in relation 
to participants with SA but without psychosis, paranoia may also have been 
a feature of SA for a subgroup of these participants. This is in keeping with 
Freeman and colleagues’ (2005a, 2005b) hierarchy of paranoia. It therefore 
seems likely that paranoid beliefs at different levels of the hierarchy may be 
present in individuals with SA and that those with comorbid psychosis are 
more likely to endorse severe threat beliefs. However, 10-20% of Freeman 
and colleagues’ (non-clinical) participants held paranoid thoughts associated 
with strong conviction and distress, suggesting that significant paranoia is not 
uncommon in individuals outside of mental health services. 
On the basis of the above findings in relation to SA in participants with 
and without psychosis, Lockett (2011) proposed that there may be two 
pathways to SA in psychosis. These are underpinned by the negative beliefs 
that have been implicated in the development of psychosis: negative beliefs 
about the self may result in self-focused shame and stigma following the 
onset of psychosis, and negative beliefs about others may result in paranoid 
thoughts and negative expectations of others. She suggested that traumatic 
experiences may be implicated in the development of these negative beliefs. 
The proposed model is shown in Figure 1.6 overleaf. 
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Figure 1.6 
 
Lockett’s (2011) Two-Path Schema Model of the Development and  
 
Maintenance of Social Anxiety in Psychosis 
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Lockett (2011) suggested that, if the two-path schema model of SA in 
psychosis is supported by further research, it may have direct implications for 
intervention approaches. These could include CBT for SA and schema 
therapy as well as CBT for psychosis for those clients whose difficulties 
relate to the ‘negative others’ pathway, and compassion-focused therapy 
(Gilbert, 2005) to target shame in those with strong negative self beliefs. 
Effective treatments could have substantial implications for this 
population, given the prevalence of SA in psychosis, associated disability, 
and the fact that it has been less likely to be a focus of treatment than 
positive or negative symptoms (Lysaker & Hammersely, 2006). The need for 
further research is considered in the next section. 
1.7 Summary of the Literature and Rationale for Further Research 
 Although treatments for individuals with psychosis have tended to 
focus on psychotic symptoms (Lysaker &Hammersely, 2006), research has 
suggested a considerable symptom-disability gap such that patients whose 
psychotic symptoms remit or reduce continue to have poor social and 
functional recovery (Harrison, Croudace, Mason, Glazebrook, & Medley, 
1996; Johnstone, Macmillan, Frith, Benn, & Crow, 1990). SA is likely to be a 
considerable barrier to factors that have been shown to be associated with 
good functional recovery such as social support and participation in work and 
education (Addington, Young, & Addington, 2003; Warner, 1985). Effective 
treatments based on an understanding of the nature of SA in psychosis 
therefore have the potential for considerable impact on quality of life in this 
client group. 
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Michail and Birchwood (2009) found that socially anxious participants 
without psychosis scored more highly on a measure of fear of negative 
evaluation than those with psychosis. Findings suggested measures such as 
the Brief Fear of Negative Evaluation Scale (BFNE; Leary, 1983a) may not 
adequately capture beliefs of those with SA and psychosis. This was 
supported by Lockett’s (2011) finding that participants with SA and psychosis 
who scored more highly on a measure of negative other schemas did not 
score more highly than participants with SA and no psychosis on the BFNE. 
In order to explore differences between those with and without psychosis, 
further research is needed using measures validated in a psychosis 
population alongside traditional measures of socially anxious cognitions. 
Despite Birchwood’s (2003) proposed pathways to SA in psychosis 
and Birchwood and colleagues’ (2006) stigma model, there has been no 
research ascertaining whether traumatic experiences and shame beliefs 
distinguish SA in those with and without psychosis. Lockett (2011) proposed 
an alternative two-path model of SA in psychosis. However, the study was 
unable to recruit sufficient participants to achieve statistical power, and 
missing data reduced the sample size further for some of the measures 
used. Further studies are therefore required to validate cognitive aspects of 
this model and the role of paranoia, and research is required to test the 
hypothesised roles of trauma and shame which were not explored in the 
initial study.  
 Neither CBT for psychosis nor neuroleptics are effective for emotional 
disorders comorbid with psychosis (Birchwood, 2003). It is therefore 
important to develop empirically based treatments, and this first requires 
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further research into the nature of SA in psychosis. No research exists into 
whether memory rescripting can be used effectively in a psychosis 
population, and ascertaining whether people with SA and psychosis report 
similar memories to people with SA is important. In addition, if SA in this 
population is related to the symptoms of psychosis or to different underlying 
beliefs, then existing SA treatments may need to be modified, or an 
approach targeting residual paranoia based on CBT for psychosis may be 
appropriate. 
 The current study aims to address some of the gaps identified in the 
existing literature. It will compare participants with SA and psychosis with 
participants with SA and no psychosis in order to explore the research 
questions below. 
1.8 Research Questions 
 Is SA in people with psychosis related to different cognitions from SA 
in people without psychosis? 
 Is SA in people with psychosis related to negative schemas about self 
and others, and are these schemas more extreme than those 
endorsed by people with SA without psychosis? 
 Are people with SA and psychosis more likely to endorse shame 
beliefs than people with SA without psychosis? 
 Are there differences in whether the memories underpinning SA in 
those with and without psychosis are focused on self or others? 
 Are the recalled events more likely to be linked to symptoms of PTSD 
in those with psychosis? 
 How does level of paranoia impact on factors associated with SA? 
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 Based on the literature reviewed in this introduction and driven by the 
above research questions, the following hypotheses were developed. 
1.9 Hypotheses 
1. Participants in the social anxiety and psychosis (SAp) group will have 
significantly higher scores than participants in the social anxiety (SA) 
group on a measure of shame.  
2. Participants in both groups will endorse negative cognitions related to 
social situations, but participants in the SAp group will have significantly 
higher scores on a measure of negative self and negative other 
schemas. 
3. There will be differences between the two groups in the memories linked 
to images experienced when socially anxious. Specifically, memories 
reported by the SA group will be more likely to be focused on own 
performance, whereas participants in the SAp group will report more 
memories focused on a threatening other or others. 
4. Participants in the SAp group will be more likely than participants in the 
SA group to report memories that are linked to symptoms of PTSD.  
5. Participants in both groups will have high scores on a measure of 
paranoia, but participants in the SAp group will have significantly higher 
scores than participants in the SA group. Level of paranoia will have a 
significant effect on factors associated with SA. 
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2 Method 
2.1 Design 
The study employed a quantitative cross-sectional design involving 
comparison between two groups of participants. To address the research 
questions, the study compared socially anxious participants with no history of 
psychosis (SA group) with participants who are socially anxious and have a 
diagnosis of psychosis (SAp group). Self-report measures of shame, socially 
anxious cognitions, schemas and paranoia were administered and t-tests 
were used to compare data on these measures between the groups. 
ANCOVAs were also conducted in order to control for confounding variables. 
Additional research questions were addressed using exploratory analyses of 
data derived from a semi-structured interview which elicited images and 
memories experienced in social situations together with a self-report 
measure of trauma symptoms. Chi-squared analysis was used to compare 
memory content between the groups. Logistic regression and ANCOVA were 
planned to compare the groups on PTSD diagnosis and overall level of 
trauma symptoms respectively whilst controlling for depression. Exploratory 
analyses were also conducted comparing participants with and without 
clinical levels of paranoia. 
2.2 Participants 
2.2.1 Sample size. 
 The sample size for the study was calculated using G*Power 3 (Faul, 
Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007) and checked against Cohen (1988) in 
order to recruit a sample with sufficient power given the expected effect 
sizes. As no previous research exists comparing shame in socially anxious 
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participants with and without psychosis, the number of participants required 
to test hypothesis 1 was based on a medium effect size of 0.3 (based on 
Cohen 1988), α error probability of .05 and power of .8. The sample size 
required for a 2-group ANCOVA was 45 per group. 
With regards to hypothesis 2, initial research comparing SAp and SA 
groups (Lockett, 2011) found an effect size of 0.31 (negative self) and 0.51 
(negative other). Using a 2-group ANCOVA, a sample size of 45 per group 
would be required to detect a significant difference assuming an effect size of 
0.3. 
 To date there has been no research published comparing memories 
underpinning SA in people with and without psychosis. However, Lockett 
(2011) explored images reported by socially anxious participants and found 
those with psychosis experienced more images related to physical threat. 
The sample size for this hypothesis was based on Lockett’s effect size of 
0.38. Given α error probability of .05, power of .8, and 5 degrees of freedom, 
the total required sample size for a chi-squared analysis is 89. 
 Hypotheses 4 and 5 are exploratory, as it was not known what 
proportion of participants would report associations between traumatic 
experiences and memories and SA or how many participants would score 
above the clinical cut-off for paranoia. Therefore, this study aimed to recruit 
90 participants (45 per group), in line with calculations for hypotheses 1, 2 
and 3. 
2.2.2 Social anxiety psychosis (SAp) inclusion criteria. 
 Participants were clients from the Norfolk Early Intervention Service 
(NEIS) aged over 16 and scoring more than one standard deviation above 
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the normal range on the Social Interaction Anxiety Scale (SIAS, Mattick & 
Clarke, 1989). This cut-off has been used within NEIS to determine eligibility 
for an ongoing exploratory trial of CBT for social anxiety in early psychosis 
and has been employed with other research with this client group (Lockett 
2011; Lockett et al., 2012). NEIS comprises the Central Norfolk Early 
Intervention Team (CNEIT) and Early Intervention teams in Great Yarmouth 
and Waveney and West Norfolk. This study formed part of an ongoing 
research programme within CNEIT, where all clients are routinely screened 
for SA. The researcher liaised with psychologists in the West Norfolk and 
Great Yarmouth and Waveney teams and attended some team meetings to 
facilitate additional recruitment. 
NEIS accepts referrals for clients aged 14-35 who have been 
experiencing at least one positive psychotic symptom for at least 2 weeks at 
a level that has caused them significant distress or functional impairment. 
This client group was targeted in order to contribute to the ongoing research 
into the nature of and interventions for SA following FEP (Lockett et al. 2012; 
Reilly, Wymbs, Painter, & Fowler, 2006; Turner, Hoppitt et al., 2011; Turner, 
White, Lower, Gega, & Fowler, 2011). In addition, Birchwood and colleagues 
hypothesised that perception of social threat may be particularly heightened 
following a FEP as this is the period during which diagnostic stigma and 
striving for social acceptance are most salient (Birchwood, 2003; Birchwood 
et al., 2006).  
During the recruitment period, Norfolk and Waveney Mental Health 
NHS Foundation Trust merged with Suffolk Mental Health Partnership NHS 
Trust to become Norfolk and Suffolk NHS Foundation Trust (NSFT). As 
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recruitment was falling short of the number needed to reach statistical power, 
the study was extended to the Suffolk Early Intervention Psychosis Service 
(SEIPS). These participants were required to meet the same inclusion 
criteria. 
2.2.3 Social anxiety (SA) inclusion criteria. 
 Participants were those scoring more than 1 standard deviation above 
the normal range on the SIAS who had never had a diagnosis of psychosis. 
In order to match the age range to the SAp group, participants aged 16 to 35 
years were recruited. 
2.2.4 Exclusion criteria. 
 The following exclusion criteria were employed: 
• insufficient fluency in English; 
• diagnosed learning disability; and 
• significant neurological disease. 
The aim was to reduce the likelihood that reported symptoms were related to 
an organic cause and to ensure that participants were able to understand the 
self-report measures and engage in the interview with appropriate 
explanation and support. Criteria were assessed and implemented through 
liaison with clinicians and initial participant questions.  
2.2.5 Recruitment. 
2.2.5.1 SAp group.  
 For all potential participants, initial contact regarding the research was 
made by staff working within NEIS or Suffolk Early Intervention Service 
(SEIS). The study recruited 30 participants into the SAp group using 
purposive sampling. Table 2.1 shows a breakdown of recruitment sources. 
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Some participants were identified by Assistant Psychologists as part of 
routine clinical assessment or assessment for other research projects. In 
these cases, consent was sought to use recently collected data on the 
screening measure (SIAS, Mattick & Clarke, 1989) and any other applicable 
measures for the current study. All remaining data were collected by the 
researcher. Further participants were identified through clinician reports of 
SA which were confirmed by the researcher using the SIAS.  
2.2.5.2 SA group.  
 Thirty-five participants were recruited into the SA group through the 
Norfolk Wellbeing Service teams and via advertisement at UEA. Table 2.1 
overleaf shows a breakdown of recruitment sources. Participants in services 
were recruited using purposive sampling based on clinicians identifying the 
presence of SA in clients or service data indicating the presence of SA in 
potential participants. All potential participants were given an information 
sheet by clinicians and only contacted by the researcher if they had given 
verbal consent to this contact. Some clinicians chose to administer the SIAS 
prior to referral into the study to ensure eligibility. In these cases, consent 
was sought from the participant to use this data for the current study. All 
further data were collected by the researcher. 
At UEA, posters were displayed around campus and in the 
counselling service advertising the study and providing contact details for the 
researcher. Permission was sought via course directors to directly email 
students within Norwich Medical School with an invitation to participate in the 
study. The study was also advertised via the Faculty of Medicine and Health 
Sciences website and Research Participant System. All advertising invited 
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potential participants to contact the researcher directly. As such, a 
convenience sampling method was adopted in that participants were those 
meeting the inclusion criteria who chose to make contact with the researcher. 
All data were collected by the researcher.  
 
Table 2.1 
Recruitment Sources for the Social Anxiety and Psychosis (SAp) and Social 
Anxiety (SA) Groups  
 SAp (N = 30) SA (N = 35) 
Norfolk Early Intervention Service 
 Central Norfolk 
 Great Yarmouth and Waveney 
 West Norfolk 
Suffolk Early Intervention Psychosis Service 
University of East Anglia 
Norfolk Wellbeing Service 
 City Locality 
 North Locality 
 South Locality 
 West Locality 
 Great Yarmouth and Waveney 
24 (80.0%) 
20 (66.7%) 
  4 (13.3%) 
   0 (0.0%) 
   6 (20.0%) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
26 (74.3%) 
  9 (25.7%) 
  2 (5.7%) 
  4 (11.4%) 
  0 (0.0%) 
  0 (0.0%) 
  3 (8.6%) 
 
As can be seen in Table 2.1, participants in the SAp group were 
recruited from services, whereas 74.3% of participants in the SA group were 
non-clinical. 
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2.3 Measures 
In addition to the collection of demographic data regarding age, 
gender, ethnicity, number of years in education, and whether participants 
had ever had treatment for anxiety, the following self-report measures were 
used and administered in the order below:  
2.3.1 The Social Interaction Anxiety Scale (SIAS, Mattick & 
Clarke, 1989). 
The SIAS was used to assess the presence of SA and eligibility for 
the current study. It is a 20-item scale using a 5-point Likert response format 
assessing anxiety in response to social interactions. Although it is not a 
diagnostic tool, items were designed to correspond to DSM-III-R descriptions 
of Generalised Social Phobia (American Psychiatric Association, 1987). 
Items include, ‘I have difficulty making eye-contact with others’, and ‘I am 
tense mixing in a group’. The SIAS takes approximately 3 minutes to 
complete. It gives a single score ranging from 0 to 80 with a maximum of four 
points for each item. 
Mattick and Clarke (1989) reported internal consistency for the SIAS 
of at least .88 across three groups of clinical participants and two groups of 
non-clinical participants (undergraduates and a community sample), and 3 
month test-retest reliability of .93. Construct validity was explored using 
correlational analyses and through pre and post testing of participants 
involved in treatment outcome research. They suggested that a correlation of 
.74 with the Social Avoidance and Distress Scale (SAD, Watson & Friend, 
1969) and a significant reduction is mean SIAS scores following active 
treatment suggested construct validity (Mattick & Clarke, 1989).  
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Mattick and Clarke (1989) also found that participants with social 
phobia had significantly higher scores on the SIAS than participants with 
agoraphobia, simple phobia and non-clinical control groups, suggesting 
discriminant validity. In the current study, the SIAS demonstrated internal 
consistency of Cronbach’s alpha .80 (SAp group) and .84 (SA group). 
2.3.2 Cognitions and schemas. 
In order to explore differences between cognitive aspects of SA in 
those with and without psychosis (hypothesis 2), the current study employed 
a measure of traditional socially anxious cognitions (The Brief Fear of 
Negative Evaluations Scale, Leary, 1983a) alongside a measure validated in 
a population with psychosis (The Brief Core Schema Scales, Fowler et al., 
2006). 
2.3.2.1  The Brief Core Schema Scales (BCSS, Fowler et al., 
 2006). 
 The BCSS comprises four subscales (negative self, positive self, 
negative other, positive other) which each contain six possible beliefs. 
Respondents indicate whether they hold each belief. If ‘yes’ is selected, 
respondents indicate the extent to which they hold the belief on a 4-point 
Likert scale, resulting in a score between 0 and 24 for each subscale. It was 
designed to assess the extreme positive and negative evaluations of self and 
others observed to be typical of people with psychosis (Fowler et al., 2006). 
The current study used the negative self and negative other subscales to 
explore differences in negative self and negative other schemas between the 
groups. Example items include, ‘I am weak’ (negative self) and ‘Other people 
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are hostile’ (negative others). The BCSS takes approximately 2 minutes to 
complete.  
Fowler et al. (2006) reported good or acceptable internal consistency 
in clinical samples for all subscales (.78-.88). For the subscales used in the 
current study, the alpha coefficients were .84 (negative self) and .87 
(negative other) in a clinical sample. Three-week test-retest reliability in a 
non-clinical student sample was .84 (negative self) and .70 (negative other). 
Principal components analysis of all items indicated a four component 
solution corresponding to the subscales, suggesting a robust factor structure 
(Fowler et al., 2006). Correlations with other measures suggested that the 
BCSS assesses a distinct construct: discriminant validity was indicated with 
correlations between the negative self and other scales and the depression 
scale of the Depression Anxiety Stress Scales (Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995) 
of .63 and .29 respectively and correlations with the Rosenberg Self-Esteem 
Scale (Rosenberg, 1965) of .53 and .23 (Fowler et al., 2006). In the current 
study, the BCSS demonstrated internal consistency of Cronbach’s alpha .83 
(SAp group) and .84 (SA group) for the negative self subscale, and .94 (SAp 
group) and .84 (SA group) for the negative other subscale. 
2.3.2.2  The Brief Fear of Negative Evaluations Scale (BFNE, 
Leary, 1983a). 
The BFNE contains 12 items related to the extent to which individuals 
expect to be negatively evaluated by others. Responses are on a 5-point 
Likert scale and example items include, ‘I am afraid others will not approve of 
me’ and, ‘I often worry that I will say or do the wrong things’. It takes 
approximately 3 minutes to complete and results in a single score between 
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12 and 60. In the current study, the BFNE was used to assess negative 
cognitions related to SA. It was included for the comparison of the groups on 
a measure that has been widely used to assess socially anxious cognitions 
alongside a measure designed to assess beliefs associated with psychosis 
(BCSS; Fowler et al., 2006) in order to explore the range of thoughts and 
beliefs in both groups. 
Reliability and validity have been demonstrated in non-clinical 
samples. Leary (1983a) demonstrated internal consistency of alpha .90 and 
4-week test-retest reliability of .75. Correlations of .19 - .35 with the anxiety 
and avoidance subscales of the SAD (Watson & Friend, 1969) and with the 
Interaction Anxiousness Scale (Leary, 1983a) suggested that the BFNE 
measures a distinct construct. In the current study, the BFNE demonstrated 
internal consistency of Cronbach’s alpha .76 (SAp group) and .69 (SA 
group). 
2.3.3 The Other as Shamer Scale (OAS, Goss, Gilbert, & Allan 
 1994). 
 The OAS (Appendix D) was designed as a measure of external 
shame and is a modification of The Internalised Shame Scale (ISS, Cook, 
1993). It comprises 18 self-report items on a 5-point Likert scale relating to 
perceptions of how others judge the self. Example items include, ‘Other 
people put me down a lot’ and, ‘People see me as unimportant compared to 
others’.  The OAS takes approximately 3 minutes to complete and gives a 
total score between 0 and 72. 
The OAS was used by Birchwood and colleagues (2006) to evaluate 
the application of social rank theory (Gilbert, 1989, 1992; Price & Sloman, 
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1987) to SA in psychosis. They found that first episode psychosis 
participants who experienced SA scored more highly than those without SA, 
suggesting that the OAS is an appropriate measure for this population. It has 
also been used to explore social rank theory (Gilbert, 1989, 1992; Price & 
Sloman, 1987) in relation to SA, shame and related cognitive and emotional 
factors in clinical and non-clinical populations (Gilbert, 2000; Gilbert & Miles, 
2000). There is currently no research comparing scores on this measure in 
participants with and without psychosis. In the current study, the OAS was 
used to explore differences in levels of shame between the groups 
(hypothesis 1).  
  The ISS has demonstrated high internal consistency (.94) and test-
retest reliability of .94 (Goss, Gilbert, & Allan, 1994). Birchwood et al. (2006) 
found Cronbach’s alpha of .90 for the OAS in their psychosis sample. In a 
group of participants with depression, Gilbert (2000) found a moderate 
correlation (0.52) between the OAS and the BFNE (Leary, 1983a), 
suggesting the OAS measures a related but distinct construct. Significant 
correlations of .65 and .81 with the shame subscales of the Test of Self-
Conscious Affect (Tagney, Wagner, & Gramzow, 1992) and the Personal 
Feelings Questionnaire 2 (Harder & Zalma, 1990) respectively suggested 
convergent validity. In the current study, the OAS demonstrated internal 
consistency of Cronbach’s alpha .93 (SAp group) and .90 (SA group). 
2.3.4 Green et al. Paranoid Thoughts Scale (GPTS, Green et al., 
 2008). 
 The GPTS incorporates two 16 item 5-point Likert scales assessing 
ideas of persecution and social reference. These ideas have been found to 
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present on a continuum in the general population, and the GPTS was 
designed to assess both clinical and subclinical levels of paranoia across 
clinical and non-clinical groups (Green et al., 2008). It takes approximately 3 
minutes to complete and yields subscale score between 16 and 80 or a total 
score between 32 and 160. Scores from 4 to 20 assessing conviction, 
preoccupation, and distress can also be calculated within each subscale.  
In the current study, total GPTS scores were used to compare level of 
paranoia between the groups and the number of participants with scores 
indicating a clinical level of paranoia (hypothesis 5). Clinical level of paranoia 
was defined as a total score of 68 or greater (personal communication from 
C. Green, as cited in Lockett, 2011), and exploratory analyses were 
conducted by splitting the sample into participants with and without paranoia. 
Example GPTS items include, ‘People have been dropping hints for me’ 
(social reference) and, ‘People have intended me harm’ (persecution). 
 Green et al. (2008) demonstrated total and subscale internal 
consistency of .68-.95. Test-retest reliability was .81-.88 over 2 weeks. Total 
GPTS score correlations with the Paranoia Scale (Fenigstein & Vanable, 
1992) were .81 and .71 in clinical and non-clinical groups respectively, 
whereas correlations with the scores on the Peters et al. Delusions Inventory 
(Peters et al., 1999) for the same groups were .43 and .39, suggesting 
concurrent and discriminant validity. In the current study, the GPTS 
demonstrated internal consistency (total scale scores) of Cronbach’s alpha 
.97 (SAp group) and .94 (SA group). 
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2.3.5 Brief Symptom Inventory (BSI, Derogatis, 1975). 
 The BSI consists of 53 items measuring nine dimensions of 
psychological symptoms and three distress indices. It takes approximately 8 
minutes to complete and raw scores on the subscales are used to calculate a 
mean score which is converted into a t-score based on the participant’s 
reference group (inpatient/outpatient/non-patient; male/female).  
In the current study, the depression subscale was used to assess 
level of depression as a potential confounding variable in the comparison of 
shame, cognitions, schemas and trauma symptoms between the groups 
(hypotheses 1, 2 and 4). The subscale consists of six items rated on a 5-
point Likert scale. Respondents are required to indicate how much they have 
been distressed by each item over the past 7 days. For example, ‘Feeling no 
interest in things’.  
For the purposes of controlling for actual levels of depression, all 
participants’ depression scores were converted to a t-score using the male 
and female non-patient norms provided by Derogatis (1993). This was 
consistent with previous use of the measure for research purposes (e.g., 
Erickson, 2003; Nelson & Wampler, 2002).  
  Derogatis (1975, 1993) reported test-retest reliability for the different 
subscales of the BSI of .68 - .91 and internal consistency for the depression 
subscale of .85. Subscale correlations with relevant scales from the 
Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory-2 (Butcher, Dahlstrom, Graham, 
Tellegen, & Kaemmer, 1989) averaged above .50, suggesting satisfactory 
construct validity. Items for the subscales were selected based on factor 
analysis of the SCL-R-90 (Derogatis, 1975, 1977), of which the BSI is a short 
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version. BSI subscales were able to correctly classify participants in a FEP 
population according to whether they had low or high scores for general 
symptoms on the Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale (PANSS, Kay, 
Fiszbein, & Opler 1987) in 72.5% of cases (Preston & Harrison, 2003). In the 
current study, the depression subscale demonstrated internal consistency of 
Cronbach’s alpha .91 (SAp group) and .83 (SA group).  
2.3.6 Memories and trauma symptoms. 
Hypotheses 3 and 4 involved the exploration of memories 
underpinning any images experienced whilst socially anxious and whether 
these memories were linked to trauma symptoms. The semi-structured 
interview used to explore memories is an amalgamation of two interviews 
developed by Hackmann and colleagues to explore images (Hackmann et 
al., 1998) and memories (Hackmann et al., 2000) underpinning SA. The 
imagery interview was piloted and adapted (with permission from the first 
author) for previous research (Lockett et al., 2012). For the current study, the 
researcher also included the additional memory interview components. 
These questions do not elicit quantitative data on the focus of any memories 
elicited.  Therefore, for the purpose of exploring hypothesis 3, the rating 
scale developed by Hackmann et al. (1998) to assess the self/other focus of 
images in the original interview was adapted to apply to memories and 
added as Scale 5 in order to assess the extent to which participants’ 
memories were focused on themselves or on others.   
The final interview was piloted by the researcher and feedback 
obtained from one patient with a diagnosis of psychosis and comorbid SA 
prior to commencing the study. The interview takes approximately 30 
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minutes, with some variation depending on whether participants experience 
relevant images and can identify a related memory. See Appendix E for the 
final interview and rating scales.  
 The interview asks participants whether they experience images when 
socially anxious – for example, having an impression of how they think they 
appear to other people or an impression of how others may be reacting to 
them even if they are not looking at them. Participants who describe an 
image are asked to recall their first recollection of having the thoughts, 
sensations, emotions and/or experiences reflected in the image and are 
asked whether there is a particular memory that seems to be closely related 
to that image. They are asked to describe the images and memories elicited 
in detail, and are also shown visual analogue scales and asked to rate their 
level of anxiety, the perspective of the image and of the memory (more 
focused on self or others), how distorted the image is compared with real life, 
and similarities between the elicited memory and the image experienced in 
current social situations. As such, the interview elicits quantitative data from 
the rating scales and qualitative data from participants’ descriptions.  
In the current study, in order to explore differences between the 
groups in whether the memories elicited were focused on own performance 
or a threatening other or others (hypothesis 3), the self/other focus of 
memories was assessed on a 7-point scale. The scale ranges from -3 
(completely focused on others/another person) to +3 (completely focused on 
myself as though looking from outside).  
There is no psychometric data available for the interview. However, 
the imagery interview was found to effectively elicit the images of participants 
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with psychosis in a pilot study (Lockett et al., 2012) and was then used to 
compare the images of participants with and without psychosis (Lockett, 
2011). The amalgamated interview has been used in previous research with 
socially anxious participants (Hackmann et al., 2000; Wild et al., 2008). 
Consistency between participants was maximised by all interviews being 
completed by the researcher. Participants’ responses are summarised and 
checked at regular intervals throughout the interview. Audio recordings of the 
interviews were made. Due to time constraints, interviews were not rated by 
a second researcher. However, the rating of interest to the current study is 
that of the self/other focus of participants’ memories. These ratings were 
made by the participants.  
 In order to explore differences between the groups in the presence of 
trauma symptoms related to the memory elicited in the interview (hypothesis 
4), participants who reported a memory were asked to complete the Self-
Rating Scale for PTSD (SRS-PTSD, Carlier, Lamberts, Van Uchelen, & 
Gersons, 1998) in relation to the event in that memory. The SRS-PTSD 
consists of 17 items on a 3-point rating scale and was developed from the 
Structured Interview for PTSD (SI-PTSD, Davidson, Smith, & Kudler, 1989) 
to provide a briefer measure of PTSD in a self-report format. The SI-PTSD 
was developed according to DSM-III criteria and was adapted for the SRS-
PTSD to assess symptoms according to DSM-III-R criteria. Scoring has been 
adapted to meet DSM-IV criteria by including physiological arousal within the 
reexperiencing symptom cluster rather than the hyperactivation cluster 
(Carlier et al., 1998).  
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The SRS-PTSD takes approximately 10 minutes to complete and 
yields scores on three symptom clusters. Diagnosis of PTSD requires the 
presence of at least one reexperiencing, three avoidance, and two 
hyperarousal symptoms. Questions relate to the effects of a specific event 
over the past 4 weeks. Example items include, ‘I repeatedly dreamed about 
the event’ (reexperiencing), ‘I did my best or forced myself not to think about 
the event’ (avoidance), and, ‘Ever since the event, I have felt less at ease or 
less safe’ (hyperarousal). In addition, a total symptom score (0-17) was 
calculated in order to compare the groups on subclinical trauma symptoms. 
Carlier et al. (1998) demonstrated internal consistency of .96 (total 
scale) and .88-.93 for the SRS-PTSD subscales. Factor analysis supported a 
three-factor solution corresponding to the subscales (Carlier et al., 1998). 
When compared to the SI-PTSD, the SRS-PTSD demonstrated sensitivity of 
86% and specificity of 80%. In the current study, the SRS-PTSD 
demonstrated internal consistency of Cronbach’s alpha .92 (SAp group) and 
.82 (SA group). 
A number of the measures (SIAS, BCSS, BFNE, GPTS, BSI and the 
imagery components of the semi-structured interview) have already been 
used within CNEIT’s ongoing research programme. It was intended that the 
choice of these measures would reduce burden of assessment and allow 
comparison with previous research within the team (e.g., Lockett, 2011).  
2.4 Ethical Considerations 
 The study was reviewed and approved by the Norfolk Research Ethics 
Committee who also conducted a non-NHS site specific assessment, 
granting a favourable opinion on the proposed recruitment from the 
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University of East Anglia. Research Governance approval was granted by 
the Research and Development departments for Norfolk & Waveney Mental 
Health NHS Foundation Trust and NHS Norfolk and NHS Great Yarmouth & 
Waveney.  Following the Trusts’ merger, research governance approval to 
extend recruitment for the SAp group into Suffolk was granted by Research 
and Development for Norfolk and Suffolk NHS Foundation Trust. See 
Appendices F and G for confirmation of these approvals.  
2.4.1 Informed consent. 
 Participants were given an information sheet (PIS) to consider at least 
72 hours before consent was sought (Appendices H, I and J). The PIS gave 
information on the aims of the study and explained what would be involved 
and that participation would not affect current or subsequent care. It informed 
participants that they could withdraw from the study at any point, without 
giving a reason. Confidentiality was explained and relevant contact numbers 
provided. The consent form (Appendix K) obtained consent to record 
interviews. Informed consent was taken by the researcher. For Suffolk 
participants, information sheets and consent forms were updated with the 
new Trust logo (Appendices L and M). 
2.4.2 Risk. 
 The main risk was seen to be that of distress, particularly where SA is 
underpinned by trauma. For this reason, it was decided that all interviews 
would be conducted by the researcher. Where self-report data was collected 
by Assistant Psychologists, they were trained in psychological assessment 
as part of their current job role and closely supervised by qualified Clinical 
Psychologists. The researcher is experienced in psychological assessments 
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and interviews. In the event of distress, the researcher terminated the 
interview, discussed the source of distress and offered support. If necessary, 
participants were signposted to their care co-ordinator. For participants not 
within services, a similar procedure was adopted, and they were signposted 
to their GP or the university counselling service. In two cases, the interview 
was paused when the researcher observed that the participant appeared 
upset. Both participants chose to continue with the interview when the source 
of their distress had been explored. Difficulties and risks were discussed with 
the researcher’s clinical supervisor. 
 During the course of the research, 13 participants indicated on the BSI 
that they had been distressed ‘quite a bit’ or ‘extremely’ by thoughts of 
ending their life. In these cases, this was discussed further to establish 
whether there were any associated plans or intentions. Where participants 
clearly stated that they had no intention of acting on these thoughts, 
appropriate signposting was offered and the conversation recorded and 
subsequently discussed with the researcher’s clinical supervisor. Three 
participants in the SAp group either described having considered plans for 
ending their life or thought that they might act on their suicidal thoughts in the 
future.  All of these participants gave consent for the researcher to discuss 
this with their care co-ordinator. No participants described immediate plans 
to harm themselves and all participants in the SA group stated that they had 
no intention of acting on any thoughts of ending their life. Should discussions 
have identified significant risk or if participants had not consented to 
discussion of possible risks with their care co-ordinator, the procedures 
outlined below would have been adopted.  
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 Only participants with completed risk assessments were offered home 
interviews. The researcher was in contact with a clinician from CNEIT before 
and after appointments, in compliance with the Trust’s lone working policy. 
Assistant Psychologists collecting self-report data within CNEIT utilised their 
buddy system to ensure researcher safety for home visits. This involved 
contacting an identified team member before and after an appointment. 
2.4.3 Data storage and confidentiality. 
 Consent forms were stored separately from research data and linked 
only through code numbers. Contact information was only given to the 
researcher with prior consent from the participant. For those not in services, 
initiation of contact with the researcher was by the participant. 
 Participants were given the option of having assessment information 
shared with their service. Information was only shared without consent if the 
assessment revealed a serious risk. This was made clear to participants in 
the information sheet and at the start of the assessment. Had any such risks 
become apparent, a documented plan was in place to inform the participant’s 
care team, the crisis resolution and home treatment team (CRHT), their GP, 
or the police, as appropriate. For those not in services, the researcher would 
seek consent to contact the participant’s GP or another appropriate contact 
or would have sought advice from CRHT or the emergency services. Risks 
were discussed with the researcher’s clinical supervisor. Further action was 
not required for any participant not in services. 
Research data were held securely. Documents were stored in locked 
filing cabinets within Norfolk and Suffolk NHS Foundation Trust (NSFT) 
premises. Recordings were saved onto a secure NHS hard drive and an 
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encrypted memory stick stored securely on NSFT premises. No participant 
identifiable details were recorded on the SPSS database used to analyse the 
results of the study. In accordance with ethical approvals, participant consent 
forms were stored for 12 months before being destroyed. Non-identifiable 
research data will be retained for 5 years, in accordance with NHS protocols 
and the requirement that research data is archived and accessible for critical 
review (Department of Health, 2005).  
2.5 Procedure 
2.5.1 Recruitment. 
Telephone contact with potential participants was made using a pay 
as you go SIM card. This was not used for any other purpose and was 
destroyed upon study completion. All participants were given the 
researcher’s email address on the study information sheet should they wish 
to make contact regarding the research at a later point. Figure 2.1 illustrates 
the recruitment pathways and study involvement for all participants. 
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Figure 2.1 
 
Recruitment Pathways and Participant Involvement in the Study 
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111 
 
  2.5.1.1 SAp group. 
  Potential participants were identified through routine use of the SIAS 
and discussion with clinicians who were made aware of the research study. 
Those clients with a score of at least 30 on the SIAS and those without a 
recent SIAS score who were identified by clinicians as feeling anxious in 
social situations were informed of the study by a clinician from within their 
team. Care co-ordinators were consulted regarding the appropriateness of 
the potential participant for the research, as documented in the research 
protocol. Potential participants were given an information sheet by a clinician. 
Those who expressed an interest in the research were asked for consent to 
be contacted by the researcher. Those identified as appropriate for the study 
as part of clinical or research assessments by an Assistant Psychologist 
gave permission to incorporate the research measures within the existing 
assessment process and consent was sought for the researcher to attend to 
conduct the semi-structured interview and any remaining self-report 
measures. At least 72 hours elapsed between participants receiving the 
information sheet and a subsequent meeting. On meeting with the 
researcher, participants had a further opportunity to ask questions prior to 
consent being taken.  
 2.5.1.2 SA group. 
 2.5.1.2.1 Clinical population. 
 The researcher met with clinical leads of the Wellbeing teams in 
Norfolk to inform them of the study and seek permission to discuss with 
clinicians. The Wellbeing service incorporates the Improving Access to 
Psychological Therapies (IAPT) service and Linkworker teams. Time was 
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spent building relationships with service leads and clinical teams to aid 
recruitment. The researcher attended team meetings and provided clinicians 
with study information. Contact with teams and monitoring of recruitment was 
maintained throughout the study. Further time was given to maximising 
recruitment from those teams that provided additional opportunities for 
cooperation. The researcher held an additional honorary contract to work 
within the clinical team of the North Norfolk Wellbeing service. This involved 
regular attendance at triage meetings to aid identification of suitable 
participants. In addition, following approval, the service lead was able to 
provide an anonymised database of past and current referrals to the service 
with diagnostic codes. This was used to identify numbers of potential 
participants by allocated clinician. Clinicians were then contacted individually 
by the researcher to discuss whether these clients were on their existing 
caseloads and would be suitable for the research.  
 Clinicians in the City Locality Wellbeing Service identified a SA group 
as a possible source for recruitment. Arrangements were made for the group 
facilitators to discuss the research with two consecutive group cohorts and 
obtain consent from group members for the researcher to attend to discuss 
the research further and answer questions. Group members were then given 
time to consider the study information and invited to either contact the 
researcher directly or give consent to the group facilitators at a subsequent 
meeting to pass on their contact details.  
 Potential participants identified by clinicians were given the study 
information sheet by the clinician and asked for consent to be contacted by 
the researcher. The researcher then made telephone contact and answered 
113 
 
any questions prior to the potential participant deciding whether they wished 
to arrange an appointment. All clinical participants were given the choice of 
meeting in an NSFT clinic room, GP surgery, a private room at UEA, or their 
home (subject to risk assessment).  
 2.5.1.2.2 Non-clinical population. 
 Participants from UEA had either received an email about the study or 
responded to advertisement of the research or information obtained via the 
counselling service. The email to students in Norwich Medical School 
included the study information sheet and was responded to by only two 
students (less than 1%). This may have been because permission to send 
the email was obtained after other forms of advertising had been in place for 
a number of weeks. Potential participants responding to advertisement of the 
research were sent an email answering any questions with an attached 
information sheet. The SIAS was also attached to the email and the option 
given for potential participants to complete this electronically to ensure they 
met study criteria or to delay completion until they met with the researcher. 
Respondents identified as not meeting criteria based on age were 
signposted to their GP and services within the university should they require 
support.  Twenty-two of the remaining potential participants (84.6%) chose to 
complete the SIAS electronically, and four participants (15.4%) chose to 
complete the screening measure together with the researcher as part of the 
interview process.  
If no response was received to the researcher’s reply to the potential 
participant’s initial contact, a follow-up email was sent following a gap of at 
least 7 days. This offered to answer any further questions or to ensure that 
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the recipient received no further contact and all emails were deleted if they 
had chosen not to participate. If appropriate, arrangements were made by 
email to conduct an interview at UEA. The option of a telephone call was 
also offered. Table 2.2 below shows the outcome of all initial responses to 
UEA recruitment methods in relation to eligibility and participation in the 
study. 
 
Table 2.2 
Outcome of Initial Responses (n = 52) to UEA Recruitment 
 N % 
Consented into study 26   50.0 
Declined   20   38.5 
Ineligible   6   11.6 
 Age > 35 years   4     7.8 
 SIAS score < 30   2     3.8 
Note. SIAS = Social Interaction Anxiety Scale (Mattick & Clarke, 1989). 
 Informed consent was obtained at the start of the meeting. Collection 
of all data and obtaining consent were the responsibility of the researcher. 
2.5.2 Data collection. 
 All data were collected between October 2011 and April 2012. After 
obtaining informed consent, the interviewer remained with participants whilst 
they completed the self-report measures in order to answer questions and 
provide support but maintained a low-key presence using reading material to 
avoid scrutinising the participant. Some participants preferred to work 
through each measure with the researcher – in these cases, the researcher 
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read the questions as printed and provided additional explanations where 
required. The SRS-PTSD was completed after the semi-structured interview. 
All other measures were completed prior to the interview to avoid the 
interview experience affecting how the questions were answered. In all cases 
where consent was provided (n = 62, 95.4%), the semi-structured interview 
was audio recorded and responses were noted beneath each question on 
the interview schedule. Three participants declined to have their interviews 
recorded. In these cases, more detailed notes were made of participants’ 
responses. 
 The length of time required for data collection from each participant 
varied depending on the relevance of the semi-structured interview to their 
experiences. The maximum time required was around 90 minutes to obtain 
consent, answer questions, complete all measures and debrief. 
Following data collection, participants were given the opportunity to 
discuss the purpose of each measure and the interview in relation to the 
aims of the research. Any additional questions about the study were 
answered. All participants were given the option of supplying their contact 
details in order to receive a summary of the study findings upon completion. 
These details were stored securely with their consent form and separately 
from their research data. Participants recruited through NHS services also 
had the option to receive a summary report of the assessment. With their 
consent, this was also sent to their care co-ordinator. See Appendix N for an 
example of an anonymised report.  
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2.6 Plan of Analysis 
 Questionnaire responses for each participant were checked during the 
interview session to minimise the level of missing data. Missing 
questionnaire responses were replaced using prorating which involved 
substituting the missing value with the participant’s mean response on that 
measure or subscale. This was seen as an appropriate method given that 
total scores rather than scores for individual items were used in the analyses 
and prorating has been seen as more reliable when the proportion of missing 
values is small (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). With regards to the semi-
structured interview and the SRS-PTSD, missing responses or questions that 
were not applicable (e.g., if the participant did not report a memory) will be 
excluded from the analyses. 
 All data will be analysed using Statistical Package for Social Sciences 
for Windows, version 18.0 (SPSS, 2010). Descriptive statistics will be 
calculated for both groups and each variable. Data distributions will also be 
examined for normality. Skewed data will initially be treated by applying 
transformations to the relevant variable. In the event that this does not result 
in normally distributed data, appropriate non-parametric tests will be used.  
 Internal consistency for each self-report measure was calculated and 
demographics and SIAS scores of both groups will be compared for 
significant differences using independent samples t-tests. The following 
analyses will be employed: 
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2.6.1 Hypothesis 1: Participants in the SAp group will have 
significantly higher scores than participants in the SA group on a 
measure of shame.  
 An independent samples t-test will be conducted to compare total 
OAS scores between participants with and without psychosis. Should a 
significant difference between the groups be detected, an ANCOVA will be 
employed in order to control for depression and trauma symptoms. This will 
involve entering BSI depression subscale t-scores and number of SRS-
PTSD symptoms as covariates.  
2.6.2 Hypothesis 2: Participants in both groups will endorse 
negative cognitions related to social situations, but participants 
in the SAp group will have significantly higher scores on a 
measure of negative self and negative other schemas. 
 Independent samples t-tests will be conducted to compare total BFNE 
and BCSS negative self and negative other scores between participants with 
and without psychosis. Where significant differences between the groups are 
found, ANCOVAs will be used to compare both groups’ total scores whilst 
controlling for depression and trauma symptoms. BSI depression subscale t-
scores and number of SRS-PTSD symptoms will be entered as covariates.  
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2.6.3 Hypothesis 3: There will be differences between the two 
groups in the memories linked to images experienced when 
socially anxious. Specifically, memories reported by the SA 
group will be more likely to be focused on own performance, 
whereas participants in the SAp group will report more memories 
focused on a threatening other or others. 
 This will be an exploratory analysis comparing the focus of the 
memories of those participants who report that any images experienced 
when socially anxious are linked to a specific remembered event. The scores 
for self/other focus of memories elicited using the semi-structured interview 
will be compared between the groups using Pearson’s chi-squared analysis. 
2.6.4 Hypothesis 4: Participants in the SAp group will be more 
likely than participants in the SA group to report memories that 
are linked to symptoms of PTSD. 
 This will be an exploratory analysis of responses to the SRS-PTSD 
completed by those participants who report a memory in the semi-structured 
interview. Pearson’s chi-squared analysis will be used to compare the groups 
on the presence/absence of PTSD according to the SRS-PTSD. Should this 
be significant, it will be followed by conducting a logistic regression analysis 
in order to control for the effect of depression. An independent samples t-test 
will be used to compare the groups on total number of symptoms on the 
SRS-PTSD to assess differences in subclinical symptoms. If a significant 
difference between the groups is found, an ANCOVA will be conducted to 
control for the effect of depression. In the logistic regression and ANCOVA, 
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depression will be controlled for by entering BSI depression subscale t-
scores as a covariate. 
 2.6.5 Hypothesis 5: Participants in both groups will have high
 scores on a measure of paranoia, but participants in the SAp 
 group will have significantly higher scores than participants in 
 the SA group. Level of paranoia will have a significant effect on 
 factors associated with SA. 
Descriptive data relating to total GPTS scores will be explored in order 
to compare the mean GPTS score for each group to normative data (Green 
et al., 2008) and to ascertain the number of participants in each group with a 
score indicative of a clinical level of paranoia (a score of 68 or greater; 
personal communication from C. Green, as cited in Lockett, 2011). An 
independent samples t-test will then be conducted to compare the total 
scores of participants with and without psychosis. Additional exploratory 
analyses will be conducted to compare participants with and without clinical 
levels of paranoia. Scores on the OAS, BFNE, BCSS negative self and 
negative other subscales, and total number of SRS-PTSD symptoms will be 
compared using independent samples t-tests. The focus of memories 
reported by participants with and without paranoia will be compared using 
Pearson’s chi-squared analysis.  
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3 Results 
3.1 Overview 
 This chapter begins by presenting descriptive details of the sample 
and outlining the data screening process. Descriptive statistics are presented 
for each of the variables explored by the study hypotheses and the treatment 
of data violating the assumptions of parametric tests is described. The 
results of statistical analyses for each hypothesis are then presented, 
followed by the rationale for and results of subsidiary analyses. The chapter 
concludes with a summary of the results. 
3.2 Description of the Sample 
A total of 65 participants were recruited into the study. Demographic 
details, SIAS scores and previous treatment for anxiety for participants in the 
two groups are detailed in Table 3.1 overleaf. The number of participants fell 
short of the 90 required based on the sample size calculation. In addition to 
regularly meeting with clinical teams, the researcher attended triage sessions 
with the Wellbeing service and discussed potential suitability of clients on the 
case loads of individual clinicians in CNEIT and Wellbeing services. The 
researcher also liaised with Assistant Psychologists conducting routine 
assessments to identify participants with a score of 30 or above on the SIAS. 
Extending recruitment into the Suffolk Early Intervention in Psychosis Service 
increased the number of participants in the SAp group. However, despite 
these efforts, recruitment remained challenging. 
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Table 3.1 
Descriptive Details of the Social Anxiety and Psychosis (SAp) and Social 
Anxiety (SA) Groups  
 SAp (n = 30) SA (n = 35) 
Mean age (SD) in years 24.6 (5.07) 24.2 (6.03) 
Gender n (%)   
 Male 21 (70.0) 20 (57.1) 
 Female   9 (30.0) 15 (42.9) 
Ethnicity n (%)   
 White British 
 White Other 
 Asian   
 Black African  
25 (83.3) 
   4 (13.3) 
   1 (3.3) 
   0 (0) 
 
28 (80.0) 
  3 (8.6) 
  3 (8.6) 
  1 (2.9) 
Mean education (SD) in 
years 
 13.5 (2.4) 14.9 (2.5) 
Mean SIAS score (SD)  46.5 (10.65)  50.7 (11.29) 
Treatment for anxiety n 
(%) 
  
 Yes  12 (40)  20 (57.1) 
 No    18 (60)    15 (42.9) 
Note. SIAS = Social Interaction Anxiety Scale (Mattick & Clarke, 1989). 
The mean age of participants was reflective of the age range for 
clients in EI services (16-35 years). The similarity in mean age between the 
groups suggested that a significant number of the SA group recruited from 
the University of East Anglia were mature students. The high ratio of males 
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to females in the SAp group was representative of a psychosis population. 
Previous research involving this client group has tended to recruit a greater 
number of males than females (e.g., Lockett, 2011; Voges & Addington, 
2005). Pearson’s chi-squared analysis (using Yates’ continuity correction for 
2 x 2 tables) was conducted to test for gender differences in treatment 
history. There was no significant difference between male and female 
participants in relation to previous treatment for anxiety (2 = 0.50, p > .05). 
The high proportion of participants identifying themselves as White British 
was indicative of the limited ethnic diversity in Norfolk. Participants in both 
groups had a mean SIAS score more than 2 standard deviations above the 
mean for an undergraduate sample and a community sample (Mattick & 
Clarke, 1998), suggesting a significant level of SA. 
T-tests were conducted to test for group differences in age, education 
and SIAS scores. Pearson’s chi-squared analysis was used to test for group 
differences in gender and treatment history (using Yates’ continuity 
correction for 2 x 2 tables). There were no significant differences between 
the groups in SIAS scores (t = -1.56, p > .05), age (t = 0.27, p > .05), 
treatment history (2 = 0.26, p > .05) and gender composition of the samples 
(2 = 0.42, p > .05). The SA group had a significantly greater number of 
years in education (t = -2.22, p = .03), although participants in both groups 
had a mean time in education indicative of at least 2 years education after 
the age of 16 years. Overall, the groups appeared to be well-matched. 
Descriptive data in relation to the study hypotheses will now be described. 
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3.3 Descriptive Data Analysis 
 All variables were screened for missing data and to ensure they met 
the assumptions for the planned statistical tests prior to analysis. Data 
screening was conducted using SPSS version 18.0.  
 3.3.1 Data screening. 
 As a result of measures employed to minimise missing data (see 
section 2.6) only one participant missed an item on a questionnaire. This 
single missing value from the SIAS (Mattick & Clarke, 1989) was replaced 
with the participant’s mean score on this measure. There were no missing 
responses to the semi-structured interview questions, but participants who 
did not report images and/or memories were not asked the subsequent 
questions and participants who did not report a memory did not complete the 
SRS-PTSD (Carlier et al., 1998). These items were coded as ‘not applicable’ 
and excluded from the analyses. The number of participants completing each 
question or measure is shown within the descriptive data for each 
hypothesis. 
 3.3.2 Distribution of variables. 
 Continuous variables were screened for normality by conducting 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests and plotting histograms of the distribution of 
variables for each group. In the event of significant Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
tests, data transformations were first applied. Where this resulted in normally 
distributed data, the transformed scores were used in the analyses. Where 
transformations were unsuccessful, non-parametric tests were used. Where 
non-parametric alternatives to the planned analyses were unavailable, this 
was taken into account when interpreting the results. For categorical data, 
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Yates’ continuity correction is reported in the results of analyses where 2 x 2 
frequency tables were analysed. 
 Appendix O provides normality test results tables for the continuous 
variables analysed. Appendix P shows histograms of the data distributions 
for skewed variables. Scores on the Other as Shamer Scale (OAS; Goss, 
Gilbert, & Allan, 1994), Brief Fear of Negative Evaluations Scale (BFNE; 
Leary, 1983b), Green et al. Paranoid Thoughts Scale (GPTS; Green et al., 
2008), and Self-Rating Scale for PTSD (SRS-PTSD; Carlier et al., 1998) 
were normally distributed and appropriate for parametric tests. Both the 
negative self and negative other dimensions of the Brief Core Schema 
Scales (BCSS; Fowler et al., 2006) were positively skewed in the SA group. 
Square root, log and reciprocal transformations were applied. All 
transformations resulted in the negative self data for the SAp group 
becoming skewed, suggesting that non-parametric tests would be more 
appropriate. Square root transformation was successful in creating normality 
in the negative other data.  
 Brief Symptom Inventory (BSI; Derogatis, 1975) depression t-scores 
were negatively skewed in the SAp group. These scores were reflected and 
log and inverse transformations were applied. The transformed scores were 
then rereflected and Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests applied. Transformations 
were unsuccessful in creating normality, which suggested that this data may 
not be appropriate for analysis using parametric tests. This is considered 
further in interpreting the findings of multivariate analyses. Normality test 
results tables and histograms for transformed scores are provided in 
Appendix Q.  
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3.4 Hypothesis Testing 
 Descriptive data relating to hypotheses 1 and 2 are shown in Table 
3.2 below. 
 
Table 3.2 
Means (  ), Standard Deviations (SD), and Numbers per Group (n) for OAS, 
BFNE and BCSS Scores in the Social Anxiety and Psychosis (SAp) and 
Social Anxiety (SA) Groups  
Measure Group     SD n 
OAS SAp 44.2 15.55 30 
 SA 35.6 13.25 35 
FNEB SAp 45.2 10.05 30 
 SA 47.5   8.83 35 
BCSS negative self SAp    9.2   5.93 30 
 SA    6.0    5.30 35 
BCSS negative other SAp    9.8    7.63 30 
 SA    6.2    5.00 35 
Note. OAS = Other as Shamer Scale (Goss, Gilbert, & Allan, 1994), BFNE = The Brief Fear 
of Negative Evaluations Scale (Leary, 1983a), BCSS = Brief Core Schema Scales (Fowler et 
al., 2006).  
 
Where ANCOVAs were conducted in testing hypotheses 1 and 2, the 
analysis plan was to control for both depression and trauma symptoms. The 
study aimed to compare the groups on trauma symptoms that were 
specifically related to memories linked to SA. As such, PTSD symptoms 
were only assessed via completion of the SRS-PTSD if a participant’s 
responses to the semi-structured interview indicated that the images they 
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experienced when socially anxious were related to a specific memory. As 
only 26 participants reported such a memory, a decision was made not to 
control for trauma symptoms, as such analyses would have limited power to 
detect an association. Therefore, only BSI depression subscale t-scores 
were entered as a covariate when conducting ANCOVAs. As discussed 
above, depression t-scores were negatively skewed. Where depression is 
entered as a covariate, the analysis should be considered subsidiary to the t-
test and interpreted with caution. This chapter will now consider the results of 
statistical analyses in relation to each of the study hypotheses. 
 3.4.1 Hypothesis 1: Participants in the SAp group will have 
 significantly higher scores than participants in the SA group on a 
 measure of shame. 
 The SAp group had a higher mean score on the OAS than the SA 
group. An independent samples t-test was conducted to test for a significant 
difference between the groups. Levene’s test for equality of variances was 
not significant, indicating that data variances were equal between the groups. 
There was a significant difference in shame scores between the groups, t(63) 
= 2.40, p = .02, r = .29, therefore the analysis plan was followed to conduct 
an ANCOVA with group (SAp, SA) as the independent variable and OAS 
scores as the dependent variable. Depression t-scores were entered as a 
covariate. 
 The covariate, depression, was significantly related to OAS shame 
scores such that higher levels of depression were associated with higher 
levels of shame, F(1, 62) = 14.98, p < .01, r = .44. There was no significant 
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effect of group on OAS scores after controlling for the effect of depression, 
F(1, 62) = 3.59, p > .05; r = .23. 
 3.4.1.1  Summary of results for hypothesis 1. 
In support of hypothesis 1, participants in the SAp group had 
significantly higher scores than participants in the SA group on a measure of 
shame. This difference did not remain significant when depression was 
entered into the analysis. However, in the latter analysis, the effect of group 
on OAS shame scores did represent a medium effect size (r = .23) and was 
approaching significance (p = .06), suggesting that participants with 
psychosis may have experienced higher levels of shame. Given that the 
study did not achieve the estimated sample size required for statistical 
power, this may have impacted on the results. 
 3.4.2 Hypothesis 2: Participants in both groups will endorse 
 negative cognitions related to social situations, but participants 
 in the SAp group will have significantly higher scores on a 
 measure of negative self and negative other schemas. 
 In order to test this hypothesis, the groups were compared in relation 
to differences in scores on the BFNE (reflecting negative cognitions 
associated with anxiety in social situations) and the negative self and 
negative other subscales of the BCSS (reflecting schematic beliefs). 
 3.4.2.1  Negative cognitions related to social situations: fear of 
 negative evaluation. 
  An independent samples t-test was conducted to test for a significant 
difference between the groups in BFNE scores. Levene’s test for equality of 
variances was not significant, indicating that data variances were equal 
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between the groups. There was no significant difference in fear of negative 
evaluation scores between the groups, t(63) = -1.02, p > .05, r = .13. This 
suggested that participants with and without psychosis did not differ in their 
level of endorsement of negative cognitions related to social situations, 
providing support for the first part of the hypothesis. Results of the second 
part of the hypothesis in relation to negative self and other schemas will now 
be described. 
 3.4.2.2  Negative self schemas. 
 As transformations were unsuccessful in creating normally distributed 
data, a Mann-Whitney U test was conducted to test for a significant 
difference between the groups in BCSS negative self scores. This indicated 
that the SAp group had significantly higher scores for negative self schemas 
than the SA group, U = 360.50, p = .03, r = .27. 
 In order to conduct the planned ANCOVA with depression t-scores as 
a covariate, square root transformations were applied to the variables as this 
was the transformation that was closest to being effective in creating 
normality in the negative self data – the only significant Kilmogorov-Smirnov 
test was then for negative self in the SAp group with an alpha value of .048. 
Levene’s test was not significant, suggesting equal variances between the 
groups. 
 The covariate, depression, was significantly related to BCSS negative 
self scores such that higher levels of depression were associated with higher 
negative self scores, F(1, 62) = 5.52, p = .02, r = .28. There was no 
significant effect of group on negative self scores after controlling for the 
effect of depression, F(1, 62) = 2.26, p > .05; r = .19. The results of the 
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analysis of BCSS negative other scores will now be considered in order to 
complete the testing of hypothesis 2. 
 3.4.2.3  Negative other schemas. 
 An independent samples t-test was conducted to test for a significant 
difference between the groups in BCSS negative other scores. The square 
root transformed scores were used as these were normally distributed. 
Levene’s test for equality of variances was not significant, indicating that data 
variances were equal between the groups. There was no significant 
difference in negative other scores between the groups, t(63) = 1.63, p > .05, 
r = .20. 
 3.4.2.4  Summary of results for hypothesis 2.  
 In support of hypothesis 2, there was no significant difference 
between the groups in the level of endorsement of negative cognitions 
related to social situations. Also supporting the hypothesis, participants in the 
SAp group had significantly higher scores on a measure of negative self 
schemas, suggesting that participants in this group had a higher level of 
negative beliefs about themselves. However, this difference did not remain 
significant when depression was entered into the analysis. Given the skewed 
nature of the negative self and depression data and the lower than expected 
sample size, this finding should be interpreted with caution. However, it may 
suggest that negative self schemas were related to depression in psychosis 
rather than psychosis itself. The role of depression is explored further in 
subsidiary analyses and appraised in the Discussion chapter. 
Contrary to the hypothesis, there was no significant difference 
between the groups in negative other schemas. This suggested that negative 
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beliefs about other people were not more extreme in socially anxious 
participants with psychosis compared to socially anxious participants without 
psychosis. 
 3.4.3 Hypothesis 3: There will be differences between the two 
 groups in the memories linked to images experienced when 
 socially anxious. Specifically, memories reported by the SA 
 group will be more likely to be focused on own performance, 
 whereas participants in the SAp group will report more memories 
 focused on a threatening other or others. 
 3.4.3.1  Descriptive data. 
 Table 3.3 overleaf details the number of participants who reported 
experiencing images when socially anxious. This shows that the number of 
participants who were able to describe an image that they had experienced 
when feeling anxious in a recent social situation was 23 (76.7%) in the SAp 
group and 30 (85.7%) in the SA group. Only participants who were able to 
describe an image went on to answer the subsequent interview questions 
regarding memories associated with their images. 
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Table 3.3 
Number of Participants Experiencing Images when Socially Anxious in the 
Social Anxiety and Psychosis (SAp) and Social Anxiety (SA) Groups  
 Described 
visual 
image? 
Non-visual 
image/ 
impression 
only 
Has 
images 
but unable 
to give 
example 
Total 
reporting 
experience 
of an image/ 
impression 
(%) 
n 
SAp 20 3 1 24 (80.0) 30 
SA 27 3 0 30 (85.7) 35 
Total 47 6 1 54 (83.1) 65 
 
Table 3.4 below shows the number of participants in each group who 
reported that there was a specific memory that seemed to be closely linked 
to the image that they experienced when socially anxious.  
 
Table 3.4 
Number of Participants Reporting a Specific Memory Linked to an Image 
Experienced when Socially Anxious in the Social Anxiety and Psychosis 
(SAp) and Social Anxiety (SA) Groups  
 Memory (%) No memory (%) n 
SAp 16 (69.6)   7 (30.4) 23 
SA 10 (33.3) 20 (66.7) 30 
Total 26 (49.1) 27 (50.9) 53 
 
Pearson’s chi-squared analysis was used to see if there were 
significant differences between the groups for whether a memory was 
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reported. Participants in the SAp group were significantly more likely to 
report a specific memory linked to their image,  2(1) = 5.47, p = .02. Based 
on the odds ratio, participants in the SAp group were 4.57 times more likely 
to report a memory, indicating that images experienced when socially 
anxious may have been more highly associated with memories of specific 
past events for participants with psychosis than for participants without 
psychosis. The data in relation to the focus of these memories will now be 
considered. 
 3.4.3.2  Memory focus. 
The semi-structured interview asked participants to rate the focus of 
their memory on a 7-point scale ranging from -3 (completely focused on 
others/another person) to +3 (completely focused on myself as though 
looking from outside). Due to the relatively small number of participants 
reporting memories and in order to increase the number of responses in 
each category, the ratings were grouped into ‘other-focused’ (scores of -1 to 
-3), ‘equally self and other focused’ (scores of 0) and ‘self-focused’ (scores of 
1 to 3). However, the resulting contingency table had four cells with an 
expected frequency below 5, violating the assumptions of Pearson’s chi-
squared analysis. This contingency table is shown in Table 3.5 below. 
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Table 3.5 
Focus of Memories Reported by Participants Responding to the Semi-
Structured Interview in the Social Anxiety and Psychosis (SAp) and Social 
Anxiety (SA) Groups  
 Other-focused 
(%) 
Equally self 
and other 
focused (%) 
Self-focused 
(%) 
n 
SAp   6 (37.5) 2 (12.5)   8 (50.0) 16 
SA 
Total 
  5 (50.0) 
11 (42.3) 
1 (10.0) 
3 (11.5) 
  4 (40.0) 
12 (46.2) 
10 
26 
 
 It was not possible to analyse this small amount of data statistically, 
and 25% of cells continued to have an expected frequency below 5 when 
only self and other-focused memories were compared (excluding memories 
reported as equally focused on self and others). However, the descriptive 
data did not suggest a difference between the groups in the focus of reported 
memories and the trend was in the opposite direction to that predicted by the 
hypothesis – i.e. participants with psychosis reported slightly more self-
focused memories and participants without psychosis reported slightly more 
other-focused memories. A larger sample would be required to appropriately 
test the hypothesis, but the current data did not allow rejection of the null 
hypothesis that there would be no difference between socially anxious 
participants with and without psychosis in whether memories underpinning 
SA were focused on a threatening other or others.  
 3.4.3.3  Summary of results for hypothesis 3.  
 The number of participants who reported a memory linked to images 
experienced when socially anxious was lower than expected given previous 
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research by Hackmann and colleagues (2000) which found that 100% of 
participants experienced images when anxious in social situations and 96% 
felt that their image was linked to a particular memory. As a result of the 
lower than expected number of memories elicited in the interview, it was not 
possible to analyse the memory focus data statistically. However, 
participants in the SAp group were significantly more likely than participants 
in the SA group to report a memory linked to an image experienced when 
socially anxious. 
 3.4.4 Hypothesis 4: Participants in the SAp group will be more 
 likely  than participants in the SA group to report memories that 
 are linked to symptoms of PTSD. 
 3.4.4.1  Descriptive data. 
 Only those participants who reported a memory as part of the semi-
structured interview completed the SRS-PTSD. Table 3.6 overleaf details the 
number of participants in each group with clinically significant scores on each 
symptom dimension of the SRS-PTSD (defined as one or more 
reexperiencing symptoms; three or more avoidance symptoms; and two or 
more hyperactivation symptoms, in accordance with diagnostic criteria; 
Carlier et al., 1998) and the numbers meeting criteria for PTSD.  
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Table 3.6 
Number of Participants with Clinically Significant Symptoms on Each 
Dimension of the SRS-PTSD and Numbers Meeting Diagnostic Criteria for 
PTSD in the Social Anxiety and Psychosis (SAp) and Social Anxiety (SA) 
Groups  
 Re  
n (%) 
Av 
n (%) 
Hy 
n (%) 
PTSD 
diagnosis 
n (%) 
No PTSD 
diagnosis 
n (%) 
SAp (n = 16) 15 (93.8) 10 (62.5) 10 (62.5)   7 (43.8)   9 (56.3) 
SA (n = 10) 
Total (n = 26) 
  7 (70.0) 
22 (84.6) 
  4 (40.0) 
14 (53.8) 
  5 (50.0) 
15 (57.7) 
  3 (30.0) 
10 (38.5) 
  7 (70.0) 
16 (61.5) 
Note. Re = Reexperiencing symptoms; Av = Avoidance symptoms; Hy = Hyperactivation 
symptoms. 
 
These data suggested that the majority of participants who reported 
memories experienced clinically significant symptoms related to at least one 
of the PTSD symptom dimensions. Therefore, total number of reported 
symptoms may more accurately capture the range of trauma responses 
experienced by participants than presence/absence of PTSD diagnosis. 
Table 3.7 overleaf details the mean total number of symptoms and 
standard deviations for participants in each group on the SRS-PTSD. Data 
for the total number of symptoms were normally distributed (Appendix O). 
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Table 3.7 
Mean (  ) Total Number of Trauma Symptoms Reported and Standard 
Deviations (SD) on the SRS-PTSD in the Social Anxiety and Psychosis 
(SAp) and Social Anxiety (SA) Groups  
     SD n 
SAp  8.7 4.76 16 
SA  
Total 
4.8 
7.2 
3.12 
4.56 
10 
26 
 
 3.4.4.2  Statistical analysis: PTSD diagnosis. 
Given the size of the sample, it was not appropriate to conduct the 
planned logistic regression analysis to explore the effect of group on PTSD 
diagnosis whilst controlling for the effect of depression. Pearson’s chi-
squared analysis was used to see if there were significant differences 
between the groups in the number of participants meeting criteria for PTSD 
based on symptoms linked to the memory reported in the semi-structured 
interview. However, as one cell (25%) had an expected frequency of below 
5, this result should be interpreted with caution. There was no significant 
difference between the groups in PTSD diagnosis,  2(1) = 0.82, p > .05.  
Additional Pearson’s chi-squared analyses were conducted to assess 
whether there were differences between the groups on any of the symptoms 
dimensions of the SRS-PTSD. There were no significant differences between 
participants with and without psychosis in the numbers with clinical levels of 
reexperiencing,  2(1) = 1.15, p > .05; avoidance,  2(1) = 0.51, p > .05; or 
hyperactivation symptoms,  2(1) = 0.05, p > .05. However, these analyses 
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also involved contingency tables containing cells with expected frequencies 
below 5, increasing the likelihood of failing to detect a significant difference. 
In order to fully evaluate hypothesis 4, the results of analyses of total number 
of PTSD symptoms data will now be considered. 
 3.4.4.3  Statistical analysis: number of PTSD symptoms. 
 The SAp group had a higher mean total symptom score on the SRS-
PTSD than the SA group. An independent samples t-test was conducted to 
test for a significant difference between the groups. Levene’s test for equality 
of variances was not significant, indicating that data variances were equal 
between the groups. There was a significant difference in total symptom 
scores between the groups, t(24) = 2.87, p = .03, r = .51. Therefore the 
analysis plan was followed to conduct an ANCOVA with group (SAp, SA) as 
the independent variable and total SRS-PTSD symptoms scores as the 
dependent variable. Depression t-scores were entered as a covariate. 
 The covariate, depression, was significantly related to total symptom 
scores such that higher levels of depression were associated with a greater 
number of symptoms, F(1, 23) = 12.29, p < .01, r = .58. There was no 
significant effect of group on total symptom scores after controlling for the 
effect of depression, F(1, 23) = 0.43, p > .05; r = .13. This suggested that 
there was no difference between participants with and without psychosis in 
number of PTSD symptoms after controlling for depression. 
3.4.4.4  Summary of results for hypothesis 4.  
 The categorical PTSD diagnosis data do not support the hypothesis 
that participants in the SAp group would be more likely than participants in 
the SA group to report memories that are linked to symptoms of PTSD. 
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However, the fact that the sample size is small and that the low expected 
frequency counts in the contingency table violate the assumptions of 
Pearson’s chi-squared analysis increases the likelihood of failing to detect a 
significant effect (Field, 2005). The descriptive data suggested a trend for 
participants in the SAp group to be more likely to meet criteria for PTSD. 
These data also suggested that the majority of participants who reported a 
memory experienced significant symptoms on at least one dimension of the 
SRS-PTSD, with a trend for participants with psychosis to be more likely to 
experience symptoms on all dimensions. These trends would need to be 
supported by further research with a larger sample in order to draw 
conclusions in relation to psychosis, SA and PTSD. 
 In support of hypothesis 4, participants in the SAp group reported a 
significantly greater number of individual PTSD symptoms connected with 
the memory described in the semi-structured interview. The effect of group 
on number of PTSD symptoms represented a large effect size (r = .51). This 
suggested that the images experienced by socially anxious participants with 
psychosis were more likely to be related to memories associated with trauma 
symptoms than the images experienced by socially anxious participants 
without psychosis. However, this difference did not remain significant when 
depression was entered into the analysis. Interpretation of this finding will be 
considered in more detail in the Discussion chapter. 
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 3.4.5 Hypothesis 5: Participants in both groups will have high 
 scores on a measure of paranoia, but participants in the SAp 
 group will have significantly higher scores than participants in 
 the SA group. Level of paranoia will have a significant effect on 
 factors associated with SA. 
 3.4.5.1  Descriptive data and data screening. 
 Participants in the SAp group had a higher mean total score on the 
GPTS than participants in the SA group. Participants in both groups had a 
mean score more than 1 standard deviation above that of a non-clinical 
reference group (Green et al., 2008). Table 3.8 overleaf provides the 
descriptive and normative data relating to GPTS scores and the number of 
participants in each group who scored at or above the clinical cut-off for 
paranoia. The high number of participants in both groups who scored above 
this cut-off for paranoia supported the rationale for the analysis plan to 
conduct exploratory analyses comparing participants with and without clinical 
levels of paranoia on factors associated with SA. 
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Table 3.8 
Means (  ) and Standard Deviations (SD) for GPTS Scores in the Social 
Anxiety and Psychosis (SAp), Social Anxiety (SA) and Non-Clinical 
Reference Groups and Number of Participants Scoring at or Above the 
Clinical Cut-Off for Paranoia  
     SD Number with 
score ≥ 68 
(%) 
SAp (n = 30) 88.6 35.47 21 (70.0) 
SA (n = 35) 
Non-clinicala (N = 353) 
69.2 
48.8 
24.37 
18.70 
19 (54.3) 
 
a
Normative data from non-clinical development sample detailed in Green et al. (2008). 
 Data on each of the variables central to the other hypotheses in the 
study were compared by splitting the sample, regardless of group (SAp and 
SA) into participants scoring below 68 on the GPTS (SA and no paranoia; 
SAn group) and participants with a score of 68 or greater (SA and paranoia; 
SAPA group) who would be considered to have a clinical level of paranoia 
(personal communication from C. Green, as cited in Lockett, 2011). Tables 
3.9 and 3.10 overleaf provide the descriptive data for these variables.  
 Continuous variables were screened for normality by conducting 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests and plotting histograms of the distribution of 
variables for each group. The only variables that were not normally 
distributed were BSI t-scores (SAPA group) and BCSS negative self scores 
(SAn group) and BCSS negative other scores (SAPA group). Square root 
transformations were successful in creating normality in the BCSS negative 
self and negative other data. Transformations were unsuccessful in creating 
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normality in the BSI data. See Appendix R for normality test results tables 
and histograms of skewed and transformed variables.  
 
Table 3.9 
Means (  ), Standard Deviations (SD), and Numbers per Group (n) for OAS, 
BFNE, BCSS, and SRS-PTSD Scores for Participants with Social Anxiety 
and Paranoia (SAPA) and Participants with Social Anxiety and No Paranoia 
(SAn)  
Measure Group     SD n 
OAS SAPA 46.5 12.62 40 
 SAn 28.6 11.21 25 
FNEB SAPA 48.2   8.69 40 
 SAn 43.6 10.00 25 
BCSS negative self SAPA    9.4    5.51 40 
 SAn    4.5    4.96 25 
BCSS negative other SAPA    9.8    7.04 40 
 
SRS-PTSD total symptoms 
SAn 
SAPA 
SAn 
   4.9   
   8.9 
   3.3 
   4.38    
   4.24 
   2.25 
25 
16 
  8 
Note. OAS = Other as Shamer Scale (Goss, Gilbert, & Allan, 1994), BFNE = The Brief Fear 
of Negative Evaluations Scale (Leary, 1983a), BCSS = Brief Core Schema Scales (Fowler et 
al., 2006), SRS-PTSD = Self-Rating Scale for PTSD (Carlier, Lamberts, Van Uchelen, & 
Gersons, 1998). 
 
 Participants with clinical levels of paranoia had higher mean scores on 
all self-report measures compared to participants without clinical levels of 
paranoia, although the large standard deviations suggested considerable 
within-group variation. The descriptive data in Table 3.10 overleaf also 
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suggested that participants with clinical levels of paranoia were more likely to 
report memories in the semi-structured interview that were focused on other 
people rather than on themselves. The differences observed in the 
descriptive data for both the self-report measures and the focus of memories 
are presented in the data analyses detailed below. 
 
Table 3.10 
Focus of Memories Reported in the Semi-Structured Interview by 
Participants with Social Anxiety and Paranoia (SAPA) and Participants with 
Social Anxiety and No Paranoia (SAn) 
 Other-focused 
(%) 
Equally self 
and other 
focused (%) 
Self-focused 
(%) 
n 
SAPA 10 (55.5) 1 (5.5)   7 (38.9) 18 
SAn 
Total 
  1 (12.5) 
11 (42.3) 
2 (25.0) 
3 (11.5) 
  5 (62.5) 
12 (46.2) 
  8 
26 
 
 3.4.5.2  Statistical analysis. 
 3.4.5.2.1  Level of paranoia. 
 An independent samples t-test was conducted to test for a significant 
difference between the SAp and SA groups in level of paranoia. Levene’s 
test for equality of variances was significant, indicating that the variances in 
the two groups were significantly different. Therefore, the significance value 
was taken from the ‘equal variances not assumed’ row. There was a 
significant difference in total GPTS scores between the groups, t(63) = 2.53, 
p = .02, r = .30. This indicated that participants with psychosis experienced 
higher levels of paranoid beliefs than participants without psychosis. To 
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explore hypothesis 5 fully, further analyses were conducted to compare 
participants with and without clinical levels of paranoia on factors associated 
with SA. Table 3.11 below shows the results of Levene’s test for equality of 
variances, independent t-test scores, significance level and effect size for 
these analyses, which are considered below.  
 
Table 3.11 
Levene’s Test Score (F), Independent T-Test Score (t), Significance Level 
(p), and Effect Size (r) for Between-Groups Comparisons of Measures 
Shame, Cognitions and Schema 
Measure F t p r 
OAS 
BFNE 
BCSS negative selfa 
0.41 
1.21 
1.36 
-5.81 
-1.97 
-3.91 
.00* 
.053 
.00* 
.29 
.24 
.44 
BCSS negative othera 0.23 -2.83 .01* .36 
Note. OAS = Other as Shamer Scale (Goss, Gilbert, & Allan, 1994), BFNE = The Brief Fear 
of Negative Evaluations Scale (Leary, 1983a), BCSS = Brief Core Schema Scales (Fowler et 
al., 2006). 
a
Square root transformed scores used in the analysis. 
*Significant at the p ≤ 0.05 level.  
 
 3.4.5.2.2  Shame, cognitions, and schemas. 
 Based on the hypothesis that paranoia would have a significant effect 
on factors associated with SA, independent samples t-tests were conducted 
to test for significant differences between participants above and below the 
clinical cut-off for paranoia on the GPTS. Differences were explored in 
relation to measures of shame, fear of negative evaluation, and negative self 
and other schemas. Participants with clinical levels of paranoia had 
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significantly higher mean scores on OAS shame, BCSS negative self 
schemas and BCSS negative other schemas. There was no significant 
difference between the groups in BFNE scores. Analyses of differences 
between the SAPA and SAn groups in relation to memories and trauma 
symptoms will now be considered.  
 3.4.5.2.3  Memory focus and PTSD symptoms. 
 In the semi-structured interview, 18 (50%) of the participants in the 
SAPA group and 8 (47.1%) of the participants in the SAn group who 
experienced images when socially anxious reported a specific memory linked 
to their image. Based on these sample sizes, it was not possible to conduct 
statistical analysis of the differences between the groups in the focus of the 
memories reported. The descriptive data (Table 3.10) suggested a trend for 
participants with clinical levels of paranoia to report more memories focused 
on a threatening other or others. 
 In order to test for a significant difference between the SAPA and SAn 
groups in total number of PTSD symptoms linked to memories reported in 
the semi-structured interview, an independent samples t-test was conducted. 
Levene’s test was not significant, suggesting equal variances between the 
groups. Participants in the SAPA group reported a significantly greater 
number of symptoms on the SRS-PTSD than participants in the SAn group, 
t(63) = -3.56, p = .00, r = .59. This indicated that participants with SA and 
paranoia were more likely to report symptoms associated with PTSD than 
participants with SA and no paranoia.  
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 3.4.5.3  Summary of results for hypothesis 5.  
 In support of hypothesis 5, participants in both the SAp and SA groups 
had mean scores on the GPTS that were more than 1 standard deviation 
above the mean score of a non-clinical reference group. More than half of 
the participants in both groups scored within the clinical range for paranoia. 
However, as predicted (hypothesis 5), participants in the SAp group had 
significantly higher scores on the GPTS than participants in the SA group. 
Overall, these findings suggested that SA in both participants with and 
without psychosis may have been associated with paranoia but that paranoid 
beliefs may be held more strongly or experienced more frequently in SA in 
psychosis than in SA without psychosis. 
 In support of the hypothesis, participants with clinical levels of 
paranoia identified from both the SAp and SA groups had significantly higher 
levels of shame, negative self and other schemas and PTSD symptoms than 
participants without clinical levels of paranoia. Differences in fear of negative 
evaluation also approached but did not reach significance. A larger sample 
would be required to explore differences in the focus of memories linked to 
images experienced when socially anxious, but the descriptive data 
suggested that paranoia may be associated with memories focused on a 
threatening other or others. Overall, the findings in relation to this hypothesis 
suggested that the presence of paranoia may relate to a more complex 
presentation of SA associated with higher levels of dysfunctional beliefs and 
related to traumatic experiences. As such, paranoia may be a more useful 
distinction than psychosis in defining subtypes of SA. On this basis, further 
analyses in relation to paranoia were conducted and are described below. 
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Subsidiary analyses were also conducted in relation to group differences in 
depression scores. 
3.5 Subsidiary Analyses 
 The results in this chapter indicated that scores on a measure of 
depression were associated with shame, negative self schemas, and PTSD 
symptoms. Therefore, additional analyses of differences between the SAp 
and SA groups in depression scores were conducted. In addition, there were 
a greater number of significant differences and larger effect sizes when 
comparing the SAPA and SAn groups rather than the original SAp and SA 
groups. As a result, additional analyses were performed to explore 
differences between participants with a clinical level of paranoia who did and 
did not have psychosis. This split resulted in groups with small numbers of 
participants, and the resulting analyses are therefore exploratory in nature.  
 3.5.1 Depression. 
 3.5.1.1  Descriptive data. 
 Participants in the SAp group had higher mean BSI depression t-
scores than participants in the SA group. However, participants in both 
groups had mean scores in the high range (based on percentile ranks 
associated with the t-distribution), with a number of participants obtaining the 
maximum possible t-score (80), suggesting that participants in both groups 
experienced significant depression. This accounted for the skewed nature of 
the depression data and suggested there may be a ceiling effect with this 
measure, with participants in both groups being highly comorbid for 
depression. When the sample was split into participants with and without 
clinical levels of paranoia, the mean score for the SAn group was in the high 
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average rather than the high range with only two (8.0%) participants in this 
group obtaining the maximum t-score. Table 3.12 below provides the 
descriptive data relating to depression and the number of participants in each 
group with a score at least 2 standard deviations above the mean for the 
normative sample (t-score ≥ 70, Derogatis, 1975). 
 
Table 3.12 
Means (  ), Standard Deviations (SD), and Number of Participants Obtaining 
a T-Score ≥ 70 for BSI Depression in the Social Anxiety and Psychosis (SAp) 
and Social Anxiety (SA) Groups and for Participants with Social Anxiety and 
Paranoia (SAPA) and Participants with Social Anxiety and No Paranoia 
(SAn) 
     SD Number with t-
score ≥ 70 (%) 
SAp (n = 30) 72.0 8.76 21 (70.0) 
SA (n = 35) 
SAPA (n = 40) 
SAn (n = 25) 
68.5 
73.6 
64.5 
9.66 
9.31 
9.66 
18 (51.4) 
31 (77.5) 
  8 (32.0) 
 
3.5.1.2  Statistical analysis. 
 As the data did not meet the assumptions of parametric tests, Mann-
Whitney U-tests were conducted to test for significant differences in 
depression scores between the SAp and SA groups and the SAPA and SAn 
groups. Table 3.13 overleaf shows the results of these analyses. There was 
no significant difference between participants with and without psychosis in 
level of depression, but participants with clinical levels of paranoia had 
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significantly higher mean BSI depression t-scores than participants without 
clinical levels of paranoia. This suggested that paranoia rather than 
psychosis was associated with higher levels of depression. 
 
Table 3.13 
Median, Range (Minimum-Maximum), Mann-Whitney U Statistic (U), 
Significance Level (p), and Effect Size (r) for Between-Groups Comparisons 
of BSI Depression T-Scores 
Group Median Range U p r 
SAp 
SA 
SAPA 
74.0 
70.0 
76.5 
29 (51-80) 
36 (44-80) 
29 (51-80) 
410.50 
 
217.00 
 .13 
 
 .00* 
.19 
 
.48 
SAn 67.0 36 (44-80)    
*Significant at the p ≤ 0.05 level.  
 
 The second set of subsidiary analyses aimed to further explore the 
relationship between paranoia and factors associated with SA by comparing 
participants in the SAPA group who did and did not have psychosis. These 
analyses are considered in the section that follows. 
 3.5.2 Comparison of participants with and without psychosis in 
 the SAPA group. 
 3.5.2.1  Descriptive data. 
 Data relating to shame, fear of negative evaluation, negative self and 
other schemas and memories were explored by splitting the SAPA group into 
participants with psychosis (PAp group) and without psychosis (PA group). 
Tables 3.14 and 3.15 provide the descriptive data for these variables.  
149 
 
 Continuous variables were screened for normality by conducting 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests and plotting histograms of the distribution of 
variables for each group. The only variable that was not normally distributed 
was BCSS negative other scores (PA group). Square root transformations 
were successful in creating normality in this data. See Appendix S for 
normality test results tables and histograms of skewed and transformed 
variables.  
 
Table 3.14 
Means (  ), Standard Deviations (SD), and Numbers per Group (n) for OAS, 
BFNE, and BCSS Scores for Participants with Paranoia and Psychosis (PAp) 
and Participants with Paranoia and No Psychosis (PA)  
Measure Group M SD n 
OAS PAp 49.9 13.22 21 
 PA 42.7 11.09 19 
FNEB PAp 48.5   8.13 21 
 PA 47.9    9.17 19 
BCSS negative self PAp 10.2    5.54 21 
 PA    8.4    5.46 19 
BCSS negative other PAp 
PA 
 11.1 
     8.2 
   7.90 
   5.62 
21 
19 
Note. OAS = Other as Shamer Scale (Goss, Gilbert, & Allan, 1994), BFNE = The Brief Fear 
of Negative Evaluations Scale (Leary, 1983a), BCSS = Brief Core Schema Scales (Fowler et 
al., 2006). 
 
 Table 3.14 shows that the mean differences between paranoid 
participants with and without psychosis on self-report measures of factors 
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associated with SA were smaller than the differences between the SAp and 
SA groups and the SAPA and SAn groups. However, the sample sizes were 
also smaller. 
 As only four participants in the PA group reported a memory, group 
differences in memory focus could not be analysed statistically. Only those 
reporting a memory completed the SRS-PTSD, therefore group differences 
in trauma symptoms were also not explored. However, the numbers of 
participants in each group who reported memories (Table 3.15) was 
suggestive of a difference between the PAp and PA groups. The differences 
observed in the descriptive data in this section were analysed for statistical 
significance and are presented below. 
 
Table 3.15 
Number of Participants Reporting Memories Linked to Images Experienced 
when Socially Anxious in the Semi-Structured Interview Split by Participants 
with Paranoia and Psychosis (PAp) and Participants with Paranoia and No 
Psychosis (PA) 
 Memory (%) No memory (%) na 
PAp 14 (73.7)   5 (26.3) 19 
PA   4 (23.5) 13 (76.5) 17 
Total 18 (50.0) 18 (50.0) 36 
a
Only participants who described an image in the semi-structured interview were asked if 
they had a linked memory. 
 
3.5.2.2  Statistical analysis. 
 The current study was designed to compare SA in participants with 
and without psychosis. However, the results presented suggested that the 
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differences between participants with and without paranoia may be of greater 
significance. In order to test these distinctions further, independent samples 
t-tests were conducted to test for differences between paranoid participants 
with and without psychosis on measures of shame, fear of negative 
evaluation and negative self and other schemas. Table 3.16 below shows the 
results of Levene’s test for equality of variances, independent t-test scores, 
significance level and effect size for these analyses. There were no 
significant differences between the groups on any of the measures. 
 
Table 3.16 
Levene’s Test Score (F), Independent T-Test Score (t), Significance Level 
(p),and Effect Size (r) for Between-Groups Comparisons on Measures 
Shame, Cognitions and Schema 
Measure F t p r 
OAS 
BFNE 
BCSS negative self 
1.37 
0.50 
0.13 
1.84 
0.23 
1.07 
.07 
.82 
.29 
.29 
.04 
.17 
BCSS negative othera 1.67 0.93 .36 .15 
Note. OAS = Other as Shamer Scale (Goss, Gilbert, & Allan, 1994), BFNE = The Brief Fear 
of Negative Evaluations Scale (Leary, 1983a), BCSS = Brief Core Schema Scales (Fowler et 
al., 2006). 
a
Square root transformed scores used in the analysis. 
 
Pearson’s chi-squared analysis (using Yates’ continuity correction for 
2 x 2 tables) was conducted to test for a significant difference between the 
groups in whether they reported a memory (versus no memory) linked to 
images experienced when socially anxious. Paranoid participants with 
psychosis were significantly more likely to report a specific memory than 
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paranoid participants without psychosis,  2(1) = 7.13, p = .01. Based on the 
odds ratio, participants in the PAp group were 9.1 times more likely to report 
a memory. This was indicative of psychosis being associated with 
identification of specific traumatic or unpleasant memories in relation to SA 
amongst paranoid participants. It was in keeping with the data reported in the 
findings for hypothesis 3 that participants in the SAp group were significantly 
more likely to report a memory linked to images experienced when socially 
anxious than participants in the SA group. 
 3.5.3  Summary of subsidiary analyses. 
 Despite the effect of depression on the analyses of shame, negative 
self schemas and PTSD symptoms in the SAp and SA groups, there was no 
significant difference in level of depression in participants with and without 
psychosis. However, participants with clinical levels of paranoia had 
significantly higher levels of depression than participants without paranoia. 
This suggested that SA comorbid with paranoia is associated with high levels 
of depression. 
 Paranoid participants with and without psychosis did not differ 
significantly on measures of shame, fear of negative evaluations or negative 
self and other schemas. Paranoid participants with psychosis were 
significantly more likely than paranoid participants without psychosis to report 
a memory linked to images experienced when socially anxious. However, 
there were insufficient data to explore differences in memory focus or related 
trauma symptoms. 
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3.6 Summary of Results 
 The main hypotheses of the study explored differences between 
socially anxious participants with and without psychosis. Participants with 
psychosis had significantly higher scores related to shame, negative self 
schemas and PTSD symptoms. However, these differences did not remain 
significant when depression was entered into the analysis. Subsidiary 
analyses suggested that depression was associated with paranoia as 
participants with clinical levels of paranoia had significantly higher levels of 
depression than non-paranoid participants. There were no significant 
differences between the groups on measures of fear of negative evaluation 
or negative other schemas. 
 Participants with psychosis were significantly more likely to report a 
specific memory linked to images experienced when socially anxious. 
However, fewer participants than expected reported a memory, and memory 
focus data could not be analysed statistically. Descriptive data suggested 
that participants with psychosis were not more likely to report memories 
focused on a threatening other or others.  
 Participants with psychosis had significantly higher paranoia scores 
than participants without psychosis. However, interestingly, more than half 
the participants in both the SAp and SA groups scored above the clinical cut-
off for paranoia. When the sample was split into participants with and without 
clinical levels of paranoia, there were significant differences in levels of 
shame, negative self and other schemas and number of PTSD symptoms, 
such that paranoid participants scored more highly on all these measures. 
Descriptive data based on a limited number of participants suggested that 
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paranoia may be associated with memories focused on a threatening other 
or others. 
 Subsidiary analyses comparing paranoid participants with and without 
psychosis found no significant differences on measures of shame, fear of 
negative evaluation or negative self and other schemas. However, paranoid 
participants with psychosis were significantly more likely to report a specific 
memory linked to images experienced when socially anxious than paranoid 
participants without psychosis. The implications of the above findings will be 
considered in the Discussion chapter that follows. 
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4 Discussion 
4.1 Overview of Study Findings in Relation to Aims and Research 
 Questions 
 The current study aimed to explore the nature of SA in psychosis 
through a comparison with SA in participants without psychosis. In order to 
build on existing psychological theories, the study focused on factors central 
to cognitive models of SA (Clark & Wells, 1995; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997) 
and of psychosis (Garety et al., 2001; Morrison, 2001): cognitions, schemas, 
paranoia, shame, memories, and trauma. The research aimed to consider 
the nature of these factors in SA in psychosis in order to build on the work of 
Lockett (2011) and potentially add to the empirical basis for future 
developments in interventions for SA in psychosis. The study hypotheses 
were developed from research questions arising from a review of the existing 
literature and considered whether SA in people with psychosis is associated 
with different cognitions, more extreme negative self and other schemas, and 
higher prevalence of shame beliefs compared to SA in people without 
psychosis. Additional research questions related to whether SA in psychosis 
is associated with memories that are more likely to be focused on others and 
linked to trauma symptoms compared to SA in people without psychosis and 
whether paranoia impacts on factors associated with SA. 
 The findings of the study suggested that participants with psychosis 
experienced higher levels of shame and negative self-schemas than 
participants without psychosis but that the groups did not differ in levels of 
fear of negative evaluation or negative other-schemas. Fewer than expected 
participants reported specific memories related to images elicited in the 
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semi-structured interview. However, the data did not appear to indicate an 
association between psychosis and memories focused on a threatening 
other or others as participants with psychosis reported slightly more self-
focused memories and participants without psychosis reported slightly more 
other-focused memories.  
Participants with psychosis reporting significantly more PTSD 
symptoms than participants without psychosis, although the difference in the 
number of participants meeting diagnostic criteria for PTSD was not 
significant. Overall, the findings suggested that SA in psychosis was more 
highly associated with memories linked to trauma symptoms than SA in 
participants without psychosis. 
The study findings suggested that SA was associated with paranoid 
thoughts for participants in both groups, but that participants with psychosis 
experienced significantly higher levels of paranoia than participants without 
psychosis. A clinical level of paranoia was found to be associated with higher 
levels of shame, negative self and other schemas and PTSD symptoms. It 
was also associated with higher levels of depression, which may have 
accounted for associations between depression, shame, negative self-
schemas and PTSD symptoms. 
This chapter will now consider these findings in relation to existing 
research and evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of the study design. It 
will then consider the theoretical and clinical implications of the findings, offer 
suggestions for future research, and end with an overall conclusion.  
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4.2 Research Findings in Relation to Previous Literature 
 4.2.1 Hypothesis 1: Participants in the SAp group will have 
 significantly higher scores than participants in the SA group on a 
 measure of shame. 
 In support of the hypothesis, participants in the SAp group had 
significantly higher scores for shame than participants in the SA group. This 
may have indicated that participants with psychosis experienced stigma 
stress, which has been found to be associated with increased SA and shame 
in people with mental illnesses (Rüsch et al., 2009). The findings were in 
keeping with Birchwood and colleagues’ (2006) stigma model of SA in 
psychosis and added empirical support to the hypothesised role of shame in 
Lockett’s (2011) two-path schema model. However, there was no significant 
difference between the shame scores of the two groups when depression 
was entered as a covariate. Level of depression was significantly associated 
with shame. This could be seen to indicate that it was higher levels of 
depression in participants with psychosis that led to shame beliefs. However, 
previous findings have suggested that shame is associated with a range of 
disorders, including both depression and SA (Allan et al., 1994; Gilbert, 
1998, 2000), and it is possible that shame was the causal factor.  
Gilbert (1992) suggested that experiences that trigger feelings of loss, 
humiliation and entrapment or defeat are related to both shame and 
depression. A psychotic episode can be considered as such an experience, 
resulting in post-psychotic emotional dysfunction (Birchwood, 2003). In this 
context, psychotic experiences are likely to trigger a perceived loss of social 
status and anticipation of rejection. Within social rank theory (Gilbert, 1989, 
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1992; Price & Sloman, 1987), such perceptions have been associated with 
SA and safety behaviours aimed at defending against negative evaluation 
(Gilbert, 2000). As such, a shame-based appraisal of psychosis is likely to 
result in both SA and depression, meaning that depression was more likely a 
consequence of shame beliefs in participants with psychosis rather than a 
confounding variable. 
4.2.2 Hypothesis 2: Participants in both groups will endorse 
 negative cognitions related to social situations, but participants 
 in the SAp group will have significantly higher scores on a 
 measure of negative self and negative other schemas. 
In support of the hypothesis, participants in both groups had a mean 
score on a measure of fear of negative evaluation that was more than 1 
standard deviation higher than the mean score for a non-clinical group 
(Leary, 1983a), and there was no significant difference between the two 
groups. This differed from Lockett’s (2011) finding that participants without 
psychosis had significantly higher scores for fear of negative evaluation than 
participants with psychosis. However, both the current study and Lockett’s 
research used relatively small sample sizes, and the mean score for the non-
psychosis group in the current study was higher than the mean for the 
psychosis group (although not significantly so), whereas the psychosis group 
tended to score more highly on other measures. Taken together, the findings 
suggested that traditional SA measures do not tap into the complexity of the 
beliefs underlying SA in psychosis. This supported the findings of Michail and 
Birchwood (2009) that there was little difference between socially anxious 
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participants with and without psychosis when traditional measures of SA 
were the focus of the research. 
The hypothesis that participants with psychosis would score more 
highly than participants without psychosis for negative self and other 
schemas was partially supported. Participants in the SAp group had higher 
mean scores for negative self and negative other schemas, but only the 
difference in negative self schemas was significantly higher. As shame has 
been found to be related to a perception of the self as undesirable (Gilbert, 
2001; Lindsay-Hartz et al., 1995), the finding that SA in psychosis was 
related to higher levels of both shame and negative self-schemas (but not to 
higher levels of sensitivity to criticism from others) may be seen as 
concordant with social rank theory (Gilbert, 1989, 1992; Price & Sloman, 
1987) and personality research (e.g., Ogilvie, 1987). However, it contrasted 
with Lockett’s (2011) finding that participants with psychosis had significantly 
higher levels of negative other schemas but did not significantly differ from 
participants without psychosis on negative self schemas. In both studies, the 
trend was for participants with psychosis to score more highly on negative 
self and other beliefs, and future research with a larger sample or combining 
the data for the two studies may provide a clearer picture.  
Compared to normative data, participants in the SAp group had higher 
scores than non-clinical samples for fear of negative evaluation and negative 
self and other schemas (Fowler et al., 2006; Leary 1983b). This added 
support to Lockett’s (2011) two-path schema model of SA in psychosis which 
suggested that SA may develop either in response to negative self-
evaluation, shame and stigma or negative other-evaluation and paranoia. A 
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perception of not meeting ideals and expecting negative judgement from 
others as a result was implicated in both pathways, suggesting that the fear 
of negative evaluation is applicable to SA in psychosis as well as typical SA. 
However, interestingly, the current findings suggested that the negative-other 
pathway may also have be applicable to participants without psychosis. This 
is considered further in relation to hypothesis 5 and is concordant with Wells 
and Clark’s (1997) suggestion that schemas linked to childhood experiences 
may be related to SA in a subgroup of non-psychotic individuals whose SA 
emerges at an early age. The findings suggested that schematic beliefs may 
need to be more explicit within Birchwood and colleagues’ (2006) stigma 
model. Although negative self and other beliefs may implicitly be associated 
with internalisation of stigma and the resulting negative automatic thoughts 
and shame beliefs, schemas were not included in the model. 
Differences between the groups in negative self-schemas were no 
longer significant when depression was entered as a covariate. Similarly to 
the findings in relation to hypothesis 1, it seemed likely that depression could 
be interpreted as a confounding variable in the exploration of any factors 
relating to SA in psychosis as a result of the overlap between different 
affective constructs within emotional dysfunction resulting from psychosis. 
Birchwood (2003) highlighted the difficulty in distinguishing between 
symptoms of post-psychotic depression, SA and PTSD, and this is 
considered further in relation to hypothesis 4 (section 4.2.4) and in 
discussion of the study’s theoretical implications (section 4.4). . 
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4.2.3 Hypothesis 3: There will be differences between the two 
 groups in the memories linked to images experienced when 
 socially anxious. Specifically, memories reported by the SA 
 group will be more likely to be focused on own performance, 
 whereas participants in the SAp group will report more 
 memories focused on a threatening other or others. 
There were insufficient data to conduct statistical analyses to 
investigate this hypothesis. This is because fewer participants than expected 
reported specific memories related to images elicited in the semi-structured 
interview. The descriptive data did not appear to support the hypothesis, as 
participants with psychosis reported slightly more self-focused memories and 
participants without psychosis reported slightly more other-focused 
memories. Future research with a larger sample would be required to explore 
this further. Nevertheless, participants with psychosis were significantly more 
likely to report the presence of any memory linked to their image, which may 
have suggested the greater importance of early experiences for these 
participants. It was also concordant with Morrison and colleagues’ (2002) 
finding that participants with psychosis commonly experienced images 
related to memories associated with psychotic symptoms. There may have 
been an overlap between such images and images associated with SA for 
these participants. Parallels have also been drawn between the 
reexperiencing symptoms of PTSD and psychotic symptoms (Butler et al., 
1996), which may have accounted for the higher levels of unpleasant 
memories reported by participants in the SAp group. This finding suggested 
support for the role of adverse early life events in Lockett’s (2011) schema 
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model. When considered alongside the finding of high rates of PTSD 
symptoms associated with the memories reported by participants in the SAp 
group, the results were in keeping with findings of the high prevalence of 
traumatic events and symptoms of PTSD in people with psychosis (Jackson, 
Knott, Skeate, & Birchwood, 2004; McGorry et al., 1991; Tarrier, Khan, 
Cater, & Picken, 2007).  
Given that participants with SA and psychosis in Lockett’s (2011) 
study reported more images containing themes of threat compared to 
participants with SA and no psychosis, it might have been expected that the 
memories underpinning those images would be more likely to be focused on 
threatening others than on own performance. However, the current data 
suggested that the content of images experienced when socially anxious 
may not correspond to the focus of associated memories. Further analysis of 
memory content as well as focus may lead to a clearer understanding of the 
relationship between memories and images in SA and SA in psychosis. 
4.2.4 Hypothesis 4: Participants in the SAp group will be more 
 likely  than participants in the SA group to report memories that 
 are linked to symptoms of PTSD. 
 This hypothesis was supported by the total number of PTSD 
symptoms reported by the SAp group, but not by the PTSD diagnosis data. 
Although a greater percentage of participants with psychosis met criteria for 
PTSD compared to participants without psychosis, this difference was not 
statistically significant. However, an insufficient number of participants 
reported a memory and completed the SRS-PTSD for an appropriately 
powered Pearson’s chi-squared analysis, and it was not possible to conduct 
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logistic regression. Future research based on a larger sample is required to 
adequately explore differences in PTSD diagnosis.  
 It was possible to conduct statistical analysis of the PTSD symptoms 
data. The finding that participants with psychosis had a greater number of 
PTSD symptoms than participants without psychosis suggested that, at the 
least, SA in psychosis may be associated with higher levels of distress in 
relation to subclinical trauma symptoms. A mean number of PTSD symptoms 
in this group of 8.7 suggested that individuals with psychosis who reported 
memories linked to their SA were significantly affected by trauma related 
symptoms. This gave empirical support to the hypothesised role of 
interpersonal trauma in Lockett’s (2011) schema model of SA in psychosis. It 
was also in keeping with Morrison and colleagues’ (2002) finding that images 
in psychosis were commonly related to traumatic memories. 
 The significant association between psychosis and trauma symptoms 
did not remain when depression was entered as a covariate. The experience 
of trauma may be associated with threats to psychological wellbeing and the 
shattering of beliefs about the self, others, and the world (Jackson & 
Birchwood, 2006; Shaner & Eth, 1989). Therefore, the appraisal of psychosis 
as shameful, inescapable, and a threat to self-concept and social status is 
likely to trigger symptoms of PTSD as well as depression and SA, and this 
does not invalidate the finding that participants with psychosis were more 
likely to experience trauma symptoms (Birchwood, 2003; Birchwood et al., 
2000; Cosoff & Hafner, 1998; McGorry et al., 1991; Shaner & Eth, 1989). 
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 4.2.5 Hypothesis 5: Participants in both groups will have high 
 scores on a measure of paranoia, but participants in the SAp 
 group will have significantly higher scores than participants in 
 the SA group. Level of paranoia will have a significant effect on 
 factors associated with SA. 
 In support of the hypothesis, participants in both groups had mean 
scores for paranoia that were more than 1 standard deviation higher than a 
non-clinical sample (Green et al., 2008), and participants in the SAp group 
had significantly higher scores than participants in the SA group. The mean 
score for paranoia in both groups was higher than that reported by Lockett 
(2011). The findings supported the negative-other pathway of Lockett’s 
schema model and added weight to the suggestion that Birchwood and 
colleagues’ (2006) stigma model required revision to explicitly incorporate 
paranoia (Lockett, 2011). However, the fact that the mean score for the SA 
group was above the clinical cut-off for paranoia and that 54.3% of 
participants in this group could have been considered ‘paranoid’ suggested 
that this negative-other pathway may not have been specific to participants 
with psychosis. This added to the rationale for exploring the data in relation 
to all previous hypotheses by splitting the sample based on 
presence/absence of clinical levels of paranoia.  
 As hypothesised, when participants were grouped by 
presence/absence of paranoia rather than psychosis, there were significant 
differences in factors related to SA. Paranoid participants had significantly 
higher levels of shame, negative self and other schemas and PTSD 
symptoms. There were insufficient data to statistically analyse differences in 
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the focus of memories linked to images experienced when socially anxious, 
but the descriptive data tentatively suggested paranoia may be associated 
with memories focused on a threatening other or others. This could be 
compared to Morrison and colleagues’ (2002) finding that images and 
memories in psychosis frequently contained themes of threat and 
persecution. In addition, the reexperiencing symptoms of PTSD are often 
accompanied by paranoia (Butler et al., 1996), and this was supported by the 
study findings of associations between paranoia and PTSD symptoms. The 
results suggested that the differences between participants with and without 
psychosis may have been related to the higher levels of paranoia in this 
group and that the hypothesis that SA in psychosis would be related to other-
focused, traumatic memories would be better applied to participants with 
paranoia. This is in keeping with research and theories which have 
suggested a relationship between persecutory delusions, adverse early 
events and negative schematic beliefs (e.g., Freeman et al., 1998, 2002; 
Trower & Chadwick, 1995). As a result of these findings, additional analyses 
were conducted to compare paranoid participants with and without 
psychosis. Implications for models of SA and SA in psychosis are considered 
below. 
 4.2.6 Additional findings. 
 Based on the above findings when the sample was split into 
participants with and without paranoia and as a result of the association 
between depression and shame, negative self schemas and PTSD 
symptoms, a number of subsidiary analyses were conducted.  
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 4.2.6.1  Depression. 
 Participants in both groups had mean depression t-scores in the high 
range with 22.9% (SA group) and 33.3% (SAp group) obtaining the 
maximum possible t-score. This accounted for the difficulties achieving a 
normal distribution of the depression data, even when transformations were 
applied. Participants with psychosis had a higher mean depression score 
than participants without psychosis, and this affected the significance of the 
difference between the groups in levels of shame, negative self schemas and 
PTSD symptoms. However, the difference between the depression scores of 
the two groups was not significant.   
When the sample was split based on paranoia rather than psychosis, 
the mean depression t-score for the non-paranoid group was in the high-
average range and participants with SA and paranoia had a significantly 
higher level of depression than participants with SA who were not paranoid. 
Only two (8%) participants in the non-paranoid group obtained the maximum 
t-score, suggesting that paranoia was associated with depression. This 
indicated that the relationship between depression and shame, negative self-
schemas and PTSD symptoms observed in the primary analyses may have 
been confounded by the higher levels of paranoia in participants with SA and 
psychosis. This is in keeping with Freeman and colleagues’ (2002) cognitive 
model of persecutory delusions. They suggested that adverse or traumatic 
experiences lead to the formation of negative self and other schemas which 
are closely associated with premorbid anxiety and depression. Anxiety and 
depression in turn influence the formation of persecutory delusions, the 
content of which may reinforce emotional dysfunction. Delusions associated 
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with powerful persecutors and beliefs about persecution being deserved 
have particularly been associated with depression, which is further reinforced 
by negative secondary appraisals of the delusional experience (Chadwick & 
Birchwood, 1994; Freeman et al., 2002; Trower & Chadwick, 1995). As such, 
paranoia, depression, anxiety, trauma and negative self and other beliefs 
form multiple interlinked maintenance cycles in complex cases. This was 
supported by the fact that paranoid participants scored significantly higher for 
both negative self and negative other beliefs, whereas psychosis alone only 
differentiated the groups on negative self beliefs. It also suggested that 
models of SA in psychosis may need to account for comorbid depression. 
As paranoia and depression were a feature of SA for the majority of 
participants, regardless of whether they had a diagnosis of psychosis, 
continuum models may more adequately capture the nature of both 
psychotic and non-psychotic symptoms. As a classification, ‘psychosis’ did 
not differentiate participants in the current study, but a higher level of 
paranoia did differentiate those participants who were more depressed, had 
more extreme dysfunctional beliefs and had a greater number of trauma-
related symptoms. A diagnostic approach may overlook many of the 
maintenance cycles contributing to an individual’s social disability and 
distress in complex cases without a diagnosis of psychosis.  This is 
considered further below. 
4.2.6.2  Comparison of paranoid participants with and without 
 psychosis. 
Participants with clinical levels of paranoia (SAPA group) were split 
into those with and without psychosis and compared on measures of shame, 
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fear of negative evaluation, and negative self and other schemas. There 
were no significant differences between the groups on any of these 
measures, suggesting that paranoia had a greater influence on the nature of 
SA than psychosis. This is in keeping with continuum theories of psychosis 
(e.g., Strauss, 1969) and Freeman and colleagues’ (2005a, 2005b) hierarchy 
of paranoia which suggested that symptoms such as delusions occur on a 
continuum with normal processes and more common social-evaluative 
concerns and implied that a categorical distinction between participants 
based on diagnosis may not capture the range of experiences associated 
with SA. It also called into question the validity of models of SA in psychosis 
as not all participants with psychosis experienced clinical levels of paranoia, 
but some participants without psychosis experienced both paranoia and high 
levels of associated emotional dysfunction and negative schematic beliefs. 
There were insufficient data to test for significant differences between 
paranoid participants with and without psychosis in relation to the focus of 
memories and associated trauma symptoms. This was partly a result of the 
fact that only four participants without psychosis reported a memory linked to 
images experienced when socially anxious. The difference in whether a 
memory was reported in the interview was significant such that paranoid 
participants with psychosis were more likely to report a specific memory than 
paranoid participants without psychosis. This is the only factor within the 
scope of the study on which psychosis rather than paranoia differentiated the 
groups. Although this was based on a small sample, the odds ratio was high, 
with participants with psychosis being 9.1 times more likely to report a 
memory. This may relate to overlap between socially anxious images and 
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images associated with hallucinations in psychosis. Morrison and colleagues 
(2002) found that 74.3% of participants with psychosis identified images 
associated with their psychotic symptoms, and 70.8% of these participants 
related these images to previous events. Overall, the number of participants 
who reported memories (50% of paranoid participants and 49.1% of all 
participants) was lower than previous research. Hackmann and colleagues 
(2000) found that 96% of their participants reported a memory linked to an 
image experienced when socially anxious. However, their participants were a 
small post-treatment sample with a greater proportion of females and a 
higher mean age than participants in the current study. There was also no 
assessment of depression in Hackmann and colleagues’ study, and this has 
been associated with the recall of general rather than specific memories 
(e.g., Mackinger, Pachinger, Leibetseder, & Fartacek, 2000). Comorbid 
depression in the current study may thus have made it more difficult for 
participants to recollect specific memories. This chapter will now consider 
strengths and weaknesses of the study design which may affect 
interpretation of the findings discussed above. 
4.3 Strengths and Weaknesses of the Study Design 
 There are a number of factors which strengthened the validity of the 
study findings. There were also a number of weaknesses which suggested 
some findings needed to be interpreted with caution. These factors are 
considered below to allow for a balanced evaluation of the results. 
 4.3.1 Strengths of the study. 
 The current study advanced existing research into SA in psychosis 
and addressed some of the suggestions indicated by previous studies. 
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Specifically, Lockett (2011) was unable to age-match participants with and 
without psychosis in her research. The current study recruited age-matched 
samples with similar gender and ethnicity distributions and similar levels of 
SA. Although the current study was also unable to achieve statistical power, 
it may be possible to combine the data from the two studies as part of 
ongoing research. This could lead to a sample size sufficient for 
appropriately powered analyses where the two studies have used the same 
measures. The current findings added to the data reported by Lockett in 
relation to cognitions, paranoia and schemas and provided the first test of the 
entire two-path schema model by incorporating analyses of shame, 
memories and trauma symptoms. The inclusion of shame bridged the gap 
between the research of Lockett and Birchwood and colleagues’ (2006) 
stigma model of SA in psychosis. As such, the study was theoretically driven 
and incorporated aspects of cognitive models of SA (Clark & Wells, 1995; 
Rapee & Heimberg, 1997) and more recent models of SA in psychosis 
(Birchwood et al., 2006; Lockett, 2011).  
4.3.2 Weaknesses of the study. 
 4.3.2.1  Sample size. 
 Although measures were employed to maximise recruitment (see 
section 2.5.1.2.3), the number of participants in both groups was below that 
indicated by the sample size calculations needed for statistical power (45 per 
group). Recruitment numbers were similar to previous studies of SA in 
psychosis which have failed to achieve the sample size required for 
appropriately powered analyses (e.g., Lockett, 2011; Michail & Birchwood, 
2009). Given that individuals with SA are likely to find it difficult to meet 
171 
 
people in a novel situation, the recruitment shortfall was perhaps not 
surprising. 
 The sample size for analyses of memory focus and PTSD symptoms 
was further reduced as a result of the low numbers of participants who 
reported a memory in the semi-structured interview. These analyses were 
intended to be exploratory as there was no previous research to indicate how 
many participants with SA and psychosis would report a memory. However, 
based on Hackmann and colleagues’ (2000) study, the overall number was 
expected to be higher. Although this was not a specific question in the 
interview, a number of participants gave responses indicating that they had 
experienced a series of difficult events which they related to their SA, but 
they did not link one specific memory to the image they experienced. This 
suggested that there may have been participants who would have endorsed 
symptoms associated with PTSD but who did not complete the SRS-PTSD. It 
may have been more appropriate to assess the presence of any trauma 
symptoms rather than only those specifically related to memories elicited as 
part of the interview. However, the aim of the research was to explore 
traumatic memories in relation to experiences of anxiety in social situations. 
 Overall, the lower than planned sample sizes for all hypotheses 
necessitated caution in interpreting the findings. Insufficiently powered 
analyses increase the likelihood of failing to detect a significant difference 
between groups (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). However, the fact that a 
number of significant differences were detected in spite of the sample size 
suggested that the current study provided a valid pilot or exploration from 
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which further research could be developed. This is considered in more detail 
in the suggestions for future research below. 
 4.3.2.2  Characteristics of the sample. 
 A large proportion of the SA group (74.3%) was recruited from the 
University of East Anglia. This was the result of lower than expected 
recruitment via Wellbeing services and a higher than expected response rate 
to University advertising. As a result, participants in this group may not have 
been representative of the population of people with SA. In particular, the 
nature of SA in students able to participate in a degree course may have 
been different from the nature of SA in people within mental health services. 
SA in students may also be related to factors specific to the experience of 
attending university. All participants were recruited between October and 
April, and those students who participated near the start of the academic 
year may have experienced an increase in symptoms, particularly if they 
were in their first year of study. Other students may also have been affected 
by examinations or academic presentations. Although a number of 
participants in the SAp group were also students, these situational and time-
related factors were more prevalent in the SA group. However, all 
participants met criteria for the study based on their level of SA (a score of at 
least 30 on the Social Interaction Anxiety Scale, Mattick & Clarke, 1989), and 
there were relatively few differences between the demographic 
characteristics of the groups. Not surprisingly, participants in the SA group 
had a significantly higher mean number of years in education, but the 
educational level of the SAp group was also relatively high (13.5 years).  
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 The mean SIAS score for the SAp group was lower (but not 
significantly lower) than the mean score for the SA group. This was 
surprising given that anecdotal reports and previous research (Lockett, 2011) 
have suggested that individuals with SA and psychosis tend to score more 
highly on this measure. This may reflect the fact that many participants were 
recruited following routine screening with the SIAS rather than through 
targeting of individuals who were being treated for SA. A level of SA following 
psychosis is common (Pallanti et al., 2004), and it may have been that those 
with more extreme SA and associated impairment were less likely to consent 
into the study. The extent to which these participants were representative of 
the population of individuals with SA and psychosis was not known. 
 Participants in both groups were predominantly White British. Whilst 
the sample was reflective of the level of ethnic diversity in Norfolk, it is 
possible that individuals from different backgrounds or living in more 
ethnically diverse areas may have different experiences related to SA. 
Birchwood and colleagues (2006) reported differences in levels of SA in 
participants with psychosis from different ethnic backgrounds, and it is 
important to consider the lack of ethnic variation in the current sample when 
applying the findings more broadly.  
Future research may benefit from comparing participants with and 
without psychosis who are matched for education as well as age as this was 
the only demographic factor on which the groups differed significantly in the 
current study. Consideration could be given to matching overall level of 
functioning both through SA scores and using more comparable recruitment 
sources. Recruiting from a wider geographical area may increase the ethnic 
174 
 
diversity of participants. It could also be beneficial to compare the 
characteristics of recruited EI participants to service level demographics or 
available data (with consent) relating to SA scores for participants who do 
not consent to the research. This may allow evaluation of the extent to which 
study participants are representative of FEP clients with comorbid SA. 
 4.3.2.3  Characteristics of the data. 
 It was not possible to successfully transform all skewed variables. In 
the case of the negative self data, transformation to correct positive skew in 
the SA group resulted in negative skew in the SAp group. This may have 
reflected the purpose of the measure to capture extremes of beliefs 
associated with psychosis (Fowler et al., 2006) and the lower prevalence of 
these beliefs in participants without psychosis. Appropriate non-parametric 
analysis was applied to test for a significant difference between the groups in 
negative self schemas. However, a parametric analysis was required to 
explore differences between the groups when depression was entered as a 
covariate. The finding that depression but not psychosis was associated with 
negative self-schemas should therefore be interpreted with caution. This is 
particularly the case given that the depression data was also skewed. 
 Negative skew in the depression data reflected the high scores on this 
measure and the number obtaining the maximum possible t-score. This may 
have suggested that the BSI depression subscale was not the most 
appropriate measure of depression as there may have been a ceiling effect – 
i.e. it may have failed to detect small differences in level of depression 
amongst participants with very high scores. Where depression was entered 
as a covariate, the findings should be interpreted cautiously as the data did 
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not meet parametric assumptions. However, univariate analyses of 
differences between groups were conducted using non-parametric tests, and 
the findings of associations between depression, paranoia, negative 
schemas and PTSD symptoms were compatible with theories of emotional 
dysfunction in psychosis and the cognitive model of persecutory delusions 
(Birchwood, 2003; Birchwoodet al., 2000; Cosoff & Hafner, 1998; Freeman et 
al., 2002; McGorry et al., 1991; Shaner & Eth, 1989). The theoretical 
implications of the current study findings will now be considered in the 
section below. 
4.4 Theoretical Implications 
 The results of the current research provided some support for existing 
hypothetical models of SA in psychosis that were developed from the 
findings of studies with small samples and which required further testing 
(Birchwood et al., 2006; Lockett, 2011). Birchwood and colleagues’ (2006) 
stigma model suggested a central role for shame beliefs which interact with a 
fear of negative evaluation that arises from the expectation of judgement 
based on mental health. The model drew on Clark and Wells’ (1995) 
cognitive model of SA in relation to fear of negative evaluation and the role of 
self-focused attention whilst also incorporating social rank and shame based 
conceptualisations of SA (Gilbert, 2002; Gilbert & Trower, 2001). The 
implication was that catastrophic shaming beliefs are specific to SA in 
psychosis and focus on fear of the individual’s mental health status being 
discovered.  The current study findings supported the role of shame in SA in 
psychosis. However, in contrast to Birchwood and colleagues’ findings, 
differences in shame between socially anxious participants with and without 
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psychosis did not remain significant when controlling for depression. 
Although Birchwood and colleagues found that FEP participants with SA had 
significantly higher levels of depression than FEP participants without SA, 
differences between the groups in levels of shame were significant even 
when depression was entered into the analysis. There were a number of 
differences between this study and the current research which may explain 
this difference. Birchwood and colleagues explored SA in psychosis by 
comparing participants to a group with psychosis but no SA, whereas the 
current research compared SA in psychosis to SA that was not comorbid 
with psychosis. Shame has previously been found to be linked to SA in the 
non-psychotic population (Gilbert, 2000), and participants in the SA group 
had a higher mean score on the Other as Shamer Scale than a non-clinical 
sample (Goss et al., 1994). The key to the current study was the hypothesis 
that shame beliefs would be more extreme in participants who also had 
psychosis. As such, the medium effect size for the univariate comparison of 
shame between the two groups (r = .29; d = 0.60) was smaller than the effect 
size reported by Birchwood and colleagues (d = 1.20). A larger effect size is 
more likely to remain significant when covariates are added to the analysis.  
The two studies also employed different means of assessing 
depression. Birchwood and colleagues (2006) used the Calgary Depression 
Scale for Schizophrenia (CDSS; Addington, Addington, & Maticka-Tyndale, 
1993). This is an observer rated measure designed specifically to assess 
depression in schizophrenia and may thus have been tapping into a subtly 
different construct from the depression subscale of the BSI. Data reported on 
the means and standard deviations for the CDSS data suggested that 
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participants had a wide range of scores but that there were few scores close 
to the upper limit of the measure. This was concordant with the fact that 
clinician rated measures tend to yield lower scores than self-report measures 
(e.g., Prusoff, Klerman, & Paykel, 1972), suggesting that differences in 
measurement rather than differences in depression or its association with 
shame may have accounted for the divergent findings of Birchwood and 
colleagues and the current study. In addition, as Birchwood and colleagues’ 
participants’ mean PANSS scores suggested that the majority had positive 
symptoms of ‘minimal’ severity (Kay et al., 1988), the CDSS may have been 
less applicable to their current emotional state. Participants’ PANSS scores 
also showed that most were not presenting with clinical levels of 
suspiciousness, and this may have accounted for the finding that 
suspiciousness/persecution was not related to SA. However, this dimension 
of the PANSS may be less sensitive to the full range of paranoid beliefs held 
by participants than the GPTS which was designed to capture both ideas of 
persecution and social reference at subclinical and clinical levels (Green et 
al., 2008). The relationship between persecutory beliefs and shame was not 
explored. 
 As a result of the findings discussed above, Birchwood and 
colleagues (2006) did not include depression or paranoia/persecutory beliefs 
in their model of SA in psychosis. However, they did report a correlation of 
.58 between depression and SIAS scores, and suggested that post-psychotic 
depression may overlap with SA. This is in keeping with previous research 
conducted by Birchwood and colleagues (e.g., Birchwood, 2003; Birchwood 
et al., 2000) into emotional disorders in psychosis.  
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 The findings of the current study suggested that a model of SA in 
psychosis required the inclusion of both depression and paranoia in order to 
fully capture the factors not included in models developed based on 
participants without psychosis (Clark & Wells, 1995; Rapee & Heimberg, 
1997). There was some support for Lockett’s (2011) proposed two-path 
schema model and her suggestion that paranoia was an important element 
missing from the stigma based model (Birchwood et al., 2006). However, the 
current study suggested that the conceptualisation of separate pathways 
based on stigma/shame and paranoia may not have been the most clinically 
useful distinction. Levels of shame were significantly higher in participants 
with clinical levels of paranoia, suggesting a single pathway to the 
development of SA in the context of paranoia. This may differentiate SA as 
an aspect of complex emotional dysfunction from a ‘pure’ anxiety state that 
may be adequately formulated within existing cognitive models (Clark & 
Wells, 1995; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997). The current findings also suggested 
that SA in the context of paranoia was associated with higher levels of 
trauma and more extreme negative self and other beliefs. Descriptive data 
suggested that traumatic experiences, paranoia and emotional dysfunction 
may also be linked via images associated with memories focused on a 
threatening other or others. As such, two pathways are proposed to account 
for the development of both types of SA.  
 4.4.1 Pathways to the development of social anxiety. 
 The hypothesised pathways are presented in Figure 4.1.   
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Figure 4.1 
 
Pathways to Social Anxiety 
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In common with Lockett’s (2011) schema model, both types of SA are 
conceptualised as developing from previous experiences. However, SA 
comorbid with paranoia is suggested to result from experiences of 
interpersonal trauma and threat, whereas ‘typical’ SA may relate to 
experiences of embarrassment and negative social interactions. These latter 
experiences are less likely to be associated with trauma symptoms but may 
lead to the development of context specific negative beliefs that are activated 
in social situations and may be reinforced by stigma experienced in 
interactions with others. In these cases, the perceived threat is thus the 
failure to meet a perceived standard in the context of predicted negative 
evaluation from others. This is in keeping with cognitive models of SA (Clark 
& Wells, 1995; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997) and is likely to be associated with 
negative, observer perspective self-images similar to those described by 
subgroups of participants with and without psychosis in Lockett’s study. 
 The negative self and other beliefs that develop as a result of 
traumatic experiences are hypothesised to be more extreme and global, as 
observed in the schema scores of participants with SA and paranoia. In the 
context of trauma and extreme negative schemas, paranoid beliefs develop 
with the perceived threat being victimisation and harm. Individuals who, as a 
result of their early experiences, already believe themselves to be ‘bad’ or 
‘inadequate’ and others to be either ‘dangerous’ and ‘bad’ or ‘superior’ and 
‘punishing’ are more likely to internalise stigma in the context of mental 
illness and/or to expect a catastrophic loss of social status (Haghighat, 
2001). As such, the search for meaning in relation to paranoid beliefs, 
unusual experiences or ambiguous social situations is likely to lead to a 
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shame-based appraisal. Such an appraisal may contribute to emotional 
dysfunction in the form of overlapping symptoms of depression, SA and 
trauma. In contrast to Birchwood and colleagues’ (2006) model, shame may 
arise from the combined influences of interpersonal trauma and associated 
schemas as well as experiences of stigma, and the content of shame beliefs 
may not relate solely to mental health status. This is in keeping with Lockett’s 
(2011) findings that a relatively small number of participants reported images 
with explicit themes related to their diagnosis. This pathway to paranoid SA 
draws on cognitive models of the positive symptoms of psychosis and of 
persecutory delusions (Freeman et al., 2002; Garety et al., 2001; Morrison, 
2001) as well as theories of shame (e.g., Gilbert, 2000). It is likely to be 
associated with threat based images and memories. Such images were 
reported by participants with and without psychosis in Lockett’s research, 
supporting a distinction based on paranoia rather than on a diagnosis of 
psychosis. 
 Both pathways also imply an original pre-disposition to anxiety which 
is inherent to SA and has also been implicated in the development of 
paranoia (Freeman et al., 2002). Although the findings of the current study 
suggested that paranoid SA is more common in individuals with psychosis, 
this was not a clear distinction. Non-paranoid individuals who have already 
developed SA but who have a high level of genetic vulnerability to 
developing psychosis may go on to have unusual experiences. Similarly, a 
significant number of participants without psychosis were found to have 
clinical levels of paranoia. These may be the people who respond less well to 
current psychological interventions for SA. As such, a conceptualisation of 
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SA based on paranoia may have clinical implications for individuals with and 
without psychosis. These implications are considered below. 
4.5 Clinical Implications 
 The proposed pathways to SA require further testing in order to 
validate their clinical utility. However, based on the current findings, 
treatments could usefully be modified based on a thorough assessment of 
paranoid beliefs. Whilst such beliefs may be routinely assessed in working 
with clients with psychosis, they may be missed in formulating SA as a 
primary diagnosis. This may be particularly the case where clients are 
reluctant to disclose paranoid ideation as a result of their appraisal of their 
beliefs and awareness of likely societal reactions. It is possible that 
awareness of the cultural unacceptability of persecutory thoughts is what 
differentiates paranoid participants with and without diagnoses of psychosis 
(Morrison, 2001).  
 The assessment of paranoia, trauma and shame will require the 
development of a strong therapeutic relationship. The establishment of such 
a relationship is also imperative prior to any intervention aimed at challenging 
beliefs associated with paranoia, shame, and schemas arising from 
interpersonal trauma. The early stages of therapy may necessitate the 
expression of openness to the client’s perspective and validation of distress 
rather than direct challenge of paranoid beliefs (Fowler et al., 1995). Drawing 
on methods adopted in CBT for psychosis may prove useful regardless of 
diagnosis where SA is part of emotional dysfunction associated with 
paranoia. However, current service models for treating anxiety disorders may 
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warrant adapting to allow for longer periods of treatment and more flexible 
ways of working. 
 Thorough assessment of paranoid SA may also reveal symptoms of 
PTSD and traumatic memories underpinning negative images experienced 
when socially anxious. In some cases PTSD may need to be treated before 
SA can be addressed.  
 The current findings suggested that some individuals with psychosis 
present with SA that is concordant with cognitive models (Clark & Wells, 
1995; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997). Therefore, it should not be automatically 
assumed that existing CBT interventions for SA are inappropriate. 
Preliminary findings have suggested that an assisted self-help intervention 
guided by a formulation based on the Clark and Wells (1995) model of SA 
was effective in reducing SIAS scores of socially anxious participants in an 
EI service (Turner, White et al., 2011). Although the mean pre and post 
intervention scores suggested that many participants continued to have 
clinical levels of SA, a mean reduction of 16.75 points on the SIAS is likely to 
have a significant impact on quality of life. Where SA is part of general 
emotional dysfunction, as conceptualised in the paranoia and shame based 
pathway, the behavioural components of CBT for SA may increase hope and 
break cycles of inactivity associated with depression. Ongoing assessment 
and developing a longitudinal formulation may help to identify individuals who 
require additional or more sophisticated interventions. A cognitive 
behavioural approach combining components of CBT for SA with additional 
interventions targeting social disability in more complex early psychosis 
cases has been the focus of a current trial in EI services. The findings of 
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such studies may help inform interventions in other mental health settings. 
Further suggestions for ongoing research will be considered below. 
4.6 Suggestions for Future Research 
 The current findings could be strengthened by further research with a 
larger sample. The study could also be improved through the recruitment of a 
more representative SA sample rather than a predominantly student group of 
participants. In order to obtain sufficient data in relation to memories and 
trauma symptoms, future research may need to be based on a sample size 
calculation that assumes around 50% of participants will report memories 
related to their SA. However, it may be more clinically useful to extend the 
current research by conducting a qualitative analysis of memories described 
by participants in the semi-structured interview. Memory themes could be 
explored in relation to both psychosis and paranoia in order to investigate 
whether the hypothesis, suggested by the descriptive memory focus data, 
that paranoia is associated with threat-based memories can be 
substantiated. The research could also be extended by exploring trauma 
symptoms in relation to multiple or ongoing traumatic experiences that may 
not be associated with a specific memory. If traumatic memories were found 
to be related to SA in the context of paranoia, then future research could 
explore whether memory rescripting (Wild et al., 2007, 2008) could be 
adapted and applied to these more complex cases.  
 The proposed pathways to SA require further testing in participants 
with and without psychosis to validate the suggestion that two types of SA 
could be distinguished based on paranoia. Comparison of paranoid 
participants with and without psychosis in terms of level of functioning would 
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also be a worthwhile direction for future research. The fact that a 
predominantly student sample (the SA group) had high levels of paranoia 
suggested that some individuals with persecutory beliefs were able to 
engage in structured activity, whereas paranoia in psychosis has been 
associated with high levels of distress and hospitalisation (Castle, Phelan, 
Wessely, & Murray, 1994; Freeman et al., 2002). Differentiations between 
high and low functioning paranoid participants may lead to the development 
of interventions to aid coping strategies and facilitate social recovery in more 
socially disabled individuals.   
4.7 Conclusion  
 This study has evaluated psychological theory and research in relation 
to SA, psychosis and SA in psychosis and considered cognitive models 
developed in these areas (Birchwood et al., 2006; Clark & Wells, 1995; 
Garety et al., 2001; Lockett, 2011; Morrison, 2001; Rapee & Heimberg, 
1997). It also considered specific factors in these models that research has 
suggested may be implicated in the development of SA in psychosis: shame 
and the relationship between images, memories and traumatic experiences. 
Based on the existing research, hypotheses were developed with the aim of 
developing understanding of SA in psychosis through comparison with SA 
that was not comorbid with psychosis.  
 The sample size of the current study necessitated some caution in 
interpretation of the findings. However, results suggested that SA in 
psychosis was associated with higher levels of shame, negative self 
schemas and PTSD symptoms compared to ‘typical’ SA. Additional analyses 
suggested that these differences were greater when participants were split 
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into those with and without clinical levels of paranoia. Although participants 
with psychosis had significantly higher levels of paranoia than participants 
without psychosis, persecutory beliefs were also common in the non-
psychosis group. The combination of SA and paranoia was associated with 
higher levels of shame, negative self and other schemas, depression and 
PTSD symptoms. Descriptive data also suggested that SA in the context of 
paranoia was more likely to be associated with memories focused on a 
threatening other or others.  
 The results of the study supported research into emotional dysfunction 
in psychosis which has suggested that SA, depression and trauma 
symptoms may be overlapping constructs resulting from early experiences, 
dysfunctional beliefs and appraisals of the meaning of psychosis (Birchwood, 
2003; Birchwood et al., 2000; Cosoff & Hafner, 1998; McGorry et al., 1991; 
Shaner & Eth, 1989). Results also supported the role of shame in SA in 
psychosis, as proposed by Birchwood and colleagues’ (2006) stigma 
processing model and strengthened the proposed role of paranoia and 
traumatic experiences hypothesised by Lockett’s (2011) schema based 
model. However, the findings also suggested that, contrary to Lockett’s two 
pathways, shame and paranoia may be part of a single pathway to the 
development of SA in the context of complex emotional dysfunction. This 
pathway may be applied to a greater proportion of socially anxious 
individuals with psychosis than those without psychosis. However, there was 
considerable crossover between the groups, and some individuals without a 
diagnosis of psychosis may present with SA that could be more appropriately 
represented by the paranoia pathway. An alternative pathway to SA in the 
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absence of paranoia was also proposed, drawing on existing cognitive 
models of SA (Clark & Wells, 1995; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997). Some 
individuals with psychosis may present with this ‘pure’ SA that is likely to 
occur relatively independently of the psychotic episode. 
 Further research could aide exploration of the validity of the proposed 
pathways to SA. However, the current findings suggested that thorough 
assessment of paranoia, trauma and schematic beliefs may benefit all 
clinicians working with SA, regardless of comorbidity with psychosis. Existing 
CBT models and protocols for treating SA may improve the quality of life of 
individuals with both types of SA. Formulating complexities associated with 
paranoia, trauma, shame and negative schemas may help clinicians to make 
sense of difficulties establishing a therapeutic alliance and the need for 
additional interventions drawing on methods from CBT for psychosis and 
CBT for PTSD. In some cases, the challenge may be for existing service 
models to adapt to the needs of complex clients. Assertive outreach 
approaches to engagement and flexibility in length of psychological 
interventions has been common practice in EI services. Further research 
may be required to justify such an approach in other services. 
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 Appendix A 
Literature Search Strategy and Results: Psychological Models of Social 
Anxiety Disorder 
Articles citing psychological models of social anxiety disorder were 
identified using the electronic database Web of Knowledge. Key terms used 
were “model* of social anxiety” OR “model* of social phobia”. Additional 
limits were then applied. Selected results were articles, reviews or editorials 
published in English between 2007 and 2012 in the subject areas of 
psychology, psychiatry, and behavioural sciences. This yielded 58 articles. A 
further nine articles were excluded because they applied specifically to SA in 
children. The resulting 49 articles were searched for citations of 
psychological models of SA. References to Clark and Wells’ (1995) cognitive 
model of social phobia (cited by 42 articles) and Rapee and Heimberg’s 
(1997) cognitive-behavioural model of social phobia (cited by 36 articles) far 
exceeded citations of other models. A total of 14 other models were referred 
to with between one and seven citations each. 
Appendix B 
Literature Search Strategy and Results: Social Anxiety in Psychosis 
An initial search was performed using the electronic database Web of 
Science. Key terms used were “social anxiety” OR “social phobia” AND 
psychosis OR schizophrenia. Additional limits were then applied. Inclusion 
criteria were articles published in English in subject areas relating to 
psychology, psychiatry, rehabilitation, behavioural sciences, and health 
policy and services. Reviews, proceedings papers, meeting abstracts and 
editorial material were excluded. This reduced the results to 183 articles. 
Additional searches were performed using the databases Academic Search 
Elite (EbscoH), Medline, PsychINFO, and Science Direct using the same key 
terms. This resulted in an additional 41 results.  
Inclusion criteria were studies in English involving participants with 
psychosis where levels of SA formed part of the analysis and where this was 
the main or one of the main study features. Book chapters, treatment trials, 
reviews, meta-analyses, posters, unpublished theses, psychometric 
evaluations of measures and studies that only established prevalence of 
social anxiety in psychosis were excluded. Reference lists of key papers 
were checked for additional studies. 
 
         
Appendix C 
 
Main Findings and Characteristics of Reviewed Studies of Social Anxiety in Psychosis 
 
Author(s) Aim Sample Measures Main findings 
Birchwood et 
al. (2006) 
 
 
 
Gumley, 
O’Grady, 
Power, & 
Schwannauer 
(2004) 
 
 
Huppert & 
Smith (2005) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To compare 
participants with 
FEP with and 
without SA.  
 
To compare 
participants with 
psychosis with and 
without SA. 
 
 
 
To explore the 
interaction of 
subtypes of anxiety 
with psychotic 
symptoms. 
 
 
 
 
 
Participants with FEP 
split into an SA group (n 
= 23) and a no SA group 
(n = 56)  
 
Participants at risk of 
relapse. 19 participants 
with SA matched for 
gender and diagnosis 
with 19 non-SA 
participants. 
 
32 outpatients with 
schizophrenia or 
schizoaffective disorder.  
 
 
 
 
SIAS, FNE, PANSS, 
IS, CDSS, PBIQ, 
OAS, SCS, PAS.  
 
 
PANSS, PBIQ, 
RSES, BSI. 
 
 
 
 
 
SIAS, SPS, ADIS-IV, 
BDI, DASS, IHS, 
PANSS, SAPS, 
SANS, researcher 
generated questions 
assessing psychotic 
symptoms, QOLI. 
 
 
Participants with SA experienced 
greater shame and entrapment attached 
to their diagnosis. SA was not 
associated with psychotic symptoms. 
 
Participants with SA had higher levels of 
self-blame, entrapment and shame and 
lower self-esteem. There were no 
differences in psychotic symptoms. 
 
 
 
SA was related to positive symptoms, 
bizarre behaviour, social quality of life 
and suspiciousness/paranoia. Self-
reported SA was related to PANSS 
depression. 
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Main Findings and Characteristics of Reviewed Studies of Social Anxiety in Psychosis (continued) 
 
Author(s) Aim Sample Measures Main findings 
Lockett et al. 
(2012) 
 
 
 
 
 
Lysaker & 
Hammersley 
(2006) 
 
 
 
 
Lysaker, 
Ringer, & Davis 
(2008) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To pilot a measure 
to explore imagery 
experienced by 
participants with  
psychosis and SA.  
 
 
To explore how SA 
and self-esteem 
influence one 
another in 
schizophrenia over 
a 6 month period. 
 
To establish the 
prevalence of social 
phobia in 
schizophrenia and 
its relationship to 
psychotic 
symptoms. 
 
 
 
 
7 participants in an EI 
service with comorbid 
SA. 
 
 
 
 
39 outpatients with 
schizophrenia or 
schizoaffective disorder. 
 
 
 
 
116 inpatients with 
schizophrenia. 
 
 
 
 
A semi-structured 
interview exploring 
imagery (Hackmann 
et al., 1998). 
 
 
 
LSAS, MSEI, 
PANSS. 
 
 
 
 
 
SCID-P, PANSS, 
LSAS. 
 
Participants experienced both typical SA 
images images seen from an observer 
perspective and images that appear 
more threatening, may be related to 
residual paranoia, and tended to be 
seen from a field perspective.  
 
Baseline self-esteem was correlated 
with SA at 6 months, independent of SA 
at baseline. SA at baseline did not 
predict self-esteem at 6 months when 
baseline self-esteem was controlled for.  
 
 
There was a trend for patients with 
social phobia to have higher total 
PANSS scores. Social fear was 
correlated with positive symptoms. 
Social avoidance scores were higher 
among participants with higher negative 
symptom scores. 
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 Main Findings and Characteristics of Reviewed Studies of Social Anxiety in Psychosis (continued) 
 
Author(s) Aim Sample Measures Main findings 
Mazeh et al. 
(2009) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Michail & 
Birchwood 
(2009) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To establish the 
prevalence of social 
phobia in 
schizophrenia and 
its relationship to 
psychotic 
symptoms. 
 
To compare SA in 
participants with 
and without FEP 
and explore  
relationship 
between SA and 
psychotic 
symptoms. 
 
116 inpatients with 
schizophrenia. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
80 FEP participants, of 
whom 20 met criteria for 
SA; 31age-matched 
participants with SA and 
no psychosis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SCID-P, PANSS, 
LSAS. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SCAN, SIAS, SPS, 
B-FNE, PANSS, 
DoT, CDSS. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
There was a trend for patients with 
social phobia to have higher total 
PANSS scores. Social fear was 
correlated with positive symptoms. 
Social avoidance scores were higher 
among participants with higher negative 
symptom scores. 
 
There were no differences in severity of 
SA or depression. Those without 
psychosis had greater fears of negative 
evaluation. SA in psychosis was not 
correlated with psychotic symptoms, but 
was related to perceived threat from 
others. 
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Main Findings and Characteristics of Reviewed Studies of Social Anxiety in Psychosis (continued) 
 
Author(s) Aim Sample Measures Main findings 
Pallanti, 
Quercioli, & 
Hollander 
(2004) 
 
 
 
 
Penn, Hope, 
Spaulding, & 
Kucera (1994) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To compare SA in 
participants with 
and without 
schizophrenia and 
explore correlates 
of SA in 
schizophrenia. 
 
To investigate the 
relationship 
between SA and 
psychotic 
symptoms and 
determine the best 
means of 
measuring SA in 
schizophrenia. 
 
 
 
 
80 outpatients with 
schizophrenia, of whom 
29 had comorbid SA; 27 
comparison participants 
with SA.  
 
 
 
38 inpatients with 
schizophrenia or 
schizoaffective disorder. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SCID, LSAS, SAPS, 
SANS, SAS-II, SF-
36. 
 
 
 
 
 
PANSS, role play 
assessment using 
SUDS and 
behavioural ratings, 
B-FNE, FQ, 
researcher designed 
‘Ward Fear Scale’, 
adapted Stroop task 
(Mattia, Heimberg, & 
Hope, 1993). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SA scores did not differ between 
groups. SA was not related to negative 
or positive symptoms.  
 
 
 
 
 
Behaviours related to SA were 
associated with negative symptoms. 
Self-reported SA was related to positive 
symptoms 
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Main Findings and Characteristics of Reviewed Studies of Social Anxiety in Psychosis (continued) 
 
Author(s) Aim Sample Measures Main findings 
Voges & 
Addington 
(2005) 
 
 
 
To examine the 
relationship 
between SA and 
social functioning in 
FEP and explore 
associated beliefs. 
60 FEP participants  
FEP, of whom 29 met 
criteria for SA. 
 
 
SCID-I, SPAI, SISST, 
QLS, SFS, PANSS, 
CDSS. 
SA was not associated with depression 
or psychotic symptoms. SA was 
associated with greater negative self-
statements and lack of SA with greater 
positive self-statements.   
Note. ADIS-IV = Anxiety Disorders Interview Schedule for DSM-IV (Brown, Di Nardo, Lehman, & Campbell, 2001); BDI = Beck Depression Inventory (Beck, Ward, 
Mendelson, Mock, & Erbaugh, 1961); B-FNE = Brief Fear of Negative Evaluation Scale (Leary, 1983b); BSI = Brief Symptom Inventory (Derogatis & Melisaratos, 1983); 
CDSS = Calgary Depression Scale for Schizophrenia (Addington, Addington, & Maticka-Tyndale, 1993); DASS = Depression Anxiety Stress Scales (Lovibond & Lovibond, 
1995); DoT = Details of Threat Questionnaire (Freeman, Garety, & Kuipers, 2001); FEP = first episode psychosis; FNE = Fear of Negative Evaluation Scale (Watson & 
Friend, 1969); IHS = Inventory of Hostility and Suspiciousness (Rawlings & Freeman, 1996); IS = Insight Scale (Birchwood et al., 1994); FQ = Fear Questionnaire (Marks & 
Mathews, 1979); LSAS =  Liebowitz Social Anxiety Scale (Liebowitz, 1987); MSEI = Multidimensional Self-Esteem Inventory (O’Brien & Epstein, 1998); OAS = Other as 
Shamer Scale (Goss, Gilbert, & Allan, 1994); PANSS = Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale (Kay, Oplar, & Lindenmayer, 1987); PAS = Pre-morbid Adjustment Scale 
(Cannon-Spoor, Potkin, & Wyatt, 1982); PBIQ = Personal Beliefs about Illness Questionnaire (Birchwood, Mason, Macmillan, & Healey, 1993);  QOLI = Lehman Quality of 
Life Interview (Lehman, 1988); QLS = Quality of Life Scale (Heinrichs, Hanlon, & Carpenter Jr.,1984); RSES = Rosenberg Self Esteem Scale (Rosenberg, 1965); SA = 
social anxiety; SAPS = Scale for the Assessment of Positive Symptoms (Andreasson, 1984a); SANS = Scale for the Assessment of Negative Symptoms (Andreasson, 
1984b); SAS-II = Social Adjustment Scale II (Schooler, Hogarty, & Weissman, 1979); SCAN = Schedules for Clinical Assessment in Neuropsychiatry (Wing, Sartorius, & 
Ustun, 1996); SCID = Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV Axis I Disorders, Clinician Version (First, Spitzer, Gibbon, & Williams, 1996); SCID-I = Structured Clinical 
Interview for DSM-IV-TR Axis I Disorders – research version (First, Gibbon, Spitzer, & Williams, 2001); SCID-P = Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-III-R – Patient 
Version (Spitzer, Williams, Gibbon, & First, 1990); SCS = Social Comparison Scale (Allan & Gilbert, 1995); SF-36 = Short Form Health Survey (Ware, Snow, Kosisnki, & 
Gandek, 1993); SFS = Social Functioning Scale (Birchwood, Smith, Cochrane, Wetton, & Copestake, 1990); SIAS = Social Interaction Anxiety Scale (Mattick & Clarke, 
1998); SISST = Social Interaction Self-Statement Test (Glass, Merluzzi, Biever, & Larsen, 1982); SPAI = Social Phobia and Anxiety Inventory (Turner, Beidel, & Dancu, 
1996); SPS = Social Phobia Scale (Mattick & Clarke, 1998); STAI = State Trait Anxiety Inventory (Spielberger, 1983); SUDS = Subjective Units of Discomfort Scale ( 
Wolpe & Lazarus, 1966); SUMD = Scale to Assess Unawareness of Illness (Amador et al., 1994); WCST = Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (Heaton, 1981).  
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Appendix D: OTHER AS SHAMER SCALE (OAS) 
 
We are interested in how people think others see them. Below is a list of statements 
describing feelings or experiences about how you may feel other people see you.  
 
Read each statement carefully and circle the number to the right of the item that indicates 
the frequency with which you find yourself feeling or experiencing what is described in the 
statement.  Use the scale below. 
 
0 = NEVER 1 = SELDOM  2 = SOMETIME   3 = FREQUENTLY   4 = ALMOST ALWAYS 
  
 
1.   I feel other people see me as not good enough.        0  1  2  3   4 
 
2.   I think that other people look down on me      0  1  2  3  4 
 
3.   Other people put me down a lot  0  1  2  3  4  
 
4.   I feel insecure about others opinions of me 0  1  2  3  4  
5.   Other people see me as not measuring up to them  0  1  2  3  4  
6.   Other people see me as small and insignificant      0  1  2  3  4  
7.   Other people see me as somehow defective as a person 0  1  2  3  4 
 
8.   People see me as unimportant compared to others 0  1  2  3  4 
 
9.   Other people look for my faults 0  1  2  3  4    
 
10.  People see me as striving for perfection but being unable  0  1  2  3  4  
to reach my own standards  
 
11.  I think others are able to see my defects 0  1  2  3  4 
 
12.  Others are critical or punishing when I make a mistake 0  1  2  3  4 
 
13.  People distance themselves from me when I make mistakes 0  1  2  3  4 
 
14.  Other people always remember my mistakes 0  1  2  3  4 
 
15.  Others see me as fragile 0  1  2  3  4 
 
16.  Others see me as empty and unfulfilled 0  1  2  3  4 
 
17.  Others think there is something missing in me 0  1  2  3  4 
 
18.  Other people think I have lost control over my body and feelings 0  1  2  3  4 
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SCORING 
 
Add up all items 
 
 
DESCRIPTION 
 
The Other as Shamer Scale (OAS)  
The OAS was adapted from Cook’s (1993) Internalised Shame Scale to measure ‘external 
shame’ (Allan, Gilbert & Goss, 1994; Goss, Gilbert & Allan, 1998).  The scale consists of 
18 items rated on a five-point scale according to the frequency of evaluations about how 
others judge the self, (0 = Never to 4 = Almost always). Items include: ‘I feel other people 
look down on me’, ‘other people see me as somehow defective as a person’ and ‘other 
people always remember my mistakes’. In the original study the scale showed high 
internal consistency with a Cronbach’s alpha of .92. The scale has been shown to have a 
high alpha level 0.96. 
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Appendix E: Imagery and memories in social anxiety amalgamated semi-structured 
interview 
 
 
NAME:    AGE:     GENDER: 
 
DATE:     YEARS IN EDUCATION: 
 
MEETS CRITERIA FOR SOCIAL PHOBIA ON SIAS?: YES / NO 
 
EVER HAD TREATMENT FOR AN ANXIETY PROBLEM: YES / NO 
 
 
 
1. Do you ever get anxious in social situations? I wonder if you could tell me about a 
few times recently when that happened to you? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. I know that when you are anxious you probably notice a variety of things going 
through you mind. I’m particularly interested in the little pictures or images 
people get when they are nervous (give lots of reassuring and prompts here). 
Have you ever had images like that when you are anxious either in social 
situations, or in anticipation of them? 
 
Always / often / sometimes / never  (coded 4, 3, 2 or 1) 
 
 
3. Can you think of a time recently when you felt particularly anxious in a social 
situation? 
 
 
4. How anxious were you at the worst moment? (Show 0-100mm rating Scale 1 and 
enter rating in box below) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 5. Did you have an image or picture going through your mind at the time? 
 
Yes / No 
 
 Did you hear any sounds, such as a voice, in your mind at the time? 
 
Yes / No 
 
Were you aware of any smells? 
 
Yes / No 
 
Were you aware of any strange sensations in your body? Some people say when 
they are in a scary social situation they feel as if they are smaller than usual, or 
further away from people, or fatter than usual – were you aware of any feelings 
like this at the time? 
 
Yes / No 
 
 
6. Sometimes people get an impression of how they appear, or how others might 
be reacting, even if they are not looking at them. Did that happen to you?  
 
Yes / No 
 
 
7. Please try to clearly recall the image/ impression now, with your eyes closed 
(allow about 30 seconds). Have you got it now? 
 
Thinking about the image/ impression, is your predominant impression one of 
viewing the situation as if looking out through your eyes, observing the details of 
what is going on around you, or is the predominant impression one in which you 
are observing yourself, looking at yourself from an external point of you? 
 
Get ratings of the extent to which the field/ observer perspective is being taken on 
scale 2 – a 7 point scale ranging from -3 (completely field) to +3 (completely 
observer). 0 is seeing both perspectives equally. Enter score in box below: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8. Can you now describe the image? What can you see? What can you hear? What 
can you smell? What can you feel? 
If focussed on appearance probe for details of posture, clothing, facial aspects, 
other parts of the body, general appearance, any change in size (height/ weight), 
voice characteristics, pronunciation, etc… Account must be detailed enough for 
a film director to recreate the image. 
 Write down every detail. Summarise all the client has described, in detail, 
adding “Is that right?” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9. Are parts of the image in your mind bigger or smaller than they would be in real 
life? Do you or other people in your image look different to how you do in real 
life? Is anything distorted in its shape or appearance? Is the perspective (how far 
things seem from each other or how big things seem in comparison to each 
other) how it would be in real life? Please look at this scale (present Scale 3, 0-
100mm rating scale) and tell me how much you feel the image was distorted, 
with 0 being “Not at all” and 100 being “Completely distorted, things appeared 
completely different to how they would in real life”. Enter rating in box below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
How about the things you hear in the image – do they appear louder or quieter 
or at all distorted to how they would in real life? On this scale (present Scale 3 
again), with 0 being “Not distorted at all” and 100 being “Completely distorted 
to how it would sound in real life”, how distorted would you say the sounds in 
your image are? Enter rating in box below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
How about the smells in the image? Are they stronger or at all distorted from 
how you would experience them in real life? On this scale (present Scale 3), 
with 0 being “Completely the same as I would smell them in real life” and 100 
being “Completely different to how they would smell in real life”, how distorted 
would you say the smells in your image are? Enter rating in box below. 
 
 
 
 
10. Interviewer – estimate whether the image or impression had the characteristics 
of a clear visual picture 
 
Yes (code 2) / No (code 0) / Probably (code 1) 
 
 
11. When was the image located in time? 
 
If it reflected something that had happened in the past, ask what was happening 
at that moment/ would happen in the immediate future in that situation/ would 
happen in the far future. 
 
Did it involve just you/ others/ a mixture of the two/ no people? 
 
 
12. Do you frequently experience this specific image when you feel anxious in 
social situations? If not, ask if the client experiences any other images regularly 
when socially anxious. 
 
Yes / No 
 
If a different image is elicited, ask client to describe this image in as much 
detail as possible, including sights, sounds, smells, tastes, body sensations. 
Remember to check back with the client that you have recorded this information 
accurately. Record below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
13. I’m now going to ask some more questions about this image. Please recall it as 
clearly as you can. 
 
How do you feel in the image (emotions)? 
 
 
 
What is happening in the image? 
 
 
 
 
Why is this happening? 
 
 
 
 
What has led up to this event? 
 
 
 
 
What is the worst thing about it? 
 
 
 
 
What does it mean about you? 
 
 
 
 
What does it mean about others? 
 
 
 
 
What does it mean about the world? 
 
 
 
 
 
Summarise the interpersonal meaning, asking “Is that right?” and make a 
written summary. 
14. What is your earliest recollection of having the thoughts/ sensations/ emotions/ 
experiences reflected in the image? 
 
 
 
 
Where were you in this earliest recollection? 
 
 
 
How old were you? 
 
 
What was happening in your life at the time? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
15. Is there a particular memory that seems to be closely linked to the image? 
 
Yes / No 
 
 
16. If so, do you think you could evoke it with your eyes closed, just as if it was 
happening now, and describe it to me? 
 
 If necessary, prompt with the following: 
 
 Can you see anything in the memory? 
 
 
 
  
 
 Can you hear anything (including your own voice)? 
 
 
 
 Any tastes or smells? 
 
 
 
 
 What sensations do you have in your body? 
 
 
 Summarise below, checking with client that information is accurate: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
17. Present Scale 4: 0-100% rating scale 
Can you please indicate on this scale, with 0% being “not at all” and 100% 
being “completely”, how similar the actual sensory aspects of the image are 
compared to those in the remembered event? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
17b. Present Scale 5: Get ratings of the extent to which the memory is focused on 
others/another person or self-focused on a 7 point scale. Enter score in box below: 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
18. What do you feel in the remembered event? 
 
 
 
 
What is happening in this remembered event? 
 
 
 
  
 
 
What has led up to this event? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
What is the worst thing about it? 
 
 
 
 
 
What does it mean about you? 
 
 
 
 
 
What does it mean about others? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
What does it mean about the world? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Summarise all the meanings, asking, “Is that right?” and make a written 
account below: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
19. Present Scale 4 again. 
Please indicate on this scale, with 0% being “not at all similar” and 100% being 
“completely the same” how similar in terms of interpersonal meaning (what 
we’ve just been talking about) the remembered event and the image are? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
20. Were you anxious in social situations before this event? 
 
Yes / No 
 
 
21. If “yes” 
Did the event change this anxiety in any way *ie. make it better/ worse/ no 
different)? 
 
 
22. Did you experience anxiety at the time of the event? 
 
Yes / No 
 
 If “no” 
 Did you recall this event when your anxiety problems started? 
 
Yes / No 
 
Scale 1 (for use with question 4) 
Ask client to mark anywhere along the line to show how anxious they were 
 
 
      0        50        100 
       25        75 
 
          
       A bit anxious         Very anxious 
Not at all anxious        Quite anxious    The most anxious I have ever been 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Scale 2 (for use with question 7) 
Ask client to choose a number to indicate the image perspective 
 
 
    -3    -2             -1    0           +1       + 2     +3 
 
 
 
                    ½ through my eyes, 
                                                        ½ seeing from outside 
                              Slightly more through my eyes 
          Mostly through my eyes                             Slightly more observing 
Completely through my eyes                   Mostly observing    
Completely as though I was seeing the 
scene from outside it 
 
 
 
 
 
Scale 3 (for use with question 9) 
Ask client to mark anywhere along the line to show how distorted from real life the image was 
 
      0        50        100 
       25        75 
 
          
       A bit distorted         Very distorted 
Not at all distorted        Quite distorted     Completely distorted 
 
 
 
 
Scale 4 (for use with questions 17 & 19) 
Ask client to mark anywhere along the line to show 
 
      0        50        100 
       25        75 
 
          
       A bit similar         Very similar 
Not at all similar        Quite similar     Completely the same 
 
 
 
 
 
Scale 5 (for use with question 17b) 
Ask client to choose a number to indicate the focus of the memory 
 
 
    -3    -2             -1    0           +1       + 2     +3 
 
 
 
                    ½ focused on others, 
                                                        ½ self-focused 
                               
Slightly more other-focused 
            Mostly other-focused                                        Slightly more 
             self-focused 
Completely focused on others/another person     Mostly self-focused    
 
Completely focused on myself as though 
looking from outside 
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Appendix H: Participant Information Sheet (SAp Group) v. 1.0    
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
Information about the Research 
 
An Investigation of the Nature of Social Anxiety in People with and without a 
Diagnosis of Psychosis. 
 
Primary Researcher: Sarah Cooke, Trainee Clinical Psychologist, University of East 
Anglia (UEA). 
Primary Supervisor: Dr Sian Coker, Clinical Psychologist and Research Tutor, UEA. 
Clinical Supervisor: Professor David Fowler, Professor of Psychiatry, UEA. 
Collaborator: Dr Ruth Turner, Clinical Psychologist, Central Norfolk Early 
Intervention Team (CNEIT). 
 
I would like to invite you to take part in a research study. Before you decide I would 
like you to understand why the research is being done and what it would involve for 
you. The researcher will go through the information sheet with you and answer any 
questions you have. You can also ask questions by telephone and discuss the 
research with your care co-ordinator before you decide whether to meet with the 
researcher. Please take the time to read this information sheet carefully. Talk to 
others about the study if you wish. 
 
Part 1 tells you the purpose of this study and what will happen to you if you take part. 
 
Part 2 gives you more detailed information about the conduct of the study.  
 
Please ask me if there is anything that is not clear or if you would like more 
information. 
 
What is the purpose of the study? 
 
 I am carrying out the study for assessment as part of my doctorate in Clinical 
Psychology. 
 I am interested in people with and without experience of psychosis who feel 
anxious in social situations. 
 I am particularly interested in the thoughts, memories and previous 
experiences of people with social anxiety. 
 
Why have I been invited? 
 
Clients within the Norfolk Early Intervention Service who experience social anxiety 
will be invited to take part. 
 
v. 1.0   28/06/11 
 
 
 
 
Do I have to take part? 
 
It is up to you to decide to join the study. I will describe the study and go through this 
information sheet. If you agree to take part, I will then ask you to sign a consent 
form. You will be given a copy of this information sheet and the signed consent form 
to keep. You are free to withdraw at any time, without giving a reason. The research 
is not linked to your treatment. If you decide not to take part or you wish to withdraw 
from the study, it will not affect any current or future care you may receive from any 
health service. 
 
What will happen to me if I take part? 
 
If you choose to take part, I will arrange a meeting at a time that is convenient for 
you. The meeting will last for approximately 90 minutes. There will be an interview 
and some questionnaires. With your permission, I would like to audio record the 
interview so that I can write down later the things that we have said. You will be able 
to request a summary of the finished report. This will be completed by July 2012. 
You will not be required to be involved in the research process after the interview 
has taken place. 
 
When I have met with enough participants, I will analyse the questionnaires and the 
interviews to compare the responses of people with and without psychosis. I will then 
write this up as a thesis to be marked at the University of East Anglia. Your name will 
not be used in the thesis. 
 
What will I have to do? 
 
We will agree a time and a location for a meeting and I will ask you some questions 
about when you feel anxious in social situations. You will not be asked to talk about 
anything you do not wish to talk about. You will then be asked to complete some 
questionnaires. 
 
What are the possible risks and benefits of taking part? 
 
I cannot promise that you will benefit directly from the study, but your experiences 
may help improve understanding of social anxiety and could contribute to the 
development of psychological treatment to help people overcome social anxiety. The 
interview will involve questions about a topic that may cause you to think about 
things that have been difficult. If you feel uncomfortable or upset at any stage, the 
interview can be stopped and you can withdraw from the study if you wish. You do 
not have to give a reason for this. 
 
If you find the interview distressing, we will stop and can discuss this. If you think that 
you would benefit from discussing the issues raised with someone who is not linked 
to this research, then I would advise you to speak to your care co-ordinator. If you 
wish, I can provide you and your care co-ordinator with a short report of the things 
we have talked about to help you think about what support you might need in the 
future. 
 
v. 1.0   28/06/11 
 
 
 
 
What happens when the research study stops? 
 
Summary reports will be given to the NHS services involved in the research. 
Participants in the research will also have summaries if requested. You can have a 
copy of the summary report to keep if you wish. You will need to provide your contact 
details in order to receive this. You will not be required to do anything else, but you 
will be directed to sources of support if you need it. 
 
What happens if there is a problem? 
 
Any complaint about the way you have been dealt with during the study or any 
possible harm you might suffer will be addressed. The detailed information on this is 
given in Part 2. 
 
Will my taking part in the study be kept confidential? 
 
Yes. I will follow ethical and legal practice and all information about you will be 
handled in confidence as detailed above and in Part 2. 
 
If the information in Part 1 has interested you and you are considering 
participation, please read the additional information in Part 2 before making 
any decision. 
v. 1.0   28/06/11 
 
 
 
 
Part 2 
 
What will happen if I don’t want to carry on with the study? 
 
You can choose to withdraw from the study at any point prior to the report being 
submitted for assessment in July 2012. If you choose to withdraw, your data will be 
destroyed and any information you have given me will not be used in the research. 
 
What if there is a problem? 
 
If you have a concern about any aspect of the study, you can contact me at 
sarah.cooke@uea.ac.uk or through your care co-ordinator, and I can arrange to 
telephone you. I will do my best to address your concerns. If you remain unhappy 
and wish to complain formally about the conduct of the research (the procedures 
carried out by the researcher), you can do this through the NHS complaints 
procedure. Details can be obtained from the Norfolk Early Intervention Service.  
 
Will my taking part in this study be kept confidential? 
 
The recording of the interview will be stored as a password protected file on a secure 
hard drive on the University of East Anglia network and on a password protected 
memory stick during the research process. Following completion of the research, the 
recording and questionnaires will be stored securely for 5 years before being 
destroyed. They will be stored in a separate location from any documents that could 
identify you such as your consent form, which will be contained in a locked storage 
facility. The recording will be stored as a password protected file and on an 
encrypted memory stick. 
 
The only time that I would tell anyone about anything you have said without your 
permission is if I believe that you or someone you tell me about may be at risk.  
 
What will happen to the results of the research study? 
 
In the first instance, I will use the results to write a thesis. The thesis will be 
submitted to the University of East Anglia and summary reports will be given to the 
services involved in the research and any participants who have requested copies. 
Once it has been marked, the thesis will be kept in the borrowing library and 
available to be read by other Trainee Clinical Psychologists. It will also be publicly 
available to other people who want to read it. It is also possible that a version of the 
thesis will be submitted for publication by a scientific journal. You will not be 
identified in any version of the study’s results. 
 
Who is organising the research? 
 
I am organising the research with the support of the University of East Anglia. The 
university is the main sponsor of the study. No one is being paid to carry out this 
research. 
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Who has reviewed the study? 
 
All research in the NHS is looked at by an independent group of people, called a 
Research Ethics Committee, to protect your interests. This study has been reviewed 
and given a favourable opinion by the Norfolk Research Ethics Committee. The 
Research Ethics Committee has also received a scientific review of the research 
conducted by the University of East Anglia. 
 
Further information and contact details 
 
For general information about research, you may find the following website helpful: 
 
www.invo.org.uk 
 
For specific information about this research project or to raise any concerns, please 
email the researcher at sarah.cooke@uea.ac.uk.  
 
Alternatively, you may wish to contact the researcher’s supervisor who has 
responsibility for supervising the research: 
 
1. Professor David Fowler 
Psychology and Psychiatry Group 
Department of Psychological Science 
Norwich Medical School UEA 
University of East Anglia 
Norwich 
NR4 7TJ 
 
01603 59 3601 (tel) 
d.fowler@uea.ac.uk 
  
2. Dr Sian Coker 
Psychology and Psychiatry Group 
Department of Psychological Science 
Norwich Medical School UEA 
University of East Anglia 
Norwich 
NR4 7TJ 
 
01603 59 3544 (tel) 
s.coker@uea.ac.uk 
 
If you are unsure about whether to participate, I would be happy to arrange to telephone you 
or discuss the study in person. You may also wish to talk to staff in Norfolk Early Intervention 
Service or your friends and family.  
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Information about the Research 
 
An Investigation of the Nature of Social Anxiety in People with and without a 
Diagnosis of Psychosis. 
 
Primary Researcher: Sarah Cooke, Trainee Clinical Psychologist, University of East 
Anglia (UEA). 
Primary Supervisor: Dr Sian Coker, Clinical Psychologist and Research Tutor, UEA. 
Clinical Supervisor: Professor David Fowler, Professor of Psychiatry, UEA. 
Collaborator: Dr Ruth Turner, Clinical Psychologist, Central Norfolk Early 
Intervention Team (CNEIT). 
 
I would like to invite you to take part in a research study. Before you decide I would 
like you to understand why the research is being done and what it would involve for 
you. The researcher will go through the information sheet with you and answer any 
questions you have. You can also ask questions by telephone and discuss the 
research with your care co-ordinator before you decide whether to meet with the 
researcher. Please take the time to read this information sheet carefully. Talk to 
others about the study if you wish. 
 
Part 1 tells you the purpose of this study and what will happen to you if you take part. 
 
Part 2 gives you more detailed information about the conduct of the study.  
 
Please ask me if there is anything that is not clear or if you would like more 
information. 
 
What is the purpose of the study? 
 
 I am carrying out the study for assessment as part of my doctorate in Clinical 
Psychology. 
 I am interested in people with and without experience of psychosis who feel 
anxious in social situations. 
 I am particularly interested in the thoughts, memories and previous 
experiences of people with social anxiety. 
 
Why have I been invited? 
 
I am recruiting participants who feel anxious in social situations and who have not 
experienced a psychotic illness. 
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Do I have to take part? 
 
It is up to you to decide to join the study. I will describe the study and go through this 
information sheet. If you agree to take part, I will then ask you to sign a consent 
form. You will be given a copy of this information sheet and the signed consent form 
to keep. You are free to withdraw at any time, without giving a reason. The research 
is not linked to your treatment. If you decide not to take part or you wish to withdraw 
from the study, it will not affect any current or future care you may receive from any 
health service. 
 
What will happen to me if I take part? 
 
If you choose to take part, I will arrange a meeting at a time that is convenient for 
you. The meeting will last for approximately 90 minutes. There will be an interview 
and some questionnaires. With your permission, I would like to audio record the 
interview so that I can write down later the things that we have said. You will be able 
to request a summary of the finished report. This will be completed by July 2012. 
You will not be required to be involved in the research process after the interview 
has taken place. 
 
When I have met with enough participants, I will analyse the questionnaires and the 
interviews to compare the responses of people with and without psychosis. I will then 
write this up as a thesis to be marked at the University of East Anglia. Your name will 
not be used in the thesis. 
 
What will I have to do? 
 
We will agree a time and a location for a meeting and I will ask you some questions 
about when you feel anxious in social situations. You will not be asked to talk about 
anything you do not wish to talk about. You will then be asked to complete some 
questionnaires. 
 
What are the possible risks and benefits of taking part? 
 
I cannot promise that you will benefit directly from the study, but your experiences 
may help improve understanding of social anxiety and could contribute to the 
development of psychological treatment to help people overcome social anxiety. The 
interview will involve questions about a topic that may cause you to think about 
things that have been difficult. If you feel uncomfortable or upset at any stage, the 
interview can be stopped and you can withdraw from the study if you wish. You do 
not have to give a reason for this. 
 
If you find the interview distressing, we will stop and can discuss this. If you think that 
you would benefit from discussing the issues raised with someone who is not linked 
to this research, then I would advise you to speak to the person you have contact 
with in the service that referred you into the study or your GP. If you wish, I can 
provide you and the professional working with you with a short report of the things 
we have talked about to help you think about what support you might need in the 
future. 
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What happens when the research study stops? 
 
Summary reports will be given to the NHS services involved in the research. 
Participants in the research will also have summaries if requested. You can have a 
copy of the summary report to keep if you wish. You will need to provide your contact 
details in order to receive this. You will not be required to do anything else, but you 
will be directed to sources of support if you need it. 
 
What happens if there is a problem? 
 
Any complaint about the way you have been dealt with during the study or any 
possible harm you might suffer will be addressed. The detailed information on this is 
given in Part 2. 
 
Will my taking part in the study be kept confidential? 
 
Yes. I will follow ethical and legal practice and all information about you will be 
handled in confidence as detailed above and in Part 2. 
 
If the information in Part 1 has interested you and you are considering 
participation, please read the additional information in Part 2 before making 
any decision. 
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Part 2 
 
What will happen if I don’t want to carry on with the study? 
 
You can choose to withdraw from the study at any point prior to the report being 
submitted for assessment in July 2012. If you choose to withdraw, your data will be 
destroyed and any information you have given me will not be used in the research. 
 
What if there is a problem? 
 
If you have a concern about any aspect of the study, you can contact me at 
sarah.cooke@uea.ac.uk, and I can arrange to telephone you. I will do my best to 
address your concerns. If you remain unhappy and wish to complain formally about 
the conduct of the research (the procedures carried out by the researcher), you can 
do this through the NHS complaints procedure. Details can be obtained from any 
NHS site.  
 
Will my taking part in this study be kept confidential? 
 
The recording of the interview will be stored as a password protected file on a secure 
hard drive on the University of East Anglia network and on a password protected 
memory stick during the research process. Following completion of the research, the 
recording and questionnaires will be stored securely for 5 years before being 
destroyed. They will be stored in a separate location from any documents that could 
identify you such as your consent form, which will be contained in a locked storage 
facility. The recording will be stored as a password protected file and on an 
encrypted memory stick. 
 
The only time that I would tell anyone about anything you have said without your 
permission is if I believe that you or someone you tell me about may be at risk.  
 
 
What will happen to the results of the research study? 
 
In the first instance, I will use the results to write a thesis. The thesis will be 
submitted to the University of East Anglia and summary reports will be given to the 
services involved in the research and any participants who have requested copies. 
Once it has been marked, the thesis will be kept in the borrowing library and 
available to be read by other Trainee Clinical Psychologists. It will also be publicly 
available to other people who want to read it. It is also possible that a version of the 
thesis will be submitted for publication by a scientific journal. You will not be 
identified in any version of the study’s results. 
 
Who is organising the research? 
 
I am organising the research with the support of the University of East Anglia. The 
university is the main sponsor of the study. No one is being paid to carry out this 
research. 
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Who has reviewed the study? 
 
All research in the NHS is looked at by an independent group of people, called a 
Research Ethics Committee, to protect your interests. This study has been reviewed 
and given a favourable opinion by the Norfolk Research Ethics Committee. The 
Research Ethics Committee has also received a scientific review of the research 
conducted by the University of East Anglia. 
 
Further information and contact details 
 
For general information about research, you may find the following website helpful: 
 
www.invo.org.uk 
 
For specific information about this research project or to raise any concerns, please 
email the researcher at sarah.cooke@uea.ac.uk.  
 
Alternatively, you may wish to contact the researcher’s supervisors who have 
responsibility for supervising the research: 
 
1. Professor David Fowler 
Psychology and Psychiatry Group 
Department of Psychological Science 
Norwich Medical School UEA 
University of East Anglia 
Norwich 
NR4 7TJ 
 
01603 59 3601 (tel) 
d.fowler@uea.ac.uk 
  
2. Dr Sian Coker 
Psychology and Psychiatry Group 
Department of Psychological Science 
Norwich Medical School UEA 
University of East Anglia 
Norwich 
NR4 7TJ 
 
01603 59 3544 (tel) 
s.coker@uea.ac.uk 
 
If you are unsure about whether to participate, I would be happy to arrange to telephone you 
or discuss the study in person. You may also wish to talk to healthcare staff or your friends 
and family.  
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Information about the Research 
 
An Investigation of the Nature of Social Anxiety in People with and without a 
Diagnosis of Psychosis. 
 
Primary Researcher: Sarah Cooke, Trainee Clinical Psychologist, University of East 
Anglia (UEA). 
Primary Supervisor: Dr Sian Coker, Clinical Psychologist and Research Tutor, UEA. 
Clinical Supervisor: Professor David Fowler, Professor of Psychiatry, UEA. 
Collaborator: Dr Ruth Turner, Clinical Psychologist, Central Norfolk Early 
Intervention Team (CNEIT). 
 
I would like to invite you to take part in a research study. Before you decide I would 
like you to understand why the research is being done and what it would involve for 
you. The researcher will go through the information sheet with you and answer any 
questions you have. You can also ask questions by telephone and discuss the 
research with your care co-ordinator before you decide whether to meet with the 
researcher. Please take the time to read this information sheet carefully. Talk to 
others about the study if you wish. 
 
Part 1 tells you the purpose of this study and what will happen to you if you take part. 
 
Part 2 gives you more detailed information about the conduct of the study.  
 
Please ask me if there is anything that is not clear or if you would like more 
information. 
 
What is the purpose of the study? 
 
 I am carrying out the study for assessment as part of my doctorate in Clinical 
Psychology. 
 I am interested in people with and without experience of psychosis who feel 
anxious in social situations. 
 I am particularly interested in the thoughts, memories and previous 
experiences of people with social anxiety. 
 
Why have I been invited? 
 
I am recruiting participants who feel anxious in social situations and who have not 
experienced a psychotic illness. 
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Do I have to take part? 
 
It is up to you to decide to join the study. I will describe the study and go through this 
information sheet. If you agree to take part, I will then ask you to sign a consent 
form. You will be given a copy of this information sheet and the signed consent form 
to keep. You are free to withdraw at any time, without giving a reason. If you decide 
not to take part or you wish to withdraw from the study, it will not affect any current or 
future care you may receive from any health service or any service at UEA. 
 
What will happen to me if I take part? 
 
If you choose to take part, I will arrange a meeting at a time that is convenient for 
you. The meeting will last for approximately 90 minutes. There will be an interview 
and some questionnaires. With your permission, I would like to audio record the 
interview so that I can write down later the things that we have said. You will be able 
to request a summary of the study findings. This will be completed by July 2012. You 
will not be required to be involved in the research process after the interview has 
taken place. 
 
When I have met with enough participants, I will analyse the questionnaires and the 
interviews to compare the responses of people with and without psychosis. I will then 
write this up as a thesis to be marked at the University of East Anglia. Your name will 
not be used in the thesis. 
 
What will I have to do? 
 
We will agree a time for a meeting in a private room at UEA and I will ask you some 
questions about when you feel anxious in social situations. You will not be asked to 
talk about anything you do not wish to talk about. You will then be asked to complete 
some questionnaires. 
 
What are the possible risks and benefits of taking part? 
 
I cannot promise that you will benefit directly from the study, but your experiences 
may help improve understanding of social anxiety and could contribute to the 
development of psychological treatment to help people overcome social anxiety. The 
interview will involve questions about a topic that may cause you to think about 
things that have been difficult. If you feel uncomfortable or upset at any stage, the 
interview can be stopped and you can withdraw from the study if you wish. You do 
not have to give a reason for this. 
 
If you find the interview distressing, we will stop and can discuss this. If you think that 
you would benefit from discussing the issues raised with someone who is not linked 
to this research, then I would advise you to speak to your GP or the university 
counselling service. Details of support available at UEA can be found at: 
http://www.uea.ac.uk/services/students/mental_health#beckie. If you wish, I can 
provide you with a summary of your questionnaire scores to help you think about 
what support you might need in the future. 
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What happens when the research study stops? 
 
Summary reports will be given to the NHS services involved in the research. 
Participants in the research will also have summaries if requested. You can have a 
copy of the summary report to keep if you wish. You will need to provide your contact 
details in order to receive this. You will not be required to do anything else, but you 
will be directed to sources of support if you need it. 
 
What happens if there is a problem? 
 
Any complaint about the way you have been dealt with during the study or any 
possible harm you might suffer will be addressed. The detailed information on this is 
given in Part 2. 
 
Will my taking part in the study be kept confidential? 
 
Yes. I will follow ethical and legal practice and all information about you will be 
handled in confidence as detailed above and in Part 2. 
 
If the information in Part 1 has interested you and you are considering 
participation, please read the additional information in Part 2 before making 
any decision. 
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Part 2 
 
What will happen if I don’t want to carry on with the study? 
 
You can choose to withdraw from the study at any point prior to the report being 
submitted for assessment in July 2012. If you choose to withdraw, your data will be 
destroyed and any information you have given me will not be used in the research. 
 
What if there is a problem? 
 
If you have a concern about any aspect of the study, you can contact me at 
sarah.cooke@uea.ac.uk, and I can arrange to telephone you. I will do my best to 
address your concerns. If you remain unhappy and wish to complain formally about 
the conduct of the research (the procedures carried out by the researcher), please 
contact Dr Sian Coker at the University of East Anglia in the first instance. Her 
contact details are at the end of this information sheet. 
 
Will my taking part in this study be kept confidential? 
 
The recording of the interview will be stored as a password protected file on a secure 
hard drive on the University of East Anglia network and on a password protected 
memory stick during the research process. Following completion of the research, the 
recording and questionnaires will be stored securely for 5 years before being 
destroyed. They will be stored in a separate location from any documents that could 
identify you such as your consent form, which will be contained in a locked storage 
facility. The recording will be stored as a password protected file and on an 
encrypted memory stick. 
 
The only time that I would tell anyone about anything you have said without your 
permission is if I believe that you or someone you tell me about may be at risk.  
 
 
What will happen to the results of the research study? 
 
In the first instance, I will use the results to write a thesis. The thesis will be 
submitted to the University of East Anglia and summary reports will be given to the 
services involved in the research and any participants who have requested copies. 
Once it has been marked, the thesis will be kept in the borrowing library and 
available to be read by other Trainee Clinical Psychologists. It will also be publicly 
available to other people who want to read it. It is also possible that a version of the 
thesis will be submitted for publication by a scientific journal. You will not be 
identified in any version of the study’s results. 
 
Who is organising the research? 
 
I am organising the research with the support of the University of East Anglia. The 
university is the main sponsor of the study. No one is being paid to carry out this 
research. 
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Who has reviewed the study? 
 
All research in the NHS is looked at by an independent group of people, called a 
Research Ethics Committee, to protect your interests. This study has been reviewed 
and given a favourable opinion by the Norfolk Research Ethics Committee. The 
Research Ethics Committee has also received a scientific review of the research 
conducted by the University of East Anglia. 
 
Further information and contact details 
 
For general information about research, you may find the following website helpful: 
 
www.invo.org.uk 
 
For specific information about this research project or to raise any concerns, please 
email the researcher at sarah.cooke@uea.ac.uk.  
 
Alternatively, you may wish to contact the researcher’s supervisor who has 
responsibility for supervising the research: 
 
1. Professor David Fowler 
Psychology and Psychiatry Group 
Department of Psychological Science 
Norwich Medical School UEA 
University of East Anglia 
Norwich 
NR4 7TJ 
 
01603 59 3601 (tel) 
d.fowler@uea.ac.uk 
  
2. Dr Sian Coker 
Psychology and Psychiatry Group 
Department of Psychological Science 
Norwich Medical School UEA 
University of East Anglia 
Norwich 
NR4 7TJ 
 
01603 59 3544 (tel) 
s.coker@uea.ac.uk 
 
If you are unsure about whether to participate, I would be happy to arrange to telephone you 
or discuss the study in person. You may also wish to talk to healthcare staff or your friends 
and family.  
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CONSENT FORM 
 
 
An Investigation of the Nature of Social Anxiety in People with and without a Diagnosis 
of Psychosis. 
 
Name of researcher: Sarah Cooke              Please initial box 
 
1. I confirm that I have read and understood the information sheet dated 
28/06/2011 (version 1.0) for the above study. I have had the opportunity to 
consider the information, ask questions and have had these answered 
satisfactorily. 
 
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at 
any point. I understand that I do not have to give a reason for my withdrawal 
and that my legal rights will not be affected. 
 
3. I consent to the audio recording of my interview and understand that this 
recording will be stored securely and destroyed once the research is complete. 
 
4. I understand that things I say during the interview may be quoted in published 
research. I consent to the use of quotations and understand that I will not be 
identifiable in any written reports. 
 
5. I understand that relevant sections of my medical notes and data collected 
during the study may be looked at by individuals from regulatory authorities or 
from the NHS Trust, where it is relevant to my taking part on this research. I 
give permission for these individuals to have access to my records. 
 
6. I agree to take part in the above study. 
 
 
 
----------------------  ---------------  --------------------------- 
Name     Date    Signature 
 
 
 
----------------------  ---------------  --------------------------- 
Researcher    Date    Signature 
 
 
When completed, 1 for participant, 1 for researcher 
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Information about the Research 
 
An Investigation of the Nature of Social Anxiety in People with and without a 
Diagnosis of Psychosis. 
 
Primary Researcher: Sarah Cooke, Trainee Clinical Psychologist, University of East 
Anglia (UEA). 
Primary Supervisor: Dr Sian Coker, Clinical Psychologist and Research Tutor, UEA. 
Clinical Supervisor: Professor David Fowler, Professor of Psychiatry, UEA. 
Collaborator: Dr Ruth Turner, Clinical Psychologist, Central Norfolk Early 
Intervention Team (CNEIT). 
 
I would like to invite you to take part in a research study. Before you decide I would 
like you to understand why the research is being done and what it would involve for 
you. The researcher will go through the information sheet with you and answer any 
questions you have. You can also ask questions by telephone and discuss the 
research with your care co-ordinator before you decide whether to meet with the 
researcher. Please take the time to read this information sheet carefully. Talk to 
others about the study if you wish. 
 
Part 1 tells you the purpose of this study and what will happen to you if you take part. 
 
Part 2 gives you more detailed information about the conduct of the study.  
 
Please ask me if there is anything that is not clear or if you would like more 
information. 
 
What is the purpose of the study? 
 
 I am carrying out the study for assessment as part of my doctorate in Clinical 
Psychology. 
 I am interested in people with and without experience of psychosis who feel 
anxious in social situations. 
 I am particularly interested in the thoughts, memories and previous 
experiences of people with social anxiety. 
 
Why have I been invited? 
 
Clients within the Early Intervention Services in Norfolk and Suffolk NHS Foundation 
Trust who experience social anxiety will be invited to take part. 
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Do I have to take part? 
 
It is up to you to decide to join the study. I will describe the study and go through this 
information sheet. If you agree to take part, I will then ask you to sign a consent 
form. You will be given a copy of this information sheet and the signed consent form 
to keep. You are free to withdraw at any time, without giving a reason. The research 
is not linked to your treatment. If you decide not to take part or you wish to withdraw 
from the study, it will not affect any current or future care you may receive from any 
health service. 
 
What will happen to me if I take part? 
 
If you choose to take part, I will arrange a meeting at a time that is convenient for 
you. The meeting will last for approximately 90 minutes. There will be an interview 
and some questionnaires. With your permission, I would like to audio record the 
interview so that I can write down later the things that we have said. You will be able 
to request a summary of the finished report. This will be completed by July 2012. 
You will not be required to be involved in the research process after the interview 
has taken place. 
 
When I have met with enough participants, I will analyse the questionnaires and the 
interviews to compare the responses of people with and without psychosis. I will then 
write this up as a thesis to be marked at the University of East Anglia. Your name will 
not be used in the thesis. 
 
What will I have to do? 
 
We will agree a time and a location for a meeting and I will ask you some questions 
about when you feel anxious in social situations. You will not be asked to talk about 
anything you do not wish to talk about. You will then be asked to complete some 
questionnaires. 
 
What are the possible risks and benefits of taking part? 
 
I cannot promise that you will benefit directly from the study, but your experiences 
may help improve understanding of social anxiety and could contribute to the 
development of psychological treatment to help people overcome social anxiety. The 
interview will involve questions about a topic that may cause you to think about 
things that have been difficult. If you feel uncomfortable or upset at any stage, the 
interview can be stopped and you can withdraw from the study if you wish. You do 
not have to give a reason for this. 
 
If you find the interview distressing, we will stop and can discuss this. If you think that 
you would benefit from discussing the issues raised with someone who is not linked 
to this research, then I would advise you to speak to your care co-ordinator. If you 
wish, I can provide you and your care co-ordinator with a short report of the things 
we have talked about to help you think about what support you might need in the 
future. 
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What happens when the research study stops? 
 
Summary reports will be given to the NHS services involved in the research. 
Participants in the research will also have summaries if requested. You can have a 
copy of the summary report to keep if you wish. You will need to provide your contact 
details in order to receive this. You will not be required to do anything else, but you 
will be directed to sources of support if you need it. 
 
What happens if there is a problem? 
 
Any complaint about the way you have been dealt with during the study or any 
possible harm you might suffer will be addressed. The detailed information on this is 
given in Part 2. 
 
Will my taking part in the study be kept confidential? 
 
Yes. I will follow ethical and legal practice and all information about you will be 
handled in confidence as detailed above and in Part 2. 
 
If the information in Part 1 has interested you and you are considering 
participation, please read the additional information in Part 2 before making 
any decision. 
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Part 2 
 
What will happen if I don’t want to carry on with the study? 
 
You can choose to withdraw from the study at any point prior to the report being 
submitted for assessment in July 2012. If you choose to withdraw, your data will be 
destroyed and any information you have given me will not be used in the research. 
 
What if there is a problem? 
 
If you have a concern about any aspect of the study, you can contact me at 
sarah.cooke@uea.ac.uk or through your care co-ordinator, and I can arrange to 
telephone you. I will do my best to address your concerns. If you remain unhappy 
and wish to complain formally about the conduct of the research (the procedures 
carried out by the researcher), you can do this through the NHS complaints 
procedure. Details can be obtained from the Early Intervention Service.  
 
Will my taking part in this study be kept confidential? 
 
The recording of the interview will be stored as a password protected file on a secure 
hard drive on the University of East Anglia network and on a password protected 
memory stick during the research process. Following completion of the research, the 
recording and questionnaires will be stored securely for 5 years before being 
destroyed. They will be stored in a separate location from any documents that could 
identify you such as your consent form, which will be contained in a locked storage 
facility. The recording will be stored as a password protected file and on an 
encrypted memory stick. 
 
The only time that I would tell anyone about anything you have said without your 
permission is if I believe that you or someone you tell me about may be at risk.  
 
What will happen to the results of the research study? 
 
In the first instance, I will use the results to write a thesis. The thesis will be 
submitted to the University of East Anglia and summary reports will be given to the 
services involved in the research and any participants who have requested copies. 
Once it has been marked, the thesis will be kept in the borrowing library and 
available to be read by other Trainee Clinical Psychologists. It will also be publicly 
available to other people who want to read it. It is also possible that a version of the 
thesis will be submitted for publication by a scientific journal. You will not be 
identified in any version of the study’s results. 
 
Who is organising the research? 
 
I am organising the research with the support of the University of East Anglia. The 
university is the main sponsor of the study. No one is being paid to carry out this 
research. 
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Who has reviewed the study? 
 
All research in the NHS is looked at by an independent group of people, called a 
Research Ethics Committee, to protect your interests. This study has been reviewed 
and given a favourable opinion by the Norfolk Research Ethics Committee. The 
Research Ethics Committee has also received a scientific review of the research 
conducted by the University of East Anglia. 
 
Further information and contact details 
 
For general information about research, you may find the following website helpful: 
 
www.invo.org.uk 
 
For specific information about this research project or to raise any concerns, please 
email the researcher at sarah.cooke@uea.ac.uk.  
 
Alternatively, you may wish to contact the researcher’s supervisor who has 
responsibility for supervising the research: 
 
1. Professor David Fowler 
Psychology and Psychiatry Group 
Department of Psychological Science 
Norwich Medical School UEA 
University of East Anglia 
Norwich 
NR4 7TJ 
 
01603 59 3601 (tel) 
d.fowler@uea.ac.uk 
  
2. Dr Sian Coker 
Psychology and Psychiatry Group 
Department of Psychological Science 
Norwich Medical School UEA 
University of East Anglia 
Norwich 
NR4 7TJ 
 
01603 59 3544 (tel) 
s.coker@uea.ac.uk 
 
If you are unsure about whether to participate, I would be happy to arrange to telephone you 
or discuss the study in person. You may also wish to talk to staff in the Early Intervention 
Service or your friends and family.  
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CONSENT FORM 
 
 
An Investigation of the Nature of Social Anxiety in People with and without a Diagnosis 
of Psychosis. 
 
Name of researcher: Sarah Cooke              Please initial box 
 
1. I confirm that I have read and understood the information sheet dated 
28/06/2011 (version 1.0) for the above study. I have had the opportunity to 
consider the information, ask questions and have had these answered 
satisfactorily. 
 
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at 
any point. I understand that I do not have to give a reason for my withdrawal 
and that my legal rights will not be affected. 
 
3. I consent to the audio recording of my interview and understand that this 
recording will be stored securely and destroyed once the research is complete. 
 
4. I understand that things I say during the interview may be quoted in published 
research. I consent to the use of quotations and understand that I will not be 
identifiable in any written reports. 
 
5. I understand that relevant sections of my medical notes and data collected 
during the study may be looked at by individuals from regulatory authorities or 
from the NHS Trust, where it is relevant to my taking part on this research. I 
give permission for these individuals to have access to my records. 
 
6. I agree to take part in the above study. 
 
 
 
----------------------  ---------------  --------------------------- 
Name     Date    Signature 
 
 
 
----------------------  ---------------  --------------------------- 
Researcher    Date    Signature 
 
 
When completed, 1 for participant, 1 for researcher 
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Chair: Maggie Wheeler 
Chief Executive: Aidan Thomas 
Trust Headquarters: Hellesdon Hospital, Drayton High Road, Norwich, NR6 5BE 
Tel: 01603 421421    Fax: 01603 421440    www.nsft.nhs.uk 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
An Investigation of the Nature of Social Anxiety in People with and without a 
Diagnosis of Psychosis 
 
Participant Report 
 
Primary Researcher: Sarah Cooke, Trainee Clinical Psychologist, University of East 
Anglia (UEA). 
Sarah.Cooke@uea.ac.uk 
 
NAME: XX 
REFERRED BY: XX  
DATE OF ENTRY INTO STUDY: XX 
 
X took part in the above study exploring social anxiety. The research involved 
questionnaires and an interview exploring thoughts, beliefs, memories and previous 
experiences related to feeling anxious in social situations. X consented to having the 
information from his participation in the study shared with the Suffolk Early 
Intervention Service. The following is a summary of that information. 
 
Screening Measure: Social Interaction Anxiety Scale (SIAS, Mattick & Clarke, 
1989) 
This questionnaire was used to establish whether potential participants met 
criteria for the study on the basis of their level of social anxiety. People with a 
diagnosis of social phobia have been found to score an average of around 35/80. X 
scored 59/80 on this measure, suggesting a significant level of social anxiety. He 
scored particularly highly on items related to making friends and finding things to talk 
about. 
 
Thoughts and Beliefs 
 
 The Brief Core Schema Scales (BCSS, Fowler et al., 2006). 
 This measure required X to indicate whether he holds a range of positive and 
negative beliefs about himself and about other people and how strongly he holds 
these beliefs. Compared to a non-clinical sample and to other respondents 
experiencing psychosis, X scored more highly on negative beliefs about himself and 
about other people and indicated fewer positive beliefs about himself and others. X’s 
responses suggest that he may have some difficulties both with his self-esteem and 
with trusting other people. This is not uncommon in people who feel anxious in social 
situations.  
 
  
 
 The Brief Fear of Negative Evaluations Scale (FNEB, Leary, 1983). 
 This questionnaire lists statements relating to the expectation that others will 
judge the respondent negatively and asks how characteristic the statements are of 
their thoughts. X scored 55/60 on this measure, which is higher than the range of the 
scores obtained by most non-clinical respondents but is in keeping with X’s reports 
of anxiety in social situations. Examples of the statements that X rated as most 
characteristic of him were: 
 
I worry about what other people will think of me even when I know it doesn’t 
make any difference. 
 
I often worry that I will say or do the wrong things. 
 
The Other as Shamer Scale (OAS, Goss, Gilbert, & Allan 1994). 
This is a measure of external shame and explores how frequently the 
respondent thinks other people make negative judgements about them. X scored 
61/72 on this measure, which is higher than the scores obtained by most other 
respondents. It is not uncommon for people who have experienced a first episode of 
psychosis to feel stigmatised or negatively judged by others, and research suggests 
that this may contribute to social anxiety. 
The items that X rated as feeling or experiencing most often included: 
 
I feel other people see me as not good enough 
 
Other people see me as somehow defective as a person 
 
Other people think I have lost control over my body and feelings 
 
Green et al. Paranoid Thoughts Scale (GPTS, 2008). 
This measure asks respondents to rate how much specific thoughts have 
applied to them over the past month. It is not only relevant to clinical levels of 
paranoia – these thoughts have been found to be present on a continuum within the 
normal population and the research aims to capture the full range of thoughts that 
participants may have about other people. The first subscale (social reference) 
relates to concerns over the actions or communications of other people and whether 
the respondent thinks they have personal significance for them. X scored 43/80 on 
this subscale. This is higher than the scores obtained by most non-clinical 
respondents but similar to the scores obtained by people who are distressed by 
thoughts about the meaning of other people’s actions. X rated the following ideas of 
social reference the most highly in relation to the previous month: 
 
I have often heard people referring to me 
 
I was certain that people have followed me 
 
The second subscale (persecutory) relates to beliefs that other people intend 
or have intended to harm the respondent. X scored 40/80 on this subscale, which is 
higher than the range of scores obtained by most non-clinical respondents but lower 
than the average score obtained by people assessed as having a persecutory 
  
 
delusion. The following persecutory thoughts are examples of items that X rated as 4 
on a 5-point scale: 
 
People have intended me harm 
 
I was convinced there was a conspiracy against me 
 
I was sure someone wanted to hurt me 
 
 
Psychological Symptoms 
 
Brief Symptom Inventory (BSI, Derogatis, 1975). 
This measure asks the respondent to rate how much a range of possible 
problems or symptoms have bothered them over the past week. It is not a diagnostic 
tool. X’s scores on the different symptom areas were compared to those of other 
male inpatients. He scored most highly on the psychoticism subscale, which includes 
items such as ‘The idea that you are being punished for your sins’ and having ‘The 
idea that someone else can control your thoughts’. This is in keeping with the 
difficulties that X is receiving support around and his symptoms seemed to be 
becoming less distressing as a result of his time in hospital. X’s scores on the other 
symptom areas were within the same range as those obtained by other male 
inpatients who may also be experiencing difficulties in certain areas.  
 
Semi-structured interview (Hackmann, Clark, & McManus, 2000; 
Hackmann, Surawy, & Clark, 1998). 
In the interview, X was asked whether he experiences images when socially 
anxious and whether these are related to a memory. Details of images and 
memories were explored. X found it difficult to give examples of specific situations 
that make him feel anxious but reported that anything involving going outside is 
difficult for him. He was able to use a walk with other residents from the ward as an 
example during the interview. 
During his walk, X described experiencing an image of himself looking 
‘nervous and vulnerable’. He reported experiencing similar images in other anxiety-
provoking situations. He sees this image as if he was looking at himself through 
someone else’s eyes, and he felt smaller than usual when he experienced the 
image. X associated the image with some difficult feelings and he reported having 
experienced these feelings in social situations since childhood. However, there was 
not a particular memory that seemed to be closely linked to the image he described.  
 
In summary, my session with X indicated that social situations are an ongoing 
difficulty for him and that he can feel quite worried about the actions or intentions of 
other people. X experiences a range of negative thoughts related to himself and 
others, and this is common in people who experience difficulties in social situations. 
X was positive that he would soon be discharged from hospital and thought that he 
might be interested in engaging in therapy to help him feel less anxious in social 
situations in the future (SARC research trial).  
Although I have been able to give an indication of how X’s scores compare 
with those of other people, this is not intended as a diagnostic assessment. Should 
  
 
you have any further questions about the research, then please do not hesitate to 
contact me at sarah.cooke@uea.ac.uk. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sarah Cooke  
Trainee Clinical Psychologist 
Supervised by Dr Ruth Turner 
 
Appendix O 
Normality Tables 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test Statistic (K-S) and Significance Level (p) with 
Degrees of Freedom (df) of Continuous Variables for the Social Anxiety and 
Psychosis (SAp) and Social Anxiety (SA) Groups  
Variable Group K-S df p 
OAS SAp .09 30 .20 
 SA .07 35 .20 
BSI depression t-score SAp .19 30 .01* 
 SA .12 35 .20 
BFNE SAp .12 30 .20 
 SA .12 35 .20 
BCSS negative self SAp .80 30 .20 
 SA .17 35 .01* 
BCSS negative other SAp .11 30 .20 
 SA .18 35 .01* 
GPTS total score SAp 
SA 
.10 
.09 
30 
35 
.20 
.20 
SRS-PTSD total 
symptoms 
SAp 
SA 
.14 
.16 
30 
35 
.20 
.20 
Note. OAS = Other as Shamer Scale (Goss, Gilbert, & Allan, 1994), BSI =Brief Symptom 
Inventory (Derogatis, 1975), BFNE = The Brief Fear of Negative Evaluations Scale (Leary, 
1983b), BCSS = Brief Core Schema Scales (Fowler et al., 2006), GPTS = Green et al. 
Paranoid Thoughts Scale (Green et al., 2008), SRS-PTSD = Self-Rating Scale for PTSD 
(Carlier, Lamberts, Van Uchelen, & Gersons, 1998). 
*p < .05. 
 
Appendix P 
Histograms Showing Data Distribution of Skewed Variables 
Negative Self Scores: SA Group 
 
Negative Other Scores: SA Group 
 
  
BSI Depression T-Scores: SAp Group 
 
Appendix Q 
Normality Tables 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test Statistic (K-S) and Significance Level (p) with 
Degrees of Freedom (df) of Transformed Variables  
Variable Group K-S df p 
BCSS negative self: SAp .16 30 .05* 
square root 
transformation 
 
SA .10 35 .20 
BCSS negative other: SAp .10 30 .20 
square root 
transformation 
 
SA .13 35 .12 
BSI depression t-
scores: 
rereflected log 
transformation 
 
SAp 
SA 
.23 
.22 
30 
35 
.00* 
.00* 
BSI depression t-
scores: 
rereflected inverse 
transformation 
SAp 
SA 
.29 
.37 
30 
35 
.00* 
.00* 
Note. SAp = Social anxiety and psychosis group, SA = social anxiety and no psychosis 
group. 
BCSS = Brief Core Schema Scales (Fowler et al., 2006), BSI =Brief Symptom Inventory 
(Derogatis, 1975. 
*p < .05. 
 
Histograms Showing Data Distribution of Transformed Variables 
Negative Self Scores: Square Root Transformed (SAp Group) 
 
Negative Self Scores: Square Root Transformed (SA Group) 
 
  
Negative Other Scores: Square Root Transformed (SAp Group) 
 
 
 
Negative Other Scores: Square Root Transformed (SA Group) 
 
  
BSI Depression T-Scores: Rereflected Log Transformation (SAp Group) 
 
 
 
 
BSI Depression T-Scores: Rereflected Log Transformation (SA Group) 
 
 
  
BSI Depression T-Scores: Rereflected Inverse Transformation (SAp Group) 
 
 
 
 
BSI Depression T-Scores: Rereflected Inverse Transformation (SA Group) 
 
 
 
 
Appendix R 
Hypothesis 5 Normality Tables 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test Statistic (K-S) and Significance Level (p) with 
Degrees of Freedom (df) of Continuous Variables for Participants with Social 
Anxiety and Paranoia (SAPA) and Participants with Social Anxiety and No 
Paranoia (SAn) 
Variable Group K-S df p 
OAS SAPA .09 40 .20 
 SAn .14 25 .20 
BSI depression t-
score 
SAPA .22 40 .00* 
 SAn .13 25 .20 
BFNE SAPA .13 40 .07 
 SAn .12 25 .20 
BCSS negative self SAPA .08 40 .20 
 SAn .21 25 .01* 
BCSS negative other SAPA .15 40 .02* 
 SAn .15 25       .15 
SRS-PTSD total 
symptoms 
SAPA 
SAn 
.18 
.13 
40 
25 
      .13 
.20 
Note. OAS = Other as Shamer Scale (Goss, Gilbert, & Allan, 1994), BSI =Brief Symptom 
Inventory (Derogatis, 1975), BFNE = The Brief Fear of Negative Evaluations Scale (Leary, 
1983b), BCSS = Brief Core Schema Scales (Fowler et al., 2006), SRS-PTSD = Self-Rating 
Scale for PTSD (Carlier, Lamberts, Van Uchelen, & Gersons, 1998). 
*p < .05. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Histograms for Hypothesis 5 Showing Data Distribution of Skewed and 
Transformed Variables 
BSI Depression T-Scores: SAPA Group 
 
 
BCSS Negative Self Scores: SAn Group 
 
Square Root Transformed BCSS Negative Self Scores: SAn Group 
 
  
 
BCSS Negative Other Scores: SAPA Group 
 
 
 
 
 
Square Root Transformed BCSS Negative Other Scores: SAPA Group 
 
 
Appendix S 
Subsidiary Analyses Normality Tables 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test Statistic (K-S) and Significance Level (p) with 
Degrees of Freedom (df) of Continuous Variables for Participants with 
Paranoia and Psychosis (PAp) and Participants with Paranoia and no 
Psychosis (PA) 
Variable Group K-S df p 
OAS PAp .09 21 .20 
 PA .11 19 .20 
BFNE PAp .14 21 .20 
 PA .13 19 .20 
BCSS negative self PAp .11 21 .20 
 PA .10 19 .20 
BCSS negative other PAp .14 21 .20 
 PA .20 19        .05* 
Note. OAS = Other as Shamer Scale (Goss, Gilbert, & Allan, 1994), BFNE = The Brief Fear 
of Negative Evaluations Scale (Leary, 1983b), BCSS = Brief Core Schema Scales (Fowler et 
al., 2006). 
*p < .05. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Histograms for Subsidiary Analyses Showing Data Distribution of Skewed 
and Transformed Variables 
BCSS Negative Other Scores: PA Group 
 
Square Root Transformed BCSS Negative Other Scores: PA Group 
  
 
Appendix T  
 
 
DECLARATION OF THE END OF A STUDY 
(For all studies except clinical trials of investigational medicinal products) 
 
To be completed in typescript by the Chief Investigator and submitted to the Research 
Ethics Committee that gave a favourable opinion of the research (“the main REC”) within 90 
days of the conclusion of the study or within 15 days of early termination.  For questions with 
Yes/No options please indicate answer in bold type. 
 
1. Details of Chief Investigator 
 
Name: Sarah Cooke 
Address: 
 
Postgraduate Research Programmes Office 
Faculty of Medicine and Health Sciences 
Elizabeth Fry Building 
Room 2.30 
University of East Anglia 
Norwich 
Norfolk 
NR4 7TJ  
Telephone: (01603) 593076 
Email: sarah.cooke@uea.ac.uk 
Fax:  
 
2. Details of study 
 
Full title of study: 
 
 
 
The role of shame, schemas, cognitions and 
memories in social anxiety following psychosis: A 
comparison with social anxiety without psychosis. 
Research sponsor: 
 
University of East Anglia 
Name of main REC: 
 
Norfolk Research Ethics Committee 
Main REC reference number: 
 
11/EE/0332 
 
3. Study duration 
 
Date study commenced: 
 
10/10/11 
Date study ended: 
 
19/04/12 (data collection) 01/06/12 (write-up) 
Did this study terminate prematurely? 
 
Yes / No 
If yes please complete sections 4, 5 & 6, if no please go 
direct to section 7. 
 
 Declaration of end of study (non-CTIMP), version 1.0, October 2004  
4. Circumstances of early termination 
 
What is the justification for this early 
termination? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5. Temporary halt 
 
Is this a temporary halt to the study? Yes / No 
If yes, what is the justification for 
temporarily halting the study? When 
do you expect the study to re-start? 
 
 
 
 
e.g. Safety, difficulties recruiting participants, trial has 
not commenced, other reasons. 
 
 
 
 
6. Potential implications for research participants 
 
Are there any potential implications 
for research participants as a result 
of terminating/halting the study 
prematurely? Please describe the 
steps taken to address them. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7. Final report on the research 
 
Is a summary of the final report on 
the research enclosed with this form? 
 
Yes / No 
 
If no, please forward within 12 months of the end of the study. 
 
8. Declaration 
 
Signature of Chief Investigator:  
Print name: 
Sarah Cooke 
Date of submission: 
19/06/12 
 
Appendix U: Final Report for Ethics Committee 
 
 
The Role of Shame, Schemas, Cognitions and Memories in Social Anxiety 
Following Psychosis: A Comparison with Social Anxiety without Psychosis: 
Summary of Final Report (Thesis) 
The study achieved its aim of exploring social anxiety (SA) in psychosis 
through comparison with SA in participants without a diagnosis of psychosis. 
Recruitment fell short of the numbers required based on a sample size calculation 
(45 in each group). However, 30 participants with SA and psychosis (SAp group) and 
35 participants with SA and no history of psychosis (SA group) were recruited. 
Participants completed self-report measures of social anxiety, shame, fear of 
negative evaluation, beliefs about self and others, paranoia and depression. They 
also took part in a semi-structured interview exploring any images experienced when 
socially anxious and whether these images were related to a specific memory. 
Participants who reported a memory completed a self-report measure of PTSD 
symptoms in relation to the event in that memory.   
Overview of findings 
Shame. 
Participants in the SAp group had significantly higher scores on a measure of 
shame than participants in the SA group, suggesting that SA in psychosis is 
associated with the perception of being seen by others as inadequate or inferior. It 
may also suggest that participants with psychosis experienced stigma. However, the 
association between psychosis and shame did not remain significant when 
depression was controlled for in the analysis.  
Cognitions and schemas. 
There was no significant difference between the groups on a measure of fear 
of negative evaluation (a commonly used measure of socially anxious cognitions). 
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This suggests that participants with and without psychosis did not differ in their level 
of endorsement of negative cognitions related to social situations. 
Participants in the SAp group had significantly higher scores than participants 
in the SA group on a measure of negative self schemas, suggesting that participants 
with psychosis had a higher level of negative beliefs about themselves. However, 
this difference did not remain significant when depression was entered into the 
analysis. 
There was no significant difference between the groups in negative other 
schemas, suggesting that negative beliefs about other people are not more extreme 
in socially anxious participants with psychosis compared to socially anxious 
participants without psychosis. 
Memories.  
Fewer participants than expected reported a specific memory linked to an 
image experienced when socially anxious. This limited the statistical analyses of this 
data. However, participants with psychosis were more likely to report a specific 
memory, indicating that images experienced when socially anxious may be more 
highly associated with memories of specific past events for these participants. Based 
on the descriptive data, there was no support for the hypothesis that participants with 
psychosis would report more memories focused on a threatening other or others. 
PTSD symptoms. 
Only participants who reported a memory in the semi-structured interview 
completed the measure of PTSD symptoms, limiting the amount of data available for 
analysis. Based on this small sample, there was no significant difference between 
the groups in the number of participants meeting diagnostic criteria for PTSD. 
However, participants with psychosis reported a significantly higher number of 
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individual PTSD symptoms. This suggests that the images experienced by socially 
anxious participants with psychosis are more likely to be related to memories 
associated with trauma symptoms than the images experienced by socially anxious 
participants without psychosis. However, this difference did not remain significant 
when depression was entered into the analysis.   
 
When considering the effect of controlling for depression on the analyses, it 
could be suggested that the findings indicate that it is higher levels of depression in 
participants with psychosis that cause higher levels of shame, negative self-schemas 
and PTSD symptoms. However, shame, depression, PTSD and SA have all been 
found to be prevalent following a diagnosis of psychosis, and may be considered as 
overlapping reactions to the experience or diagnosis (e.g., Birchwood, 2003; 
Birchwood et al., 2006).  
Paranoia. 
Participants in the SAp group had significantly higher scores on a measure of 
paranoia than participants in the SA group, suggesting that participants with 
psychosis experienced higher levels of paranoid beliefs. However, participants in 
both groups had a mean score more than 1 standard deviation above that of a non-
clinical reference group (Green et al., 2008), and over 50% of participants without 
psychosis scored above the clinical cut-off for paranoia.  
In order to explore the role of paranoia further, additional analyses were 
conducted to compare participants (regardless of whether they had psychosis) with 
and without clinical levels of paranoia on factors associated with SA. Participants 
with clinical levels of paranoia had significantly higher scores on measures of shame, 
negative self schemas and negative other schemas. Descriptive data suggest that 
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they were also more likely to report memories focused on a threatening other/others 
(rather than on own performance). Participants with paranoia also reported a 
significantly greater number of PTSD symptoms in relation to memories elicited by 
the interview. There was no significant difference between the groups in fear of 
negative evaluation scores. Effect sizes suggest that the differences between 
participants with and without paranoia were greater than the differences between 
participants with and without psychosis. 
Additional findings. 
Subsidiary analyses indicated that, despite the effect of depression on the 
analyses of shame, negative self schemas and PTSD symptoms in the SAp and SA 
groups, there was no significant difference in level of depression in participants with 
and without psychosis. However, participants with clinical levels of paranoia had 
significantly higher levels of depression than participants without paranoia. This 
suggests that SA comorbid with paranoia is associated with high levels of 
depression. 
When participants scoring above the clinical cut-off for paranoia were split into 
those with and without psychosis, there were no significant differences on measures 
of shame, fear of negative evaluation, or negative self and other schemas. This 
suggests that paranoia rather than psychosis may be a more clinically useful 
distinction between types of SA.  
Service Implications  
The findings of this study suggest that there may be two pathways to SA. 
These are shown in Figure 1.  
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Figure 1 
 
Pathways to Social Anxiety 
 
 
 
  
(Early) experiences 
Pre-disposition to anxiety 
Embarrassment; 
Negative social 
experiences 
Fear of negative evaluation; 
context specific negative beliefs:- 
self as socially incompetent; 
others – high standards, critical. 
Perceived threat = failure to 
meet perceived standard 
Social 
withdrawal 
Social anxiety 
Interpersonal trauma; 
Threat 
Extreme global negative 
beliefs: - self as ‘bad’/ 
‘inadequate’; others as 
‘dangerous’/ ‘bad’/ ‘superior’. 
 
Perceived threat = 
victimisation, harm, 
catastrophic loss of role/status 
Social 
withdrawal 
Paranoia 
Search for meaning: 
Shame-based appraisal 
Depression SA Trauma 
symptoms 
Stigma 
     internalised 
Appendix U: Final Report for Ethics Committee 
 
 
SA comorbid with paranoia is suggested to result from experiences of 
interpersonal trauma and threat, whereas ‘typical’ SA may relate to experiences of 
embarrassment and negative social interactions. These latter experiences are less 
likely to be associated with trauma symptoms but may lead to the development of 
context specific negative beliefs that are activated in social situations. The negative 
self and other beliefs that develop as a result of traumatic experiences are 
hypothesised to be more extreme and global. Individuals who hold such beliefs are 
more likely to internalise stigma and develop shame-based appraisals of their 
experiences, contributing to emotional dysfunction in the form of overlapping 
symptoms of depression, SA and trauma.  
Although the findings of the current study suggest that paranoid SA is more 
common in individuals with psychosis, this was not a clear distinction. As such, a 
conceptualisation of SA based on paranoia may have clinical implications for 
individuals with and without psychosis. Whilst paranoid beliefs may be routinely 
assessed in working with clients with psychosis, they may be missed in formulating 
SA as a primary diagnosis. This may be particularly the case where clients are 
reluctant to disclose paranoid ideation as a result of their appraisal of their beliefs 
and awareness of likely societal reactions.  
 The assessment of paranoia, trauma and shame will require the development 
of a strong therapeutic relationship. The establishment of such a relationship is also 
imperative prior to any intervention aimed at challenging beliefs associated with 
paranoia, shame, and schemas arising from interpersonal trauma. The early stages 
of therapy may necessitate the expression of openness to the client’s perspective 
and validation of distress rather than direct challenge of paranoid beliefs (Fowler et 
al., 1995). Drawing on methods adopted in CBT for psychosis may prove useful 
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regardless of diagnosis where SA is part of emotional dysfunction associated with 
paranoia. However, current service models for treating anxiety disorders may 
warrant adapting to allow for longer periods of treatment and more flexible ways of 
working. 
 Thorough assessment of paranoid SA may also reveal symptoms of PTSD 
and traumatic memories underpinning negative images experienced when socially 
anxious. In some cases PTSD may need to be treated before SA can be addressed.  
 The current findings suggest that some individuals with psychosis present 
with SA that is concordant with cognitive models (Clark & Wells, 1995; Rapee & 
Heimberg, 1997). Therefore, it should not be automatically assumed that existing 
CBT interventions for SA are inappropriate. Preliminary findings suggest that an 
assisted self-help intervention guided by a formulation based on the Clark and Wells 
(1995) model of SA is effective in reducing SIAS scores of socially anxious 
participants in an EI service (Turner, White, Lower, Gega, & Fowler, 2011). Although 
the mean pre and post intervention scores suggest that many participants continue 
to have clinical levels of SA, a mean reduction of 16.75 points on the SIAS is likely to 
have a significant impact on quality of life. Where SA is part of general emotional 
dysfunction, as conceptualised in the paranoia and shame based pathway, the 
behavioural components of CBT for SA may increase hope and break cycles of 
inactivity associated with depression. Ongoing assessment and developing a 
longitudinal formulation may help to identify individuals who require additional or 
more sophisticated interventions. A cognitive behavioural approach combining 
components of CBT for SA with additional interventions targeting social disability in 
more complex early psychosis cases is currently being trialled in EI services. The 
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findings of such studies may help inform interventions in other mental health 
settings.  
Plans for Dissemination 
A summary of the results of the research has been disseminated to the 
clinical teams involved in recruitment into the study. Participants who requested 
feedback on the study findings have been sent an appropriate summary. The thesis 
has been submitted for assessment to the Doctoral programme in Clinical 
Psychology at the University of East Anglia. Following feedback from the examiners 
and the application of any required corrections, the final thesis will be a publically 
accessible document available through the University. The researcher will be 
presenting the results of the study at the Annual Conference of the British 
Association of Behavioural and Cognitive Psychotherapies (BABCP) on 28th June 
2012. There are plans to submit an article for publication in a scientific journal in the 
coming months. 
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